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Abstract 
States are increasingly asserting jurisdiction over criminal offences that occur extraterritorially. To 
some extent, this is a response to transnational criminal activity. The assertion of jurisdiction by 
States outside their territory, however, has been a source of continuing controversy and legal 
uncertainty.  This is because the principles of jurisdiction under international law do not adequately 
resolve competing claims to jurisdiction and are primarily concerned with the relationship between 
States and not as between the State and the individual. In that context, this thesis considers 
principles of jurisdiction and mechanisms by which to achieve jurisdictional restraint under 
international law. In so doing, the means by which assertions of extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction 
are regulated in Australia, India and the United States are assessed. A chosen conception of the rule 
of law is used to provide the criteria by which to measure such regulation. The criteria drawn from 
the chosen conception of the rule of law is that it requires: 1) that the law must be both readily 
known and available, and certain and clear; 2) that the law should be applied to all people equally, 
and operate uniformly in circumstances which are not materially different; and 3) that there must be 
some capacity for judicial review of executive action. This thesis measures the regulation of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction by Australia, India and the United States against these three criteria. In 
so doing, the relationship between municipal law and international law in each jurisdiction is 
considered, as is the potential utility of the ‗abuse of rights‘ doctrine as a regulator of extraterritorial 
criminal jurisdiction. The thesis then presents three tiers of conclusions. The first tier relates to the 
regulation of extraterritorial jurisdiction by Australia, India and United States, respectively. The 
second tier is concerned with conclusions as to the regulation of extraterritorial jurisdiction in 
common-law jurisdictions. The third tier identifies contributions this thesis makes to the broader 
dialogue on extraterritorial jurisdiction. Ultimately, this thesis argues that exercises of 
extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction can be useful in seeking to achieve some ends, such as the 
regulation of transnational crimes. There must, however, be some accountability in 
extraterritoriality. Principles of jurisdiction under both international and municipal law are generally 
permissive. Therefore, the means by which jurisdiction is exercised must be better regulated and 
domestic courts need tools with which to so. This thesis suggests that the abuse of rights doctrine 
may be a useful tool in such regulation and if so, could result in the emergence of a specialist abuse 
of jurisdictional rights doctrine.   
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1. Topic 
States are increasingly asserting jurisdiction over criminal offences that occur extraterritorially. To 
some extent, this is a response to transnational criminal activity. However, the assertion of 
jurisdiction by States outside their territory has been a source of continuing controversy and legal 
uncertainty.  This is because the principles of jurisdiction under international law do not adequately 
resolve competing claims to jurisdiction and are primarily concerned with the relationship between 
16 
 
States and not as between the State and the individual. In that context, this thesis considers 
principles of jurisdiction and jurisdictional restraint under international law and the means by which 
assertions of extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction are regulated in Australia, India and the United 
States. It adopts a conception of the rule of law that provide criteria by which to measure such 
regulation and proceeds on the assumption that, at a bare minimum, the chosen conception of the 
rule of law requires: 1) that the law must be both readily known and available, and certain and clear; 
2) that the law should be applied to all people equally, and operate uniformly in circumstances 
which are not materially different; and 3) that there must be some capacity for judicial review of 
executive action. This thesis then assesses the regulation of extraterritorial jurisdiction by Australia, 
India and the United States against these three criteria. In so doing, the relationship between 
municipal law and international law in each jurisdiction is considered, as is the potential utility of 
the ‗abuse of rights‘ doctrine as a regulator of extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction.  
 
2. Background 
Since the emergence of the sovereign nation State, jurisdiction has generally been understood by 
reference to geographical borders. Assertions by States of jurisdiction over crimes occurring outside 
their territory, such as piracy or treason, occurred as an exception to the rule. This is particularly the 
case in common law jurisdictions.
1
 The late twentieth and early twenty-first century saw an increase 
in transnational organised crime. States became interested in criminal activity occurring in other 
parts of the world, either because of the unwillingness or inability of another State to prosecute 
serious crime, or because it served some sort of domestic or foreign policy agenda. In response, the 
international community developed treaties that either called for, or permitted, extraterritorial 
application of some types of domestic criminal offences.   
 
For example, the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) and the Optional Protocol on 
the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography together require State Parties to 
criminalise child prostitution whether or not the acts occur domestically or transnationally.
2
 All 
countries of the world but two are party to the CRC, making it one of the most universally ratified 
of all United Nations Conventions.
3
 Other examples include international anti-corruption 
frameworks. The major international treaties on anti-corruption all either require or permit a degree 
                                               
1
 Assertions of extraterritoriality in the common law world tend to be ad hoc. By contrast, criminal codes in European 
jurisdictions such as Switzerland, France, Spain and Belgium often have a generic extraterritorial reach over nationals. 
This is discussed in further detail in Chapter 2. 
2
 Optional Protocol To the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child 
Pornography, UNGA A/RES/54/263, Art 1,3. 
3
 Fiona David, ‗Child Sex Tourism‘ (Australian Institute of Criminology No 156, Trends and Issues in Crime and 
Criminal Justice, 2000).  
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of extraterritorial jurisdiction.
4
 Treaties relating to terrorism and torture also permit some assertions 
of extraterritorial jurisdiction.
5
 Consequently, more States now have domestic offences with 
extraterritorial reach. As noted by the International Court of Justice in 2000: 
a gradual movement towards bases of jurisdiction other than territoriality can be discerned. This slow 
but steady shifting to a more extensive application of extraterritorial jurisdiction by States ... has led 
to ... the recognition of other, non-territorially based grounds of national jurisdiction.
6
  
 
2.1. Introducing Jurisdiction under International Law 
Under customary international law, States generally derive authority to exercise jurisdiction from 
three main principles: territoriality, nationality and universality.
7
 The territoriality principle may be 
invoked where conduct either takes place within a nation‘s borders (subjective territoriality), or the 
effects of the conduct are felt within the borders (objective territoriality).
8
 While subjective 
territoriality is rarely controversial because of the long history of States having jurisdiction over 
their geographic territory, objective territoriality is more complicated. This is because it will often 
involve competing claims for jurisdiction.
9
  Although parts of the conduct will have taken place in 
one territory, it will have been consummated in another.   
 
The nationality principle can provide a basis for jurisdiction where a State‘s citizen is either a 
victim (passive nationality) or a perpetrator (active nationality).
10
 This principle raises questions as 
to who is to be considered a ‗national‘, given that traditional models of citizenship and nationality 
have been altered by globalisation in the sense that individuals are more mobile, and can live and 
                                               
4
  See for example, Convention on Combating the Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business 
Transactions, OECD (21 November 1997); United Nations Convention Against Corruption, UNCAC, UNTS No 2349 
(31 October 2003); Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, opened for signature 29 March 1996, Organization 
of American States (entered into force 6 March 1997)); Criminal Law Convention on Corruption and Additional 
Protocol, opened for signature 27 January 1999, UNTS No 2216, ETS No 173 (entered into force 1 July 2002)). 
5
 See International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, UNTS No 2149 adopted by the UNGA on 15 
December 1997, art 6; International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, UNTS No 2178 
adopted by the UNGA on 9 December 1999, art 7(1); Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, UNTS No 1465 adopted by the UNGA on 10 December 1984, Art 5. 
6
 Joint separate opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal in Democratic Republic of the Congo v Belgium 
(Arrest Warrant) [2002] ICJ Rep 3, 73.  
7
 See generally, Cedric Ryngaert, Jurisdiction in International Law (Oxford University Press, 2008); Gillian D. Triggs, 
International Law: Contemporary Principles and Practices (LexisNexis Butterworths, 2
nd
 ed, 2006) 345; Jennifer A. 
Zerk, ‗Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: Lessons for the Business and Human Rights Sphere from Six Regulatory Areas‘ 
(Working Paper No 59, Harvard Corporate Social Responsibility Initiative, 2010); and Alejandro Chehtman, The 
Philosophical Foundations of Extraterritorial Punishment (Oxford University Press, 2010). 
8
 Ibid.  
9
 David Gerber, ‗Beyond Balancing: International Law Restraints on the Reach of National Laws‘ (1984) 10 Yale 
Journal of International Law 185, 185. 
10
 Ibid.  
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work in different parts of the world.
11
 International law is generally neutral to a grant of nationality, 
provided the granting State does not breach certain international obligations, such as those under the 
Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness.
12
 This means that determination as to who is a 
‗national‘ for the purpose of the nationality principle is a matter largely left to individual States.  
 
The existence and use of the passive nationality principle is particularly controversial.  Of all the 
grounds of extraterritorial jurisdiction discussed in this thesis, it is the only one not included in the 
Harvard Research Draft Convention on Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime.
13
 As a ground of 
criminal jurisdiction, it has been described as the ‘most contested in contemporary international 
law.‘14 However, in a joint judgment of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 2002, three 
Judges noted that the passive personality principle, ‗for so long regarded as controversial, is now 
reflected … in the legislation of various countries … and today meets with relatively little 
opposition, at least so far as a particular category of offences is concerned‘.15 
 
The universality principle is reserved for conduct considered to be an international crime, such as 
piracy, genocide and crimes against humanity.
16
 Unlike other grounds of extraterritorial jurisdiction, 
which demand some connection with the regulating State (such as the nationality of the perpetrator 
or the victim), this principle provides every State with a basis to prosecute certain international 
crimes. For example, international law grants every State the authority to assert jurisdiction over 
piracy and slave trading because these crimes are ‗prototypal offences that ... have long been 
considered the enemies of humanity‘.17 
 
International law also recognises a ‗protective principle‘, which permits a State to assert jurisdiction 
over foreign conduct which threatens national security,
18
 and an ‗effects principle‘, which supports 
jurisdictional claims over extraterritorial conduct if the effects are felt within a territory.
19
 The 
protective principle is used to prosecute offences relating to counterfeiting currency, desecration of 
                                               
11
 See, for example: Kim Rubenstein, ‗Citizenship in an Age of Globalisation: The Cosmopolitan Citizen?‘ (2007) 25(1) 
Law in Context 88. 
12
 Triggs, above n 7. 
13
 ‗Draft Convention on Jurisdiction with respect to Crime‘ (1935) 29 American Journal of International Law 
Supplement435, 437. 
14
 Chehtman, above n 7, 67. 
15
 Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium), International 
Court of Justice (ICJ), 14 February 2002, ICJ Reports 2002,  77-78,  [47].  
16
 Chehtman, above n 7, 67.  
17
 Kenneth Randall, ‗Universal Jurisdiction Under International Law‘ (1988) 66 Texas Law Review 785, 788,  
18
 See Triggs, above n 7, 356-7; Zerk, above n 7, 19; and generally Monika B Krizek, ‗The Protective Principle of 
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: A Brief History and an Application of the Principle to Espionage as an Illustration of 
Current United States Practice‘ (1988) 6 Boston University International Law Journal 337. 
19
 For example, see Austen Parrish, ‗The Effects Test: Extraterritoriality‘s Fifth Business‘ (2008) 61Vanderbilt Law 
Review 1455, 1470.  
19 
 
flags, economic crimes, forgery of official documents such as passports and visas, and political 
offences (such as treason).
20
  Although its scope is sometimes debated, the existence of the 
protective principle is generally well accepted by academics and States. By contrast, the effects 
doctrine has been described as ‗problematic for both conceptual and pragmatic reasons‘.21 
 
2.2. Extraterritoriality as a Source of Controversy 
Therefore, the boundaries and, indeed, even the inherent legitimacy of some grounds of jurisdiction 
are still the subject of debate. As pointed out by Jennifer Zerk,
22
 exercises of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction are ‗frequently controversial‘23 and contribute to ‗tensions between States.‘24  One 
reason for this is that States may have competing claims to jurisdiction, and there is no clear 
hierarchy of jurisdictional claims.  A well-known example is the ‗Lockerbie‘ case, which was the 
subject of on-off negotiations on competing jurisdictional claims for over 20 years. This case 
concerned a commercial PanAm flight from Frankfurt to Detroit via London and New York City. 
The plane exploded over Scotland in 1988, killing all passengers and crew aboard the plane as well 
as persons on the ground in the small town of Lockerbie. The victims were of 21 different 
nationalities, but predominantly from the United States and United Kingdom. The two persons later 
accused of planting the bomb on board the plane were Libyan nationals. Further complicating 
jurisdictional matters was the fact that the plane was registered in the United States, crashed in 
Scotland, and that the two accused had returned to Libya. Only after protracted negotiations and 
legal proceedings was it agreed that a trial would be held in the Netherlands, in a court deemed to 
be a Scottish Court.
25
   
 
A more recent example occurred in 2012, when India and Italy disputed their competing claims of 
jurisdiction in relation to the killing of two Indian fishermen by Italian naval officers near the coast 
of Kerala, India.  Both Italy and India claimed the right to hear the matter on the basis that both 
have relevant laws applying extraterritorially.
26
 The dispute over jurisdiction led to diplomatic 
                                               
20
 Amnesty International, Universal Jurisdiction: The Duty of States to Enact and Enforce Legislation (2 June 2011) 
<http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/IOR53/003/2001/en/ab0c8dc8-d8f0-11dd-ad8>. 
21
 Parrish, above n 19, 1470. 
22
 Zerk, above n 7,  13. 
23
 Ibid 12.  
24
 Ibid. 
25
 Triggs, above n 7, 345. 
26
 See for example, Sandeep Dikshit, ‗As Italy Pushes for ―Midway Formula‖, India Swears by Courts‘, The Hindu 
(online), 22 February 2012 <http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/article2920853.ece>; Jayanth Jacob, ‗Italy, India 
in Tug of War Over Trial‘, Hindustan Times (online), 20 February 2012 <http://www.hindustantimes.com/India-
news/NewDelhi/Italy-India-in-tug-of-war-over-trial/Article1-814436.aspx>; Sachin Parashar, ‗India Hardens Stand on 
Arrest of Italian Naval Guards‘, The Times of India (online), 22 February 2012  
<http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2012-02-22/india/31086102_1_italian-naval-foreign-minister-
jurisdiction>. 
20 
 
tensions, and protracted legal action. These two cases illustrate the complexity and tensions that can 
arise in resolving competing claims to jurisdiction.  
 
In addition to causing tensions between States, assertions of extraterritorial jurisdiction also pose 
significant risks for individuals. By way of example, in Canada, some constitutional guarantees 
have been excluded from applying to investigations and prosecutions of extraterritorial conduct.
27
 
In R v Hape,
28
 and R v Klassen,
29
 the Supreme Court of Canada held the Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms is limited to Canadian provinces and territories, and does not apply extraterritorially to 
searches and seizures outside of Canada.  Further, in the United States, the ‗Ker-Frisbie‘ doctrine 
provides that illegalities in the extradition process will not bar prosecution in United States Courts. 
In Ker v. Illinois,
30
 the U.S. Supreme Court held that forcible abduction presents no valid objection 
to a criminal trial. In that case, the accused was forcibly kidnapped from Peru and brought to the 
United States for trial. Although the Australian High Court has rejected any equivalent of the Ker- 
Frisbie doctrine, government officials have openly admitted to pursuing the prosecution of an 
individual in order to influence the affairs of a foreign nation.
31
  In the case of Moti v The Queen,
32
 
the Commonwealth conceded that, ‗the motivation [for the prosecution] was largely to prevent the 
applicant from becoming the Attorney-General in the Solomon Islands.‘33  
 
These types of assertions undermine the rule of law and public confidence in the criminal justice 
system by creating uncertainty and inequality.  An accused will not necessarily know the forum in 
which the accused is to be tried, or be able to anticipate which rights and protections will apply, and 
which will not. A person tried for extraterritorial conduct may be treated differently from a person 
accused of territorial conduct. For example, there is no protection against double jeopardy at a 
transnational level. Even the protection against double jeopardy in the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights,
34
 is limited to prosecutions within a State, and not as between them.
35
  As 
James Crawford has observed, ‗[t]here is no assumption (even in criminal cases) that individuals or 
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corporations will be regulated only once, and situations of multiple jurisdictional competence occur 
frequently. In such situations there is no ‗natural‘ regulator‘.36 This means a person could be subject 
to multiple trials across multiple jurisdictions. These issues risk undermining the legitimacy of what 
may be otherwise justified prosecutions. As Royal J Stark asserted:  
Justice is rooted in respect for the law, and respect is commanded only when the tribunal meting out 
justice is seen as transcendent of the impulse for vengeance and protective of the defendant in the 
face of accusation and prosecution by the organised forces of society.
37
 
 
Traditionally, assertions of extraterritorial jurisdiction are regulated by principles of jurisdictional 
restraint, such as comity and non-interference in the affairs of another State.  Such limitations focus 
on the rights of States, and are ineffective in protecting the rights of individuals. There is a need to 
identify, develop and articulate the obligations owed by a State to an individual accused of an 
extraterritorial criminal offence. This thesis explores the usefulness of the abuse of rights doctrine 
and a chosen conception of the rule of law in such regulation.  
2.3. Preliminary Points 
As a preliminary point, there is a distinction between prescriptive, enforcement and adjudicative 
jurisdiction.
38
 Prescriptive extraterritorial jurisdiction simply refers to the capacity of a State to 
legislate in respect of persons and/or conduct.
39
 Enforcement jurisdiction refers to the capacity, or 
otherwise, of that State to enforce compliance with those laws.
40
 Adjudicative jurisdiction refers to 
the ability of courts to adjudicate and resolve disputes.
41
 For example, Adolf Eichmann, a senior 
Nazi official accused of crimes against the Jewish people, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and 
membership in a hostile organization, was kidnapped in 1960 in Argentina and taken to Israel for 
trial.
42
 It was not the prescription or adjudication of the offences for which he was charged that 
troubled the international community; rather, it was the method of enforcement that caused the 
United Nations Security Council to declare that Israel had violated Argentinean sovereignty.
43
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Generally speaking, competing claims to jurisdiction between States or concerns for the rights of 
individuals accused of extraterritorial offences will only arise in the context of adjudicative or 
enforcement jurisdiction.  For the purpose of this thesis, however, prescriptive, enforcement and 
adjudicative jurisdiction are discussed together under the umbrella term of ‗assertions‘ or 
‗exercises‘ of extraterritorial jurisdiction. This is not intended as an attempt to reconceptualise, 
ignore or challenge the distinction between them, but rather because for the purposes of this thesis, 
is it is not necessary to maintain a sharp distinction between them. In any event, it has been argued 
that there is not always a theoretically sound method determining the distinction between the 
three.
44
 Rather, as Roger O‘Keefe suggests, ‗one is a function of the other‘,45 and they ‗are, in 
practice, intertwined‘.46  For example, as Olivier De Schutter has observed:  
[W]hile the exercise of prescriptive extraterritorial jurisdiction may, in theory, be detached from the 
exercise of adjudicative extraterritorial jurisdiction, in practice the latter is always implied by the 
former : it would hardly be conceivable for a State to seek to influence situations outside the national 
territory by the adoption of extraterritorial legislation, while at the same time denying to its courts 
the power to accept jurisdiction over cases relating to such situations, to which such legislation is 
applicable. There is, in that sense, an intimate connection between adjudicative and prescriptive 
extraterritorial jurisdiction.
47
  
 
In any event, an exhaustive treatment of all aspects of the doctrine of jurisdiction ‗would require an 
enormous apparatus that would exhaust the resources and powers of a single student‘.48  
 
As a further preliminary point, this thesis is not directly occupied with human rights law. This is not 
intended to suggest that human rights law is not relevant, but rather it is because human rights law 
cannot answer all issues that may confront an individual subject to extraterritorial regulation, such 
as the lack of certainty as to the applicable forum or the lack of accountability in being subject to a 
legal regime developed by a community of which they are not a member and in which they do not 
participate. For this reason, human rights law is not a major focus of this thesis. Instead, this thesis 
is more concerned with the question as to whether the abuse of rights doctrine and the chosen 
conception of the rule of law may be useful to the regulation of extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction. 
Nonetheless, human rights law is a component of the broader picture and for this reason, the 
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relationship between human rights law and extraterritorial jurisdiction will be acknowledged by 
way of a brief discussion in Chapter 3. 
 
3. Significance 
This thesis is significant because it considers the usefulness of the ‗abuse of rights‘ doctrine in a 
common law context, and employs a conception of the rule of law, in order to develop that 
‗undeveloped field‘. Further, the work undertaken in this thesis is of particular significance in 
Australia, where very little analysis of extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction has taken place outside 
of judicial decision-making. The regulation of extraterritorial jurisdiction has not kept pace with 
extraterritorial activity. This is problematic because,  
There is no more important way to avoid conflict than by providing clear norms as to which State 
can exercise authority over whom, and in what circumstances. Without that allocation of 
competences, all is rancour and chaos.
49
 
There is a body of literature focusing on particular types of extraterritorial criminal offences and 
transnational crimes, such as child sex tourism, terrorism and money laundering. There is 
commentary on particular bases of extraterritorial jurisdiction in international law, and the rights of 
States to protect their sovereign interests and territorial borders. There is also, of course, a 
significant body of literature on international human rights law. There is, however, little scholarly 
examination of the relationship between individual rights and extraterritorial jurisdiction and this 
thesis seeks to contribute to this ‗gap‘. This is important because, ‗by their nature extraterritorial 
activities take place in circumstances where individuals are extremely vulnerable‘.50 As Larry May 
observes, research on extraterritorial procedural rights is a ‗vastly underdeveloped field‘.51  
 
Assertions of extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction do not often fit neatly in either international law 
or domestic law ‗space‘. Although influenced by both, such assertions nonetheless exist in a hybrid 
‗third space‘. For example, international criminal law frameworks exist for international crimes. 
Domestic law frameworks exist for territorial crimes. By contrast, domestic laws with 
extraterritorial scope do not fit neatly in either domestic or international law frameworks and raise 
issues under both.  In this way, there is a third zone, a regulatory space, in need of further clarity of 
regulation. This thesis seeks to contribute to that space.  
 
                                               
49
 Roslyn Higgins, Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It (Oxford University Press, 1994) 56. 
50
 Ralph Wilde, ‗Legal ―Black Hole‖? Extraterritorial State Action and International Treaty Law on Civil and Political 
Rights (2005) 26 Michigan Journal of International Law 739, 754. 
51
 Larry May, Global Justice and Due Process (Cambridge University Press, 2011) 2. 
24 
 
4. Aim and Objective 
4.1. Aim  
The aim of this thesis is to explore the ways in which extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction is 
regulated under international law and under the laws of Australia, India and the United States and 
whether that regulation may usefully contribute to the broader debate on extraterritoriality. The gaps 
in the literature which this thesis seeks to address are the ways in which municipal law and 
international law interact in the regulation of extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction in Australia, India 
and the United States and what that means for the individual persons accused of extraterritorial 
offences, and the potential usefulness of the abuse of rights doctrine in that regulation. This is a 
significant gap because the existing literature tends to focus only on international law, or if 
considering municipal law, is centred on European or United States jurisprudence. Although the 
United States experience is still considered in this thesis, it is hoped that the inclusion of analysis on 
the Australian and Indian experience will add to the body of literature on jurisdiction and to the 
broader debate on the regulation of extraterritoriality.  
 
4.2. Objective 
States are increasingly asserting jurisdiction over criminal offences that occur extraterritorially. To 
some extent, this is a response to transnational criminal activity. However, the assertion of 
jurisdiction outside the territory of the acting State has been a source of continuing controversy and 
legal uncertainty.  This is because the principles of jurisdiction under international law do not 
adequately resolve competing claims to jurisdiction and are primarily concerned with the 
relationship between States and not as between the State and the individual. Further, international 
human rights law is not always capable of protecting individuals subjected to exercises of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction.  In that context, the objectives of this thesis are:  
a) To consider principles of jurisdiction and jurisdictional restraint under international law and 
the means by which assertions of extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction are regulated in 
Australia, India and the United States.  
b) To consider the relationship between municipal law and international law in each of these 
jurisdictions. 
c) To evaluate the potential utility of the ‗abuse of rights‘ doctrine as a regulator of 
extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction.  
d) To assess the regulation of extraterritorial jurisdiction by Australia, India and the United 
States against three criteria of the chosen conception of the rule of law. The thesis proceeds 
25 
 
on the assumption that, at a bare minimum, the rule of law requires: 1) that the law must be 
both readily known and available, and certain and clear; 2) that the law should be applied to 
all people equally, and operate uniformly in circumstances which are not materially 
different; and 3) that there must be some capacity for judicial review of executive action. 
 
5. Research Questions 
The research questions guiding this thesis are as follows: 
1. What are the principles of jurisdiction under international law? 
2. What are the restraints on jurisdiction under international law? Are these restraints useful in 
regulating extraterritorial jurisdiction? 
3. How are assertions of extraterritorial jurisdiction regulated in Australia, India and the United 
States?  
a. What are examples of criminal legislation that operate extraterritorially?  
b. How have the courts approached questions of extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction?  
c. What is the relationship between municipal law and international law? 
d. Is the abuse of rights doctrine useful in the regulation of extraterritorial criminal 
jurisdiction? Have the courts demonstrated an engagement with analogous 
principles?  
e. Is the regulation of extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction consistent with the chosen 
conception of the rule of law?  
4. What contribution can an analysis of extraterritorial jurisdiction in Australia, India and the 
United States make to the broader discussion and debate on extraterritoriality? 
 
6. Methodology 
The methodology of this thesis can be described as ‗doctrinal‘. Terry Hutchinson and Nigel Duncan 
have described doctrinal research as ‗research into the law and legal concepts‘.52  It has also been 
described as ranging from a description of the law with interpretative comments to ‗innovative 
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theory building‘.53 In that context, this thesis presents research into the law of extraterritorial 
criminal jurisdiction, combining a description of primary resources and interpretative comments to 
identify principles by which to understand its exercise. As such, this thesis researches the law by 
analysing legal decisions and legal instruments, such as statutes, international conventions, and 
judicial decision-making in order both to identify legal practice and legal principles, and to draw 
normative conclusions on the regulation of extraterritorial jurisdiction.  
 
A distinction can be drawn between methodology and method. The former describes the approach 
taken by this thesis and the latter refers to the mechanisms through which that methodological 
approach is implemented. In that context, there are two questions to be answered in order to explain 
the method of this thesis.  The first question is, what ‗data‘ is contained in this research? The second 
question is, how was this ‗data‘ collected? 
 
What data is contained in this research? 
The data presented in this research is a collation of the law on the exercise of extraterritorial 
criminal jurisdiction under international law and under the municipal laws of Australia, India and 
the United States. An assessment of the effectiveness of that law is also presented. This assessment 
is based on three criteria, taken for the purpose of this thesis, to be the key requirements of the rule 
of law. The data is also used to determine the usefulness, or otherwise, of the abuse of rights 
doctrine as a mechanism for regulating extraterritorial jurisdiction.  
 
How was this data collected?  
The data was collected by identifying and analysing international treaties and conventions relevant 
to extraterritorial jurisdiction and provisions in the constitutions of Australia, India and the United 
States that may have a bearing on questions of jurisdiction and international law. Data was also 
obtained from the decisions of judges in cases where questions of jurisdiction and international law 
were at issue. This is a legitimate means of collecting data on common-law systems, such as 
Australia, India and the United States, because the decisions of superior courts are considered a 
source of law. This is also known as the ‗doctrine of precedent‘ and is consistent with doctrinal 
methodology. Hutchinson and Duncan state:  
The term 'doctrinal' is also closely linked with the doctrine of precedent - legal rules take on the 
quality of being doctrinal because they are not just casual or convenient norms, but because they are 
                                               
53
 Mark van Hoecke (ed), Methodologies of Legal Research: Which Kind of Method for What Kind of Discipline? (Hart 
Publishing, 2011) vi. 
27 
 
meant to be rules which apply consistently and which evolve organically and slowly.54 
 
Further, the conduct of nation States, also known as ‗state practice‘ can be evidence of the content 
of international law. As Andre Nollkaemper observes, national courts are often called to review the 
legality of national acts through constitutional review, and therefore, ‗national courts can play a role 
in the interpretation, determination, and development of international law.‘55 Data in the form of the 
works of academics or ‗publicists‘ was also collected. This is a legitimate method of collecting data 
on international law because Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice identifies 
such commentaries as a subsidiary source of international law.
56
  
 
The decision was taken to focus on the regulation of extraterritorial jurisdiction by municipal 
courts, rather than by international tribunals. This is because in cases other than the prosecution of 
high-profile international crimes, it is municipal courts that are called on to regulate exercises of 
extraterritoriality. In this way, municipal courts play a substantial role in the development not only 
of their own legal culture and doctrine, but also of international law more generally. As such, the 
literature review in this Chapter includes a section on the relationship between international law and 
municipal courts, and an acknowledgment that there have been some decisions of international 
tribunals on point.  
 
A description of the methodology and method of this thesis also calls for an explanation as to why 
the laws of Australia, India and the United States were chosen for comparison. While, the 
experience of other jurisdictions is drawn on from time to time for illustrative purposes, the thesis is 
primarily concerned with Australia, India and the United States. These States were selected for 
comparison because all three are common law jurisdictions, with federal systems of government 
and written constitutions. They all have, at least to some extent, a shared legal heritage from the 
United Kingdom. This makes them appropriate subjects for a comparative analysis.  The genesis of 
this thesis began with a consideration of Australia‘s assertions of extraterritorial criminal 
jurisdiction, which has been given little, if any, academic consideration. The United States was then 
chosen as a country of comparison because it is also a common law and federal system, and due to 
the existence of a significant body of literature in assertions of extraterritorial jurisdiction by the 
United States.  The inclusion of India was both because it is also a common-law and federal system, 
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but also because if the analysis in this thesis was restricted to only ‗western‘ States, then its 
contribution may be less useful and balanced than if an Asian State were also considered. Further, 
the view was taken that Australian jurisprudence could benefit from a deeper understanding of 
India. As Michael Kirby, a former Justice of the High Court of Australia has observed:
 
 
Australian lawyers do not know enough about India. I warrant that the opposite is also true ... The 
neglect by Indian and Australian lawyers of each other is as tragic as it is puzzling. It is tragic 
because it represents a lost opportunity for two common law countries, which are federations, which 
live by the rule of law, which are governed under democratic, parliamentary constitutions and which, 
in their different ways, protect fundamental human rights and basic freedoms.
 57
 
 
P.V. Rao also comments on what he describes as missed opportunities in Indian-Australian 
relations. In his view, ‗in the post-colonial period, perhaps, few countries were better placed than 
India and Australia to forge a meaningful, long-term and mutually beneficial partnership.
58
 Rao 
goes on to observe: 
Ignoring ... the shared bounds of a common colonial past and membership of the Commonwealth, 
language and familiarity with each other‘s‘ culture, institutions and traditions, both countries 
chartered a different course for themselves. Australia was a major regional power in the Pacific with 
the potential to play an important role; and the newly independent India was an emerging power in 
South and South-East Asia with considerable economic, military and strategic significance. Indeed, 
both countries should have had much interest in forging a strategic, political and economic 
partnership which would have been a significant factor in the rapidly changing geo-political and 
strategic map of the Asia-Pacific. However, Australia due to her largely colonial connections and 
imperatives, chose to look at herself as a European and Trans-Atlantic country rather than as an 
Asia-Pacific country.
 59
 
 
Therefore, this thesis seeks to remedy some of this ‗lost opportunity‘ for three common-law 
jurisdictions to better understand each other. This is because:  
When one is confined to the study of one's own law within one's own country and, thus within one's 
own cultural environment, there is a strong tendency to accept without question the various aspects 
(norms, concepts, and institutions) of one's own legal system. One is inclined to think that the 
solutions of one's own legal order are the only possible ones. This leads to an idealisation of one's 
own legal institutions and to treating them as inherent in the general nature of law.
60
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To that end, a separate chapter will be devoted to Australia, India and the United States.  To ensure 
consistency of analysis, the same issues will be considered for each country. This is because 
comparative law is an ‗observational and exactitude-seeking science‘,61 that ‗endeavours to collect, 
observe, analyse, and classify‘.62 Comparative law, ‗like other sciences ... searches for typical 
collocations, coincidences, and sequences‘.63As a research method, it is the ‗systematic application 
of comparison to law‘.64 
 
First, an overview of the national history is given. This is to provide context to a reader who may be 
not be familiar with the basic structures of Australia, India or the United States. Examples of 
legislation with extraterritorial reach and of judicial consideration of extraterritoriality are then 
given. The relationship between each country and international law is explored, as is any 
application of legal principles analogous to the abuse of rights doctrine. This is so as to determine 
whether the abuse of rights doctrine may be useful in regulating extraterritorial criminal 
jurisdiction. Finally, the regulation of exercises of extraterritorial jurisdiction by each country is 
assessed as against three criteria set out above.   
 
In turn, it is suggested that an exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction that does not meet these three 
criteria is an abuse of the right to exercise jurisdiction. In this way, this thesis considers there to be a 
tripartite relationship between jurisdiction, the rule of law, and the abuse of rights doctrine. It is 
acknowledged that the content of the rule of law is controversial and not ‗amenable to an exhaustive 
definition.‘65  Jeremy Waldron has described the rule of law as ‗multi-faceted ideal‘.66 If, however, 
the rule of law were to be defined as entailing the three stated criteria, this thesis considers whether 
assertions of extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction by Australia, India and the United States are 
consistent with such principles.  Notably, the analysis presented in this thesis is limited to the laws 
of the federal or central governments of Australia, India and the United States. It is not intended to 
extend the analysis to the law of the provincial levels of government, other than in passing or by 
way of illustration.  
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7. Structure 
 
This thesis is divided into seven chapters. 
 
Chapter One: Introduction 
Chapter One provides an introduction to extraterritorial jurisdiction and explains the significance of 
the thesis. It sets out the objectives and goals and the methodology. Chapter One also establishes the 
parameters of existing literature, and identifies the gaps therein.   
 
Chapter Two: Principles of Jurisdiction 
Chapter Two is concerned with the circumstances in which a nation State can assert extraterritorial 
criminal jurisdiction under international law. It provides a historical context to assertions of 
extraterritoriality in the 21
st
 century, and introduces the principles of extraterritorial jurisdiction 
under international law. This Chapter makes some preliminary conclusions as to some of the 
problems with extraterritorial jurisdiction and the circumstances in which extraterritorial 
jurisdiction should not be exercised.  
 
Chapter Three: Principles of Jurisdictional Restraint  
Chapter Three considers whether current principles of jurisdictional restraint are adequate 
regulators of extraterritorial jurisdiction.  While most are concerned only with the rights of States, 
and not with the rights of individuals (with the exception of international human rights law), this 
Chapter considers whether the ‗abuse of rights‘ doctrine may be of some use. In this context, the 
relationship between the abuse of rights doctrine and the chosen conception of the rule of law is 
explored.  
 
Chapters Four, Five and Six:  
Chapter Four is concerned with extraterritoriality in Australia, Chapter Five with extraterritoriality 
in India and Chapter Six with extraterritoriality in the United States. Each of these Chapters offers a 
historical overview of the legal system and then considers the regulation of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction. It does so by providing examples of assertions of extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction 
and analysing significant decisions of the superior courts. Following that analysis, the relationship 
between international law and municipal law is considered, as is the question as to whether the 
‗abuse of rights‘ doctrine could have any role to play in the regulation of extraterritorial jurisdiction. 
To that end, the existence of engagement by courts with the abuse of rights doctrine, or any 
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analogous principles, is explored. Finally, the exercise, and regulation, of extraterritorial criminal 
jurisdiction is assessed as against the three stated criteria of the chosen conception of the rule of 
law.  
 
Chapter Seven: Conclusions 
Chapter Seven draws on the data in Chapters Two to Six in order to make three tiers of conclusions. 
The first tier presents conclusions as to the regulation of extraterritorial jurisdiction by Australia, 
India and United States, respectively. The second tier relates to any conclusions about the regulation 
of extraterritorial jurisdiction in common-law jurisdictions. The third tier identifies contributions 
this thesis makes to the broader debate on extraterritorial jurisdiction. 
 
8. Literature Review 
This literature review is grouped into the following themes: 
 Increased Reliance on Assertions of Extraterritorial Criminal Jurisdiction;  
 Assertions of Extraterritorial Criminal Jurisdiction are Useful;  
 While Useful, Assertions of Extraterritorial Criminal Jurisdiction are Controversial; 
 International Law and Municipal Law; 
 Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in Australia; 
 Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in India; 
 Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in the United States; and 
 Extraterritorial Criminal Jurisdiction and the Human Rights of Individuals. 
 
First, the seminal international law decision on extraterritorial jurisdiction is introduced. In 1927, 
the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) gave its decision in Lotus.
67
 In this case, the 
PCIJ considered whether Turkey, in instituting criminal proceedings against a French national over 
a collision on the high seas between a Turkish and a French flagged ship which resulted in the death 
of Turkish nationals, acted in conflict with international law.
68
  The French Government submitted 
that the Turkish Courts, in order to have jurisdiction, must be able to identify a specific title to 
jurisdiction given to Turkey in international law.
69
 Conversely, the Turkish government took the 
view that it inherently had jurisdiction as long as such jurisdiction did not come into conflict with a 
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principle of international law.
70
 While observing that ‗jurisdiction is certainly territorial‘,71 the PCIJ 
found that:  
It does not, however, follow that international law prohibits a State from exercising jurisdiction in its 
own territory, in respect of any case which relates to acts which have taken place abroad, and in 
which it cannot rely on some permissive rule of international law. Such a view would only be tenable 
if international law contained a general prohibition …72 
  
The Court concluded, in what is now widely described as the ‗Lotus principle‘, as follows:  
Far from laying down a general prohibition to the effect that States may not extend the application of 
their laws and the jurisdiction of their courts to persons, property and acts outside their territory, it 
leaves them in this respect a wide measure of discretion which is only limited to certain cases by 
prohibitive rules; as regards other cases, every State remains free to adopt the principles which it 
regards as best and most suitable.
73
 
  
The decision in Lotus has been criticised. For example, Cedric Ryngaert observes the judgement is 
‗nowadays often considered as obsolete‘,74 and FA Mann argues the decision ‗cannot claim to be 
good law‘.75 It is, however, a significant judgment of an international court directly dealing with the 
issue of extraterritorial jurisdiction. Nonetheless, as Ryngaert points out, customary international 
law based on actual State practice would point towards extraterritorial jurisdiction being prohibited 
unless specifically permitted, rather than the permissive approach in Lotus.
76
 Ian Brownlie 
described the sufficiency of a base of jurisdiction as being ‗relative to the rights of other States and 
not as a question of basic competence‘.77 Similarly, James Crawford has said that the ‗sufficiency of 
grounds for jurisdiction is normally considered relative to the rights of other States‘.78  
 
8.1. Increased Reliance on Assertions of Extraterritorial Criminal Jurisdiction 
A common theme in existing literature is that there is now an increased reliance on extraterritorial 
jurisdiction. In her report, Jennifer Zerk asserts that ‗States are increasingly prepared to use direct 
extraterritorial jurisdiction‘,79 particularly in relation to transnational crimes such as terrorism, 
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money laundering, corruption, and sex tourism. She also observes that the reactions of States to 
assertions of extraterritoriality ‗depend greatly on regulatory motives and modes, and on the 
potential for inter-State regulatory conflict‘.80 Zerk makes the point that while historical assertions 
of extraterritoriality were unilateral; the obligation to legislate extraterritorially is now contained in 
international and regional treaties, and cooperative frameworks.
81
 In this way, the literature also 
links extraterritoriality with national security concerns, such as terrorism, or with welfare concerns, 
such as child sex tourism. This is used by the thesis as a starting point from which to analyse the 
extent to which the rights of individuals are protected in the relevant treaties and cooperative 
frameworks.  Notably, a distinction, however, might be drawn between treaties that expressly oblige 
extraterritorial jurisdiction on uncontroversial grounds of jurisdiction, and those that are simply 
permissive in character, and therefore arguably permit controversial grounds, such as the passive 
personality principle, as discussed in further detail in Chapter Two.   
 
Similarly, Steffano Battini observes that while nation States, particularly in the common law world, 
traditionally permitted extraterritoriality as an exception to the rule, ‗interdependence between 
States is making extraterritoriality increasingly unexceptional.‘82 Battini, like many others, is of the 
view that increasing reliance by nation States on extraterritorial jurisdiction is an unavoidable effect 
of globalisation.
83
 Larry Kramer asserts that the ‗world in which a presumption against 
extraterritoriality made sense is gone,‘84 and Mark Gibney and Sigrun Skogly argue that in a 
globalised world, jurisdiction over individuals, companies, or particular actions makes more sense 
than the traditional parameters of physical territory.
85
 There is debate as to whether or not an 
increased reliance on extraterritoriality is a forgone conclusion. For example, Parrish disagrees that 
an increased reliance on extraterritorial jurisdiction is inevitable, and instead argues that 
‗territoriality should play a larger role in answering jurisdictional questions, not a smaller one.‘86 He 
is of the view that territoriality should be reinvigorated as a constraint on State power.
87
 In a similar 
vein, Diane Orentlicher suggests, ‗[i]f we believe that citizens should be at least indirect authors of 
the law that governs them, we instinctively shrink from the thought of … being governed by the law 
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of Judges deliberating an ocean away.‘88 However, unlike Parrish, Orentlicher then goes on to argue 
that the fact that law making across borders involves multiple communities does not necessarily 
compromise its legitimacy.
89
  Either way, as Wade Estey has observed:  
It is clear that the problems and conflicts of extraterritorial jurisdiction will continue to expand as the 
economics of the world become increasingly intertwined, and as governments attempt to extend the 
reach of their own laws to exert specific economic or political agendas.
90
 
 
8.2. Assertions of Extraterritorial Criminal Jurisdiction can be Useful  
This thesis is largely a critique of the exercise and regulation of extraterritorial jurisdiction. 
However, it is not intended to suggest that extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction should never be 
exercised. Rather, it is accepted that extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction can, in some 
circumstances, be a useful and legitimate response to transnational crime. Criminal activity is not 
always confined to territorial borders, and so it follows, that the law may seek to follow the crime 
on its extraterritorial journey so as to prevent an offender from enjoying impunity. In some cases, 
international law even obliges States to exercise extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction. For example, 
as Olivier De Schuttert has suggested:  
The development of extraterritorial jurisdiction may be attributed, first, to the spectacular progress of 
international criminal law. In order to comply with the requirements of international humanitarian 
law or with those of the Convention against Torture, or – more recently – in the acts they have 
adopted in order to implement the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, a number of 
States have included in their criminal legislation provisions allowing for the investigation and 
prosecution of international crimes, even when such crimes are committed outside their national 
territory, and whether or not the perpetrators or the victims are nationals of the State concerned.
91
 
 
De Schuttert goes on to State:  
The need to address transnational crimes such as terrorism, trafficking of human beings, or sexual 
abuse of children overseas (‗sexual tourism‘), also explains the use of extraterritorial jurisdiction in a 
growing number of instances. For instance, in the tradition of a large number of instruments related 
to the combating of terrorism, our modern equivalent to piracy which all States have not only an 
interest in combating, but also an obligation to do so‘.92 
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Similarly, Neil Boister observes that: 
International society‘s concern with the upsurge in certain kinds of criminal activities within a 
[S]tate is considered legitimate because of the fear that these activities will have a knock-on effect in 
other [S]tates. At its simplest, then, transnational crime describes conduct that has actual or potential 
trans-boundary effects of national and international concern.
93
  
 
There are also political and economic arguments in favour of criminal offences, such as child sex 
offences, having extraterritorial reach. This is because the economic divide between developed 
nations such as Australia and poorer destination countries such as Thailand and Cambodia is 
obvious. There is a moral-political pressure on countries like Australia to regulate the behavior of 
their citizens overseas for the simple reason that the country in which they are in cannot or will not 
do so.  This line of reasoning is supported by what one commentator terms the ‘mechanics of 
substitution‘. In his 2005 discussion, Patrick Keenan argues ‗substitution‘ can occur where effective 
regulation of criminal activity in one venue (such as Australia) leads those engaged in such activity 
merely substituting one venue for another (such as Cambodia or Thailand).
94
 Keenan argues 
increased accessibility to cheap international travel and wealth disparities between the developing 
and developed world,
95
 have facilitated the displacement or substitution of child sex offences to 
destinations less willing or able to prosecute. This means, ironically, that law enforcement successes 
in some countries can morph into ‗social disasters‘ for others.96 For example, although Cambodia 
has laws that would permit the prosecution of child sex offences, it is still reeling from the 
aftermath of the Khmer Rouge regime, during which it lost its trained attorneys and judges.
97
 
Further, law enforcement officials in poorer countries are often paid very little, and this can make 
them more susceptible to bribery from perpetrators.
98
  
 
Further, for crimes such as terrorism, the prosecution of extraterritorial activity may actually be a 
better alternative to military action. In the context of prosecutions before federal courts in the 
United States, Sara Salow suggests:  
The government‘s decision to use the Article III court system [federal courts] in its effort to contain 
global terrorism is to be celebrated. The resort to legal process rather than to the use or force vis-à-
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vis terrorists ensures that alleged perpetrators are truly guilty of terrorism before they are retaliated 
against or subjected to punishment. The resort to process also prevents the infliction of collateral 
damage on innocent bystanders that might otherwise occur when the United States responds to 
terrorism with counterattacks.
99
 
  
Salow goes on to suggest, however, that the work of the courts in this regard has been troubled by a 
lack of a clear due process test. This will be discussed in Chapter 6, which considers the regulation 
of extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction in the United States. However, the concept also links in with 
the broader suggestion that the abuse of rights doctrine may be a useful regulatory tool for 
municipal courts in regulating exercises of extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction.   
 
In short, the regulation of extraterritorial jurisdiction has not kept pace with its exercise and most 
principles of jurisdictional restraint are concerned with the rights of States vis-à-vis each other, 
rather than with the individual accused. Further, broad assertions of extraterritoriality can give rise 
to multiple, and possibly competing, claims to jurisdiction. Consequently, assertions of 
extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction can be useful, but are nonetheless, controversial.   
 
8.3. While Useful, Assertions of Extraterritorial Criminal Jurisdiction are Controversial 
Without exception, the existing literature agrees that exercises of extraterritorial jurisdiction are 
controversial. As Harold Maier observes: 
The assertion of national jurisdiction outside the territory of the acting State has been a source of 
continuing controversy since the development of the territorial State as the principal political unit in 
the world community during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.
100
  
Alfred Van Staden and Hans Vollaard articulate the dilemma as being, ‗sustaining out dated but still 
democratically legitimized territorial political structures or embracing non-territorial structures that 
may be more effective in dealing with new transnational challenges but lack roots in people‘s 
consent.‘101  Mark Gibney expresses a similar view about extraterritoriality generally, describing it 
as ‗a situation where rule makers in one country get to pick and choose which of their own rules 
they will apply in other countries‘.102 He notes that in contrast to territorial laws of the United States 
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where ‗those who create and pass laws are ultimately held accountable to ―the people‖,103 the 
lawmakers of extraterritorial laws to be enforced for conduct occurring in other countries ‗are not 
accountable to ―the people‖ in these other lands.‘104 He observes: 
These ―other people,‖ are not consulted about the application of foreign law to them, nor do they 
have the ready means to change the law if it is not consistent with their own domestic standards and 
norms.
105
 
 
Battini refers to this as an ‗accountability gap‘. In doing so, he draws analogies as to the 
‗fundamental public law problem of regulation without representation.‘106 In Battini‘s view, the 
accountability gap is a consequence of ‗far reaching economic and social integration … without a 
similar political and legal integration.‘107 In essence, this thesis uses existing literature to illustrate 
that the development of legal obligations of States has not kept pace with the willingness to assert 
extraterritorial jurisdiction. From that point, an attempt is made by the thesis to identify and develop 
such legal obligations.  
 
There is controversy as to the basis on which extraterritorial jurisdiction can be asserted. In Zerk‘s 
view, States regard the nationality principle as the ‗strongest basis for direct extraterritorial criminal 
jurisdiction‘.108 This is consistent with Peter Arnell‘s argument, that the nationality principle is 
symbolic of an evolution from narrow, self-interested territorial interests to a broader collective 
interest in the conduct of nationals overseas.
109
  He asserts that the cumulative effect of the ‗ever-
greater mobility of nationals, the ability to commit crimes remotely … an evolution in the citizen-
State relationship, and the increasing internationalisation of criminal law‘,110 strengthens arguments 
in favour of nationality based jurisdiction.
111
 Similarly, Van Den Herik, in noting one of the ‗dark 
side effects‘,112 of globalisation is crime ‗increasingly moving beyond borders‘, suggests that States 
‗have a direct interest in regulating and adjudicating the behaviour of their own nationals‘.113 
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By contrast, some commentators have expressed concerns as to the underlying philosophical 
justifications for the nationality principle. For example, Chehtman claims ‗as a basis for criminal 
jurisdiction, the nationality principle is altogether unjustified at the bar of justice‘.114 He argues 
‗individuals in any given State lack an interest in having that State‘s criminal laws enforced against 
them or their co-nationals (or co-residents) abroad‘.115  This is because, in his view, the enforcement 
of laws are only of interest to the community in which they are broken, presumably because, in 
theory, that community is the one affected by the conduct in question. There is also other literature 
on the merits of other specific bases of extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction, and of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction generally.  For example, Jack Goldsmith and Stephen Krasner observe that assertions of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction grounded in universality ‗may provoke domestic unrest or international 
conflict‘.116 Debate as to the merit of a particular basis of extraterritorial jurisdiction is typical of the 
literature on extraterritoriality.  
 
Some literature also suggests that extraterritorial jurisdiction is controversial because it can be used 
as a backdoor means of implementing foreign policy, or achieving unrelated political ends. This 
idea is consistent with the musings of Gibney who suggests the reason why ‗the extraterritorial 
application of U.S. law [for example] will continue to be applied inconsistently is that this ... 
inconsistency serves some very useful political ends‘.117  
 
Some scholars suggest that the legitimacy of assertions of extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction 
should be guided by ‗comity‘ or the international law doctrine of ‗non-interference‘. However, 
these doctrines are concerned with the interest of States, not individuals, and, as Simon Chesterman 
observes, ‗those with the most leverage to demand and enforce accountability may be those with the 
least interest in doing so‘.118  David Gerber suggests comity is ‗a political, not a legal solution‘,119 
and consists of ‗little more than an exhortation to neighborliness‘.120 He goes on to argue that to 
allow, let alone compel, a judge to make that political decision, is inappropriate.
121
 In his view, this 
is because courts do not have independent access to foreign intelligence and therefore, ‗may not 
understand the far-reaching implications of their decisions‘.122  
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8.4. International Law and Municipal Law 
One of the objectives of this thesis is to consider the relationship between municipal law and 
international law in Australia, India and the United States. To that end, it is necessary to 
acknowledge the theories that exist on the nature of such relationships. There are three key theories 
on the relationship between international and domestic law.  First, is that of ‗monism‘, the idea that 
international law and domestic law are not separate bodies of law. Eric Engl describes monists as 
viewing ‗the international and national legal systems as interdependent and united, part of a 
seamless whole‘.123 For example, Magda Karagiannakis has suggested that ‗international law is a 
component of the law in general‘.124  Second, is the ‗dualism‘ theory, which argues that 
international law and domestic law are separate and distinct bodies of law.  Engl has described 
dualists as viewing the ‘national and international legal systems as hermetically separate with 
autonomous rules of interpretation‘.125 For example, Hilary Charlesworth has expressed the view 
that the High Court of Australia has adopted a dualist approach to international law because it treats 
national and international legal systems as ‗quite distinct‘.126  Third, is the theory of 
‗complementarity‘, which suggests that international law and municipal law are neither together nor 
separate, but, instead, operate to compliment and develop the other. For example, Andre 
Nollkaemper has espoused the theory of complementarity when stating:   
The international and national legal order play complementary roles, and may combine in providing 
the incentives and conditions under which national courts can fulfil a role in the international legal 
order.
127
 
 
As will be seen in Chapters Four, Five and Six, judicial decision-making in Australia and the 
United States tends to reflect a dualist approach, whereas in India, judicial decision-making adopts a 
more complimentary approach.  
 
As stated at the outset, this thesis is concerned with the regulation of extraterritorial jurisdiction by 
municipal courts rather than international courts and tribunals. This is not to say that the issue of the 
relationship between individual rights and jurisdiction is not also relevant to international tribunals. 
It is. For example, Susan Lamb refers to the arrest preceding the decision of the International 
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Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY),
128
 in Prosecutor v Dokmanovic.
129
 The arrest 
had allegedly ‗been effected by an elaborate ruse on the part of the Office of the Prosecutor and a 
peace-keeping force, whereby Dokmanovic had been enticed to enter a UN vehicle on the Serbian 
side of the border with Eastern Slovenia, driven to a military base and there detained‘.130  Lamb also 
suggests that an example of an  ‗alleged clash between ICTY arrest powers and fundamental human 
rights norms is provided by the arrest of Steven Todorovic‘.131 During the pre-trial proceedings, it 
was alleged that the accused had been abducted by ICTY agents.
132
 These cases all concerned 
violations of international humanitarian law and so Lamb takes the view that where the crime is 
serious, ‗the presumption in favour of trying (the accused) is strengthened‘.133 Lamb concedes 
though, that ‗all bodies have an inherent jurisdiction to guard against abuses of their own 
process‘.134  
 
In any event, this thesis is concerned with the way in which municipal courts regulate 
extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction and the relationship between that regulation, the abuse of rights 
doctrine and the chosen conception of the rule of law. Such an approach is still capable of adding to 
the dialogue on international law because: 
the rule of law at the international and domestic levels is not a normative ideal or a requirement of 
separate legal orders, but is intimately connected and mutually reinforcing‘.135   
 
Further, national courts can exert a ‗normative influence on interpretation of international law 
itself‘.136 As Nollekaemper has suggested,  
national institutions can protect the rule of law against weaknesses of international law itself … 
national courts can provide the missing link by assessing international acts against fundamental 
rights, whether as ‗international norms‘ or in the form of domestic constitutional rights.137 
He has also observed that, ‗[t]o a large degree, international law defers necessarily to national law; 
this is perhaps most evident in the field of procedural law, on which international law has hardly 
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anything to say‘,138 and  that ‗the volume of municipal case law on such matters of international law 
easily out-numbers the decisions of international courts and tribunals‘.139 
 
Therefore, this thesis seeks not only to understand how extraterritorial jurisdiction is regulated in 
the courts of Australia, India and the United States, but also to contribute in some way to the 
broader debate on extraterritoriality. 
 
8.5. Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in Australia 
The academic commentary on Australian assertions of extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction has 
tended to focus on Australia‘s child sexual offences regime.140 There has been little or no 
commentary on the theoretical legitimacy of such assertions, or on the obligations owed to 
individuals prosecuted for extraterritorial offences. However, there has been some judicial 
consideration of extraterritorial jurisdiction, such as that in XYZ v Commonwealth,
141
 and Moti v 
The Queen.
142
  Further, there has been commentary on Australia‘s relationship with international 
law. For example, Charlesworth has expressed the view that Australian courts could better engage 
with international law and that the apparent reasons for not doing so, that international law is too 
vague and too broad to be useful or appropriate to have a role in judicial decision making, are not 
justified. She has written:   
It is true that some international law principles are expressed in general terms, but there are also 
many forms of international jurisprudence that can assist in interpreting international standards. The 
internet now allows easy access to such materials, whereas even a few years ago they were quite 
difficult to track down. The fears of the uncertainty of international law are overstated. Concepts 
regularly used in domestic law, such as 'reasonableness', or 'foreseeability', are no less vague and 
require considerable interpretation in context. The anxious reference made by McHugh J in Al-Kateb 
to the fact that there are 900 treaties to which Australia is a party gives an inaccurate sense of the 
breadth of international law. Only a small number of treaties will be relevant to any particular 
decision. There are indeed more High Court decisions than there are treaties that bind Australia and 
yet no one suggests that it is unreasonable to refer to them in litigation.
143
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In a 2006 speech, Chief Justice French also observed that the legal community in Australia does not 
properly understand international law. He suggested that intersection between international law and 
Australia law is: 
multifaceted, complex and difficult to encompass within any all embracing theory. There is no doubt 
a continuing need for greater consciousness of it in our legal community and of the opportunities and 
challenges which it presents.
144
  
Writing in the same year as Charlesworth, 2004, Wendy Lacey was more optimistic about the 
relationship between Australian courts and international law and suggested:  
The courts have begun to consider the role that international legal standards may play when an 
individual judge exercises judicial discretion. This trend in the case law reflects the growing 
significance of this method of utilising international human rights law in litigation, the potential of 
which is likely to be increasingly realised in the coming years.
145
  
 
These issues will be further considered in Chapter Four.  
 
8.6. Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in India 
A 2013 decision by the Supreme Court of India, in which Italy and India have sought to resolve 
competing claims to jurisdiction over two Italian naval officers accused of committing a criminal 
offence in the contiguous zone near the coast of India, has attracted international attention and will 
be the subject of analysis in Chapter Five. Aside from this, there has been little or no consideration 
of the assertion, or of the regulation, of extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction by India by authors 
outside India. There has, however, been judicial consideration of extraterritoriality in India and 
there is some literature on the relationship of international law and Indian municipal law. For 
example, B.S. Chimni has suggested that India has a complex relationship with international law 
because both its colonisation and independence ‗implicated the gaze of international law‘.146 V.G. 
Hedge has also considered the issue and has suggested that:  
Indian courts perceive the necessity of international law as a persuasive tool. Accordingly, 
international legal norms are consistently creeping into the domestic legal arena in different forms. 
The Indian courts, specifically the Supreme Court, as one could assess from the Indian experience, 
seek to incorporate or give effect to the international legal norms within the domestic sphere, albeit 
with a measure of caution.
147
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There is also literature on individual rights in India, as is also the case with the United States. This 
may be because of a shared experience with colonialism and the pursuit of independence. As 
Abhishek Singhvi has observed:   
As in U.S. history, the evolution of individual rights in India is a story of persistence by Indian 
citizens (especially by the political formation which was in the vanguard of the Indian independence 
movement) and an equally consistent rejection of this demand by the British‘.148  
 
8.7. Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in the United States 
There has been more judicial consideration, and more literature, on assertions of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction by the United States than there is in relation to either Australia or India. By way of 
background, in 1909, the Supreme Court of the United States held that ‗all legislation is prima facie 
territorial.‘149 At that time, law generally ended at territorial borders.150 At the turn of the century, 
however, the Court noted, ‗Congress has the authority to enforce its laws beyond the territorial 
boundaries of the United States.‘151 Since then, the extraterritorial application of laws has generally 
been determined by reference to legislative intent, either express or implied.
152
 In 1991, Mark 
Gibney observed that this stood in ‗stark contrast to the prevailing theory‘,153 at the turn of the 
century. Gibney expresses the view the application of legislation extraterritorially serves political 
purposes. He suggests, ‗US law has been applied extraterritorially when that has served the national 
interest of the United States or its corporate actors, and it has been given a territorial application 
when a restrictive interpretation would serve those same ends‘.154 Gibney also argues that the 
interpretation of Congress‘s intent to extend laws extraterritorially has been left too much in the 
hands of the judiciary, and that this has resulted in a ‗lack of institutional check on extraterritorial 
legislation‘.155 In his view, extraterritorial jurisdiction is an ‗anathema to the United States 
democratic system‘,156 because the State is not always accountable to the persons bound by its 
laws,
157
 in that they can not participate in the election of those who make these laws. Further, the 
situation can arise where the protections of the law and the Constitution do not follow the 
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application and enforcement of the law.
158
 Gibney suggests the remedy may lie in the judiciary 
playing a protective role to ensure ‗some form of representation for the politically powerless‘.159  
 
Gibney‘s work is useful to the thesis in identifying some of the theoretical problems with assertions 
of extraterritorial jurisdiction.  It is also used by this thesis to demonstrate inequitable treatment 
between those accused of territorial offences, as compared with those accused of extraterritorial 
offences. However, this thesis is more accepting of the inevitability of extraterritorial jurisdiction 
and does not necessarily consider it to be entirely inconsistent with democracy. Instead, it works 
towards developing principles to ensure better regulation of the extraterritorial space.  
 
Charles Doyle, in his report for the Congressional Research Service, hints at similar concerns. In 
context of a discussion on the extraterritorial application of due process protections in the 
Constitution, he observes: 
Unfortunately, many of the cases do little more than note that due process restrictions mark the 
frontier of the authority to enact and enforce American law abroad. [footnotes omitted] Even the 
value of this scant illumination is dimmed by the realization that the circumstances most likely to 
warrant such due process analysis are the very ones for which the least due process is due.
160 
 
Anthony Colangelo articulates the dilemma of extraterritorial jurisdiction as being ‗the need to 
evaluate how effectively to achieve justice through expanding notions of jurisdiction while 
respecting the rule of law and individual rights‘.161 In his view, the answer lies in the incorporation 
of principles of international law into United States domestic legal framework and judicial decision-
making. Colangelo is generally supportive of assertions of extraterritorial jurisdiction, in particular 
for organised transnational crimes such as terrorism.  
 
By contrast, Austen Parrish is a critic of assertions of extraterritorial jurisdiction by the United 
States. In a 2009 article, he suggests the United States has disengaged from international law by 
declining to join a number of significant multilateral treaties. In his view, this has left a void that 
has been filled by domestic law with extraterritorial reach.
162
 Parrish describes the acceptance, by 
most commentators of extraterritoriality as an inevitable by-product of globalisation, as 
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‗unfortunate‘.163 In his view, extraterritorial domestic legislation undermines the integrity of 
international law and national sovereignty. He argues unilateral legislation replaces meaningful 
multilateralism. Parrish suggests human rights and environmental rights are better protected when 
international problems are solved internationally, rather than unilaterally.
164
 He argues that 
‗multilateral treaty-making processes should be reinvigorated and traditional international 
lawmaking embraced, while domestic litigation should be used more cautiously in response to 
international challenges.‘165 Parrish‘s commentaries provide an alternative to the generally accepted 
view that an increased reliance on extraterritorial jurisdiction is inevitable.  
 
Notably, the United States has relied on controversial bases of extraterritoriality such as the passive 
personality principle. Another source of controversy in the approach of the United States to 
extraterritoriality is the so-called ‗Ker-Frisbie‘ and ‗dual sovereignty‘ doctrines. These will be 
considered in further detail in Chapter Six.  
 
8.8. Extraterritorial Criminal Jurisdiction and the Human Rights of Individuals  
Although the issue of extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction is attracting increasing interest from 
governments and academics, aside from the cases and commentary discussed above, there is little 
literature which analyses the means of its regulation and the impact that has on individual persons.  
As Michael Hirst observes: 
This topic [extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction] has attracted considerable interest in recent years, 
largely because of concerns raised by international terrorism, fraud, and other forms of high-profile 
transnational crime; but it has suffered from many years of neglect, and remains largely 
misunderstood by the majority of criminal lawyers.
166
 
 
This is a significant gap in the literature when considering that:  
As the criminal justice system is the most prominent and public means by which a State may deprive 
any person falling under its jurisdiction of their liberty, issues relating to the criminal justice process 
are intimately connected with human rights issues.
167
 
 
Although there is little literature on the protection of individual rights in an extraterritorial context, 
there is, however, an extensive body of literature on the nature of procedural rights and notions of 
due process generally.  As a starting point, Joel Feinberg suggests ‗to have a right is to have a claim 
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against someone whose recognition as valid is called for by some set of governing rules‘.168 As for 
what makes a right either procedural or substantive, the literature suggests that it is not always easy 
to distinguish between the two. Michael Bayles provides a useful starting point: 
Most people have a common-sense grasp of the difference. Procedure concerns the process or steps 
taken in arriving at a decision; substance concerns the content of the decision. The two are 
conceptually distinct, for one can use different procedures for the same substantive issue and the 
same procedure for different substantive issues.
169
  
 
Mathew McCubbins, Roger Noll and Barry Weingast suggest the distinction is not quite so simple 
because procedural rights are ‗designed to serve various normative ends, such as due process and 
deliberative rationality‘.170 Larry Alexander takes a similar view and posits that procedural rights 
are actually just particular kinds of substantive rights; the rights against risk.
171
 He describes 
procedural rights simply as the ‗constitutional and non-constitutional … legal rights that govern 
official adjudications‘. He also argues: 
 
Such procedural rights as ―the right to a hearing‖, ―the right to a trial by jury‖, ―the right to proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt‖, and ―the right to an attorney‖ are normatively defensible only by 
reference to a complete elaboration of the substantive rights at stake when such procedural rights are 
invoked.
172
 
 
As for notions of due process, Larry May suggests that due process can be understood as fairness.  
He suggests fairness ‗is not a State or outcome, but a way or method to reach States or 
outcomes.‘173 In May‘s view, due process is largely concerned with procedural rights, the purpose 
of which is to ‗put a stop to arbitrariness of the actions of rulers and their agents.‘174 He presents 
procedural rights as being as equally important as substantive rights, asserting that ‗some procedural 
rights are also extremely important human rights that the international community should protect as 
vigilantly as certain better known substantive rights.‘175  
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The literature generally conceives of due process and procedural rights in an administrative or 
constitutional law paradigm. Administrative and constitutional law generally form part of the body 
of law referred to as ‗public law‘. Jeremy Farrall and Kim Rubenstein describe the purpose of 
domestic administrative law as being to ‗regulate accountability and governance within the 
nation.‘176 Carol Harlow agrees and suggests the primary function of administrative and 
constitutional law is the ‗control of public power‘,177 which in turn is essential to the rule of law. As 
Immanuel Kant mused, ‗to preserve freedom, order must be created to restrict it‘.178 The 
International Commission of Jurists (the Commission) asserts that judicial oversight is key to the 
control of public power, and the rule of law.  In 2011, the Commission Stated, ‗[j]udicial oversight 
of the constitutionality or legality of the acts of the political branches is a requisite of the rule of 
law‘.179 This is particularly the case in the administration of criminal justice because ‗such function 
is of greatest importance when … an individual is deprived of his or her liberty.‘180 However, as L 
Song Richardson observes, ‗the fairness and accuracy norms that underpin criminal prosecutions 
are increasingly ephemeral and illusory.‘181 Simon Chesterman makes the point that notions of 
accountability should not simply be a reaction to scandal, but instead should exist as rights and 
standards.
182
 
 
There is also some literature on the importance of the rule of law, procedural rights and due process 
in the context of the development of the emerging field of global administrative law. For example, 
May expresses the view that ‗infirmities of international law ... can be cured by focusing more on 
procedural rights than is commonly done.‘183 Battini goes further and suggests that global 
institutions would benefit from typical administrative law content such as due process, and that a 
‗kind of Global Rule of Law is thus emerging, in order to remedy the problem of regulation without 
representation in our new globalised world.‘184 Chesterman also engages with the concept of a 
global administrative law to help ‗frame questions of accountability and sketch some appropriate 
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responses.‘185  He makes the observation that it is only the ‗jurisdictional walls erected along the 
boundaries of nation States‘186 and the principle of State sovereignty that separates principles of 
domestic public law and international public law. In his view, increasing use of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction and the forces of globalisation have weakened both jurisdictional walls, and traditional 
notions of State sovereignty. In turn, Chesterman argues, ‗the domestic and international rule of law 
are not only linked conceptually but practically in that they are mutually reinforcing and, at least 
partially, mutually interdependent‘,187 In a similar vein, Peter Danchin suggests the notion of a 
static divide between domestic and international law is ‗both descriptively and normatively 
unconvincing‘,188 and therefore calls for ‗more sophisticated accounts of transnational, 
supernational, and global law‘.189  
 
The literature on principles of global administrative law and accountability is concerned with global 
institutions and procedures. It does not extend to the domestic institutions and laws extending into 
extraterritorial space. Therefore, this thesis seeks to contribute to the literature by considering the 
regulation of jurisdiction in the context not only of international law, but also of municipal law.  
 
In summary, the gap in the literature which this thesis seeks to address is the way in which 
municipal law and international law interact in the regulation of extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction 
in Australia, India and the United States and what that means for the individual persons accused of 
extraterritorial offences. This is a significant gap because the existing literature tends to focus only 
on international law, or if considering municipal law, on European or United States jurisprudence. 
Although the United States experience is still considered in this thesis, it is hoped that the inclusion 
of analysis on the Australian and Indian experience will add to the body of literature on jurisdiction 
and to the broader debate on the regulation of extraterritoriality.  
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CHAPTER TWO:  PRINCIPLES OF EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION 
Chapter Two is concerned with the circumstances in which a nation State can assert extraterritorial 
criminal jurisdiction under international law.  It provides a historical context to assertions of 
extraterritoriality in the twenty-first century and introduces the principles of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction under international law. This Chapter makes some preliminary conclusions as to some 
of the problems with extraterritorial jurisdiction and the circumstances in which extraterritorial 
jurisdiction should not be exercised. It is relevant to the thesis as whole because it provides the 
framework through which extraterritoriality is conceived under international law. It also serves to 
illustrate why the issue of extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction is worthy of attention.  
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1. Introduction  
In international law, the term ‗jurisdiction‘ describes the rights of States to regulate conduct, and the 
limit on those rights. Domestic law prescribes the extent to which States make use of those rights. 
Under customary international law, States are entitled to exercise jurisdiction on three main bases: 
territoriality, nationality, and universality. Put simply, the nationality principle can provide a state 
with grounds for jurisdiction where a victim (passive nationality) or a perpetrator (active 
nationality) is a national of that state. The territoriality principle may be invoked where conduct 
either takes place within a nation‘s borders (subjective territoriality), or the effects of the conduct 
are felt within the borders (objective territoriality). The universality principle is reserved for 
50 
 
conduct recognised as a crime under international crime, such as piracy, genocide and crimes 
against humanity. International law also recognises a ‗protective principle‘, wherein a state can 
assert jurisdiction over foreign conduct that threatens national security.  There is also some support 
for an ‗effects principle‘, which gives jurisdiction over extraterritorial conduct, the effects of which 
are felt by a state. These will all be discussed in further detail below.   
 
This Chapter sets out some of the historical development of extraterritorial jurisdiction, and 
introduces the principles of extraterritorial jurisdiction. It then presents some preliminary 
conclusions on the grounds on which States, such as Australia, India and the United States, ought 
not assert extraterritorial jurisdiction. This Chapter is relevant to the thesis as whole because it 
provides the framework through which extraterritoriality is conceived under international law. It 
also serves to illustrate why the issue of extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction is worthy of attention. 
 
2. Historical context  
2.1. Pre-Twentieth Century: early developments 
Traditionally, the geographical boundaries of a nation state provided the foundation for 
jurisdictional queries. Territoriality was considered a defining pillar of international law.  For 
example, in the 1600s, the treaties of Westphalia conceptualized a nation‘s power as ending at its 
territorial borders.
1
 In this way, regardless of economic or military disparities, each state possessed 
exclusive jurisdiction within its own territory.
2
 However, the concept of extraterritorial jurisdiction 
was not unknown. For example, it existed in medieval Italy, sixteenth-century Brittany, and 
seventeenth-century Germany.
3
  Further, during the nineteenth century some European jurisdictions 
began to claim jurisdiction over extraterritorial acts committed by non-citizens that threatened the 
security of the state.
4
 Nonetheless, extraterritorial jurisdiction occurred as an exception, rather than 
as a rule.  
 
2.2. Twentieth Century  
In 1927, the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) delivered judgment in the Lotus case.
5
 
This decision was a turning point in jurisdictional jurisprudence. The PCIJ considered whether 
Turkey, in instituting criminal proceedings against a French national over a collision on the high 
                                               
1
 Leo Gross, ‗The Peace of Westphalia, 1648-1948‘ (1948) 42 American Journal of International Law 20, 28-29, 42.  
2
 Austen Parrish, ‗The Effects Test: Extraterritoriality‘s Fifth Business‘ Vanderbilt Law Review 611455, 1464. 
3
 Michael Akehurst, ‗Jurisdiction in International Law‘ (1972-1973) 46 British Yearbook of International Law 145, 163.  
4
 Ibid 157-8. 
5
 The S.S. Lotus (France v Turkey) (Judgment) [1927] PCIJ (ser A) No. 10. 
51 
 
seas between a Turkish ship and a French ship resulting in the death of Turkish nationals, acted in 
conflict with international law.
6
  The French government submitted that the Turkish courts, in order 
to have jurisdiction, must be able to identify a specific title to jurisdiction given to Turkey in 
international law.
7
 Conversely, the Turkish government took the view that it inherently had 
jurisdiction, provided such jurisdiction did not come into conflict with a principle of international 
law.
8
  The PCIJ stated: 
International law governs relations between independent States. The rules of law binding upon States 
therefore emanate from their own free will as expressed in conventions or by usages generally 
accepted as expressing principles of law and established in order to regulate the relations between 
these co-existing independent communities or with a view to the achievement of common aims. 
Restrictions upon the independence of States cannot therefore be presumed.
9
 
  
And, while observing that ‗jurisdiction is certainly territorial‘,10 the PCIJ found:  
It does not, however, follow that international law prohibits a State from exercising jurisdiction in its 
own territory, in respect of any case which relates to acts which have taken place abroad, and in 
which it cannot rely on some permissive rule of international law. Such a view would only be 
tenable if international law contained a general prohibition…11 
  
The Court concluded, in what has become a frequently cited passage and articulates what could be 
described as the ‗Lotus principle‘,  
… Far from laying down a general prohibition to the effect that States may not extend the application 
of their laws and the jurisdiction of their courts to persons, property and acts outside their territory, it 
leaves them in this respect a wide measure of discretion which is only limited to certain cases by 
prohibitive rules (emphasis added); as regards other cases, every State remains free to adopt the 
principles which it regards as best and most suitable.
12
 
 
In this way, the PCIJ established a presumption in favour of a nation‘s extraterritorial jurisdiction, 
in the absence of a prohibitive rule. Some commentators attribute the development of the ‗effects 
test‘ to the decision in the Lotus case having undermined ‗territoriality as a limiting constraint on 
legislative jurisdiction‘.13  Following the decision in Lotus, domestic courts began to grapple with 
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the consequences of assertions of extraterritorial jurisdiction.  Although Austen Parrish argues that 
jurisdiction based solely on territoriality well ‗served the goals of ‗predictability and efficiency‘,14 
by the mid-1900s the ‗heyday‘ of territorial jurisdiction had begun its demise.15 As economies 
became increasingly interconnected there was an increased interest in regulating cross-border 
activities, such as transnational crime and the activities of multinational corporations.
16
 In some 
cases, the interest in extraterritoriality became associated with attempts to enforce human rights.
17
  
 
The prosecution of war crimes after World War II was also pivotal in the development of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction. The adjudication of war crimes in the Nuremberg trials ‗transformed our 
understanding of jurisdiction‘.18  The trials are often described as an exercise of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction that sought to bring ‗accused war criminals to account on behalf of the entire world 
community of civilized nations.‘19 Although it has been argued by some commentators that the 
allied forces were in fact exercising territorial jurisdiction as sovereigns over occupied territory,
20
 it 
is widely accepted that the Nuremberg trials were an exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction based 
on the universality principle. Following the Nuremberg trials, Israel‘s prosecution of Otto Adolf 
Eichmann,
21
 for his involvement in administering the so-called ‗final solution‘ against members of 
the Jewish community in World War II,
22
 in Attorney General of the Government of Israel v 
Eichmann,
23
 is also widely cited as an example of extraterritorial jurisdiction. Nonetheless, as late 
as 1990, Francis (FA) Mann observed: 
Normally no State is allowed to apply its legislation to foreigners in respect of acts done by them 
outside the dominions of the sovereign power enacting. That is a rule based on international law, by 
which one sovereign power is bound to respect the subjects and the rights of all over sovereign 
powers outside its own territory.
24
 
 
                                               
14
 Parrish, above n 2, 1467. 
15
 Ibid. 
16
 Ibid, 1469. 
17
 Ibid,1470. 
18
 Ruti Teitel, ‗Nuremberg and its Legacy: Fifty Years Later‘ in B Cooper (ed), War Crimes: the Legacy of Nuremberg 
(TV Books, 1990) 44, 50. Note the term ‗Nuremberg trials‘ refers to trials of 22 leading German officials for war crimes 
between 1945 and 1946. The trials took place in Nuremberg, Germany.  
19
 William Simons, ‗The Jurisdictional Bases of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg‘ in G Ginsburgs and 
V Kudriavtsev (eds), The Nuremberg Trial and International Law (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1990) 39, 52.  
20
 Mahmoud Cherif Bassiouni, ‗Universal Jurisdiction for International Crimes: Historical Perspectives and 
Contemporary Practice‘ (2001) 42 Virginia Journal of International Law 81, 96-97. 
21
 A German Nazi SS - Obersturmbannführer (lieutenant colonel). 
22
 The term ‗final solution‘ was used by the Nazi regime to describe a policy of genocide against Jewish people.  
23
 (1961) 36 International Law Reports 5. 
24
 Frederick Alexander (FA) Mann, Further Studies in International Law (Oxford University Press, 1990) 5. 
53 
 
He was also of the view that ‗the nationality of the defendant is now probably an insufficient link to 
provide the courts of his home state with jurisdiction over him.‘25 By the end of the twentieth and 
beginning of the twenty-first centuries, a number of treaties called on States to assert extraterritorial 
jurisdiction. For example, the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) and the Optional 
Protocol on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography together require parties 
to criminalise child prostitution whether or not the acts occur domestically or extraterritorially.
26
 All 
but two countries of the world are now party to the CRC, making it one of the most universally 
ratified of all United Nations conventions.
27
  
 
Other examples include the international anti-corruption frameworks. The major international 
treaties on anti-corruption all either require or permit a degree of extraterritorial jurisdiction.
28
 
Similarly, international treaties relating to terrorism and torture also permit some assertions of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction. For example, the International Convention for the Suppression of 
Terrorist Bombings calls upon parties to assert jurisdiction on the basis of both passive and active 
nationality,
29
 and the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism 
calls upon parties to assert active nationality jurisdiction.
30
 The Convention against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment also permits States to exercise active 
nationality jurisdiction, and passive nationality, where a state deems it to be ‗appropriate‘.31  
 
2.3. Twenty-first Century developments 
Many States now have domestic legislation with extraterritorial reach.  By way of example, States 
as diverse as Singapore,
32
 Indonesia,
33
 Zimbabwe,
34
 Iraq,
35
 Russia,
36
 France,
37
 the United 
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Kingdom,
38
 Mexico,
39
 Canada,
40
 the United States,
41
 Japan,
42
 Israel
43
 and Thailand
44
 have at least 
some legislative provisions with extraterritorial effect. Geographical conceptions of territory are 
‗becoming a less salient feature of the international legal landscape.‘45 States are acting on treaty 
obligations, reacting to world events, or seeking to achieve political objectives.
46
  Undoubtedly, 
high-profile terrorist attacks such as the events in the United States in September 2001, and Internet 
leaks such as those by the organization ‗Wikileaks‘, have resulted in increased efforts by States to 
regulate extraterritorial conduct. These particular efforts will be further discussed in Chapter Six.  
 
The Internet poses particular challenges for jurisdictional frameworks. As Ellisa Okoniewski 
observes, ‗because anyone can view information on the Internet, every nation has an interest in 
regulating it … and determining which nation has jurisdiction over a particular issue can have a 
significant impact on the outcome.‘ 47 For example, in UEJF & LICRA v Yahoo!, Inc. & Yahoo! 
France, Yahoo! Inc (Yahoo),
48
 Yahoo, an Internet service provider, was prosecuted for breaching 
the French Penal Code, under which it is an offence to sell, exchange or display Nazi-related 
materials or Third Reich memorabilia.
49
 The prosecution followed complaints from two French 
non-profit organisations about Yahoo‘s auction site, which allowed the posting of Nazi and Third 
Reich memorabilia.
50
 Yahoo was incorporated under the laws of Delaware and operated principally 
in California in the United States. The Tribunal in France found that since French citizens have 
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access to Nazi and Third Reich material on Yahoo‘s Internet site, Yahoo had breached the relevant 
provisions of the French Penal Code.
51
 Subsequently, Yahoo successfully sought a declaration in 
the United States, its place of incorporation, that the orders made in France were not enforceable in 
the laws of the United States on the basis that the orders would breach the constitutional guarantees 
of free speech.
52
   
 
Given the increased interest in regulating extraterritorially, States now need clear frameworks by 
which to do so. A substantive conception of the rule of law and the abuse of rights doctrine may 
assist in providing this framework, and this is discussed in later Chapters.  However, first, the 
principles of extraterritorial jurisdiction under international law are considered.  
 
3. Principles of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction 
The principles of extraterritorial jurisdiction are now explored in further detail. Differential time 
and attention will be given to each principle, because some principles are less controversial than 
others and require less explanation.  Nonetheless, the nature of the principle, an example of that 
principle, and whether or not there is debate on that principle is described for each.  
 
3.1. The Territoriality Principle 
What is the territorial principle of jurisdiction? 
The territoriality principle is the most common basis of jurisdiction,
53
 and is widely regarded as a 
manifestation of state sovereignty.
54
 At its simplest, the territoriality principle denotes that a state 
has jurisdiction over conduct that occurs within territorial borders. It has both subjective and 
objective limbs. Subjective territoriality describes the jurisdiction of a state over conduct that occurs 
entirely within that State‘s borders. It generally requires that the accused be present in that territory 
at the time the conduct was committed. Objective territoriality refers to the jurisdiction of a state 
over conduct that only partially occurs in that state‘s territory. In particular, a territorial conception 
of jurisdiction is deeply rooted in common-law countries. One reason for this in common-law 
jurisdictions is the need for trial by jury, and original conceptions of the jury being part of the 
community in which the crime was committed.
55
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What is an example of territorial jurisdiction?  
An example of subjective territorial jurisdiction is a murder committed in the physical territory of 
State A. The arrest, trial and imprisonment of the perpetrator in State A are on the basis of territorial 
jurisdiction.  An example of objective territorial jurisdiction takes place on the border between two 
States, State A and State B. A gun is fired across the border from State A into State B, where it 
causes injury. Although, the trigger was pulled in State A, the injury from the bullet occurred in 
State B.  In that scenario, State B may assert jurisdiction on the basis of objective territorial 
jurisdiction. Another example of objective territorial jurisdiction is an offence relating to trafficking 
in migrants. In order to take persons from State A into State B, preparations may be made in State A. 
The remaining parts of the conduct may occur in State B. This may also give rise to objective 
territorial jurisdiction. In both cases, if the either the victim or the perpetrator is a national of a state 
other than State A or State B, that other state may also be able to assert jurisdiction based on the 
nationality principle. This is further discussed below in relation to the nationality principle.  
 
Is there debate on this principle? 
From a theoretical standpoint, it is uncontroversial and universally recognised that a State may 
assert jurisdiction over activities in its own territory.
56
 It is commonly relied on. As Michael 
Akehurst has observed: 
One of the main functions of a State is to maintain order within its own territory, so it is not 
surprising that the territorial principles is the most frequently invoked ground for criminal 
jurisdiction …57 
Nonetheless, objective territoriality may involve competing jurisdictional claims.
58
  For example, as 
set out in Chapter One, the decision of the PCIJ in Lotus,
59
 involved competing claims to 
jurisdiction as between Turkey and France. The PCIJ in that case was prepared to accept a 
presumption of jurisdictional rights in the absence of any prohibitive rule. To use the human 
trafficking example above, although parts of the conduct will have taken place in State A, others 
were consummated in State B.  If each of State A and State B wished to assert jurisdiction, this may 
give rise to a competing claim. International law does not clearly set out a hierarchy of 
jurisdictional claims, other than by reference to principles of jurisdictional restraint, such as 
reasonableness. These and other principles of jurisdictional restraint will be discussed in greater 
detail in Chapter Three.  
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3.2. The Nationality Principle 
What is the nationality principle of jurisdiction?  
The nationality principle authorises extraterritorial jurisdiction by a State over its nationals, even 
where the subject conduct may have occurred extraterritorially. Like the territorial principle of 
jurisdiction, this principle also has two limbs.  If jurisdiction is asserted over a national accused of 
being a perpetrator of extraterritorial conduct, this is described as ‗active nationality‘. If the national 
is a victim of extraterritorial conduct, then jurisdiction over that national is termed ‗passive 
nationality‘. Civil-law jurisdictions rely on the nationality principle to a ‗far greater extent‘,60 than 
common-law countries. For example, countries such as the United States, Canada and Australia 
tend to assert nationality jurisdiction on an ad-hoc basis, and for specific offences. This means that 
not all criminal offences in those jurisdictions will have extraterritorial effect, and they are 
generally presumed not to unless otherwise specified. In contrast, European countries such as 
France and Switzerland have a broader range of offences with extraterritorial reach. For example, 
the French Penal Code provides:  
French criminal law is applicable to any felony, as well as to any misdemeanour punishable by 
imprisonment, committed by a French national or by a foreigner outside the territory of the republic 
when the victim is of French nationality at the time of the offense.
61
 
 
This provision is an example of both active and passive personality jurisdiction. There is generally a 
connection between the prohibition on extradition of nationals and the broad assertion of 
extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction over nationals.
62
  
 
What is an example of the nationality principle? 
Domestic child sexual offences with extraterritorial reach are an example of active nationality 
jurisdiction. State A may legislate to criminalise sexual activities between its nationals and children, 
regardless of where that activity takes place. It may seek extradition of the national or, if the activity 
is discovered on the national‘s return to State A, simply prosecute in much the same way as for a 
territorial offence. An example of passive nationality jurisdiction is State A legislating to make it an 
offence to recklessly or intentionally harm, commit manslaughter or seriously injure a State A 
citizen or resident anywhere in the world.  
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Is there debate on the nationality principle?  
States are described as having ‗an unlimited right to base jurisdiction on the nationality of the 
accused.‘63 There is uncertainty as to how nationality is to be defined. Traditional models of 
citizenship and nationality have been altered by globalisation
64
 and increased mobility of persons.  
Larry May articulates this when he asserts that it is a ‗mistake to say that there are citizens and yet 
for it to be unclear what political community these citizens are connected to.‘65 International law is 
generally neutral toward a grant of nationality, provided the granting state does not breach certain 
international obligations, such as those under the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness.
 66
 
This means that determination as to who is a ‗national‘ for the purpose of the nationality principle is 
a matter largely left to individual States. By way of example, Australia‘s child-sex tourism laws 
assert extraterritorial jurisdiction over citizens and residents, and persons and corporate entities.
67
 
Given that residents have no right to vote in parliamentary elections, this raises issues as to the 
legitimacy of assertions of authority over Australian residents overseas. It is also problematic in that 
residents are not always considered nationals in other aspects of the law, and, therefore, residents 
are not truly nationals under Australian law. In this way, assertions of jurisdiction over residents 
may be outside the nationality principle. For dual citizens, there is also the possibility of persons 
being subject to multiple, and potentially conflicting, legislative regimes. Kim Rubenstein observes:  
Domestic laws about who is and who is not a citizen vary significantly, and laws relating to 
citizenship in each of the different States are also different.  As a result, many people hold more than 
one nationality by fulfilling the formal requirements for citizenship in more than one domestic legal 
framework.
68
 
 
The idea that every individual may be subject to the laws of multiple States in all places, and at all 
times is described as ‗intolerable‘.69 This is because of the lack of legal certainty that might ensue. 
Further, there is also debate on the scope of both the active and the passive limbs of the nationality 
principle. 
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i) Active nationality 
A report for the Harvard Corporate Social Responsibility Initiative,
70
 suggests that States regard the 
active nationality principle as the strongest basis for direct extraterritorial jurisdiction.
71
 This is 
supported by scholars such as Ian Brownlie,
72
 Robert Jennings and Arthur Watts.
73
 Other more 
recent commentators, however, have expressed concern as to the underlying philosophical 
justifications for the principle. For example, Alejandro Chehtman claims that, ‗as a basis for 
criminal jurisdiction, the nationality principle is altogether unjustified at the bar of justice.‘74 He 
argues that ‗individuals in any given state lack an interest in having that state‘s criminal laws 
enforced against them or their co-nationals (or co-residents) abroad.‘75 By way of example, and 
referring to assertions of extraterritorial jurisdiction by Spain, he suggests:  
Inhabitants of Spain may feel horrified by a particular crime committed outside its territory by a co-
national, but their belief in the system of criminal laws under which they live being in force is not 
undermined by these offences.
76
  
 
Paul Arnell, in contrast, argues that the nationality principle is symbolic of an evolution from 
narrow, self-interested territorial interests to a broader collective interest in the conduct of nationals 
overseas.
77
 He suggests that greater reliance on the nationality principle is justified on three 
grounds. First, he argues that given that the conduct of nationals overseas is already regulated on an 
ad-hoc basis, a standard framework should be developed to govern its use more broadly.
78
 It is 
possible that this has merit; a standardised framework would allow for greater transparency and 
consistency in the employment of the nationality principle.  Second, he argues that exercises of 
jurisdiction on the basis of nationality can be used to ensure that the accused receives a fair trial.
79
 
Arnell refers to the United Kingdom, where the rights to a fair trial, liberty, and freedom from 
retrospective legislation are all part of municipal law, and therefore would be guaranteed to 
nationals being prosecuted for extraterritorial criminal conduct. While this assurance of basic 
human rights is certainly desirable, the reverse could equally be true. Nationals of States that do not 
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guarantee those same human rights could equally assert jurisdiction over the conduct of their 
nationals overseas, thereby depriving a person of those rights.   Finally, Arnell argues that the 
mobility of people has changed the relationship between citizen and state to the extent where 
territorial boundaries are less relevant, and so the relationship ought to be governed by the 
nationality principle.
80
  
 
ii) Passive Nationality  
The existence and use of the passive nationality (or passive personality) principle is particularly 
controversial, perhaps because of the particular challenge it poses for territorial-based systems of 
regulation.
81
 Of all the grounds discussed in this thesis, it is the only one not included in the Draft 
Convention on Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime.
82
 As a ground of criminal jurisdiction, it has 
been described as the ‗most contested in contemporary international law.‘83 In his dissenting 
judgment in the Lotus case, Judge Moore expressed his reservation on the passive nationality 
principle thus:  
[A]n inhabitant of a great commercial city ... may in the course of an hour unconsciously fall under 
the operation of a number of foreign criminal codes ... this ... is at variance not only with the 
principle of exclusive jurisdiction of a State over its own territory, but also with the equally well 
settled principle that a person visiting a foreign country ... falls under the dominion of the local 
law.
84
 
 
In particular, the passive nationality principle has potential to create legal uncertainty. Where a 
person is generally aware of their own nationality, they may not be aware of the nationality of the 
persons with whom they interact. For example, a person in State A, when he or she acts, may not be 
aware of the nationality of Citizen X, and therefore will not be in a position to assess the legal 
framework in which his or her conduct will be assessed.
85
 Nonetheless, examples of State practice 
indicate the international community is increasingly willing to accept assertions of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction on the basis of the passive nationality principle.
86
 This is particularly so where the 
conduct constitutes a serious crime such as terrorism, hijacking or hostage-taking.
87
 As three 
Justices of the International Court of Justice have observed, the passive personality principle, ‗for so 
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long regarded as controversial, is now reflected … in the legislation of various countries … and 
today meets with relatively little opposition, at least so far as a particular category of offences is 
concerned‘.88 
 
3.3. The Universality Principle 
What is the universality principle? 
The universality principle refers to the right of States to assert jurisdiction over serious international 
crimes regardless of where the conduct occurs, or the nationality of the perpetrator(s).
89
 The theory 
is that some crimes are so offensive to international peace and security that all States are regarded 
as having a legitimate interest in their proscription and punishment.
90
 Unlike other grounds of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction, which demand some connection with the regulating state (such as the 
nationality of the perpetrator or the victim), this principle provides every state with a basis to 
prosecute certain international crimes.  
 
The scope of universal jurisdiction is conceived of in two different ways: conditional and absolute. 
A conditional conception of universal jurisdiction requires the presence of the accused in the 
prosecuting state. 
91
   An absolute conception, in contrast, does not require the presence of the 
accused.
92
 This is sometimes described as ‗universal jurisdiction in absentia‘. The latter is far more 
controversial, and is not widely accepted as a sound basis for jurisdiction.
93
 
 
The issue of universal jurisdiction was considered by the ICJ in the Arrest Warrant Case 
(Democratic Republic of the Congo v Belgium).
94
 However, in that case, the members of the Court 
were divided on their views. As Matthias Goldmann has observed, the ‗members of the ICJ 
appended to the judgment a total of four Separate Opinions, one Joint Separate Opinion authored by 
three judges, three Dissenting Opinions, and one Declaration, representing a wide range of views in 
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particular on the issues of immunities and universal jurisdiction‘.95 By way of example, three of the 
Judges in their joint separate opinion,
96
 and a dissenting Judge,
97
 accepted the permissibility of 
universal jurisdiction in absentia. By contrast, President Guillaume and Judge Rezak were of the 
view that in order to assert universal jurisdiction, a state must have the accused person in its 
territory.
98
   The issue of universal jurisdiction was also considered by the ICJ in Belgium v 
Senegal,
99
 although not nearly as extensively as in the Arrest Warrant Case. In that case, the 
judgment of the court expressed the view that not only are States permitted to exercise universal 
jurisdiction, but under the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman 
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
100
 they are obliged to do so.
101
  
 
What is an example of universal jurisdiction?  
In earlier times, the reach of extraterritorial jurisdiction on the basis of universality was limited to 
piracy and the slave trade.
102
 For example, international law grants every state the authority to assert 
jurisdiction over piracy and slave-trading because those crimes are ‗prototypal offences that  ... have 
long been considered the enemies of humanity.‘103 It has expanded since World War II, to the extent 
that there is now no firm consensus as to which crimes are subject to universal jurisdiction.
104
 
Prosecutions over war crimes and crimes against humanity in the post-World War II era also relied 
heavily on the universality principle.
105
 As noted earlier, the prosecution of war crimes in the 
Nuremberg tribunals and Israel‘s prosecution in Eichmann are considered examples of universal 
jurisdiction. The Court before which Mr Eichmann was tried in Israel found that:
106
  
The[se] abhorrent crimes … are crimes not under Israeli law alone. These crimes which offended the 
whole of mankind and shocked the conscience of nations are grave offences against the law of 
nations itself. Therefore, far from international law negating or limiting the jurisdiction of countries 
with respect to such crimes … the international law is in need of the judicial and legislative 
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authorities of every country to give effect to its penal injunctions and bring criminals to trial. The 
jurisdiction to try crimes under international law is universal.  
 
A more recent example can be seen in the French prosecution between 2013 and 2014, of Pascal 
Simbikangwa, a Rwandan national, for the crimes of complicity in genocide and complicity in 
crimes against humanity.
107
 The offences, for which a French court found Mr Simbikangwa guilty, 
took place in Rwanda in 1994.
108
 Rather than refer cases to the International Criminal Tribunal of 
Rwanda, France prosecuted the crimes under French legislation with extraterritorial reach. 
Reportedly, France did not extradite Mr Simbikangwa to Rwanda on the basis that he would not 
receive a fair trial.
 109
  
 
Is there debate on the universality principle? 
There is little to no debate on the existence of the universality principle, but there is some debate as 
to its scope. Critics of universal jurisdiction argue that the courts and prosecutors ‗are completely 
unaccountable to the citizens of the nation whose fate they are relying upon.‘110 Since absolute 
universal jurisdiction allows prosecution by any country at any time, there are also concerns as to 
due process. For example, George Fletcher warns that universal jurisdiction may result in ‗hounding 
an accused in one court after another until the victims are satisfied that justice has been done.‘111   
 
The response to Belgium‘s assertions of universal jurisdiction indicates that States are still resistant 
to a broad conception of universal jurisdiction. Criminal prosecutions were instituted in Belgian 
courts against current and former leaders of Chad, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Iran, Iraq, 
Israel, Cote d‘Ivoire, the Palestinian Authority, the United States, and others.112  Individuals such as 
the then United States Secretary of State, Colin Powell, were named. There was a strong reaction, 
particularly from the United States and Israel. Israel withdrew its ambassador.  The United States 
warned that Belgium risked losing its status as headquarters of North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO), and that US officials would stop visiting Belgium if it did not further restrict its laws on 
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universal jurisdiction.
113
  Consequently, Belgium bowed to this pressure, and amended its laws, 
‗leaving scant scope for universal jurisdiction.‘114  
 
3.4. The Protective Principle 
What is the protective principle? 
The protective principle is invoked to justify claims of extraterritorial jurisdiction by a regulating 
State for offences against its national interest. This might include the security, integrity, sovereignty 
or government functions of that State.
115
 In particular, a State may rely on the protective principle 
because acts that threaten its security or national interest may not be illegal in the State where they 
are being performed.
116
  
 
What is an example of protective principle jurisdiction? 
The protective principle has been used to prosecute extraterritorial offences relating to 
counterfeiting currency, desecration of flags, economic crimes, forgery of official documents such 
as passports and visas, and political offences (such as treason).
117
  For example, in Joyce v DPP,
118
 
an American citizen gained a British passport by fraudulent means and worked for German radio 
during World War II. It was argued on behalf of the accused that the United Kingdom did not have 
jurisdiction to try a non-national for a crime committed outside British territory. The Court rejected 
this argument on the basis that:  
No principle of comity demands that a State should ignore the crime of treason committed against it 
outside its territory.  On the contrary a proper regard for its own security requires that all those who 
commit that crime, whether they commit it within or without the realm should be amenable to its 
laws.
119
  
 
Is there debate on the protective principle? 
Given uncertainties as to what constitutes a sufficient threat to ‗national interest‘, the protective 
principle is open to abuse.  While jurisdiction over counterfeiting of state documents is 
unobjectionable, some States have made far wider claims.  For example, in the 1960s and 1970s, 
companies that purchased goods from the United States and undertook not to on-sell those goods to 
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communist countries were liable for prosecution in the United States if they breached that 
undertaking.
120
 The Hungarian Criminal Code once spoke sweepingly of offences against ‗a 
fundamental interest relating to the democratic, political and economic order.‘121 Notoriously, Nazi 
Germany prosecuted extraterritorial acts that threatened the racial purity of the nation.
122
 As 
Akehurst has stated,
123
  
A State is entitled to impose its ideology on its nationals and on all persons present in its territory; it 
is also entitled to oblige both categories of persons to take its side in its struggles against other 
States. But it is not entitled to make such demands on aliens living in foreign countries.  
 
Nonetheless, most commentators accept the legitimacy of the protective principle. For example, 
Chehtman accepts that individuals within a given State have a collective interest in the security of 
their State being protected.
124
 He argues that ‗the fact that a given State can abuse a right it has is 
hardly a conclusive argument against it initially holding that right.‘125 Similarly, Gillian Triggs 
notes that the protective principle is open to abuse, but observes that reliance on the principle is 
generally limited to exceptional cases and particular categories of offences.
126
 She also suggests that 
concerns about terrorism have led to a growing acceptance by the community of assertions of 
extraterritoriality on the basis of the protective principle.
127
 
 
3.5. The Effects Principle 
What is the effects principle? 
Commentators on extraterritoriality often refer to the effects principle as an additional basis for 
asserting extraterritorial jurisdiction. The effects principle allows States to assert jurisdiction over 
conduct occurring extraterritorially if that conduct has an effect on their territory. The effects 
principle is easily confused with objective territoriality. It differs from objective territoriality, 
however, in that no constituent element of the offence takes place within the territory of the 
asserting State.
128
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What is an example of effects principle jurisdiction? 
Legislation drafted as applying in State A to ‗conduct both within or having an effect within the 
territory‘129 of State A, would be an assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction on the basis of the 
effects principle. Jurisdiction on the basis of offences that merely produced effects in their territory 
has generally been claimed in the context of anti-trust and competition laws, including by the 
United States,
130
 Argentina, Mexico, China, Cuba,
131
 and in the European Community,
132
 now the 
European Union. For example, in 1977, the European Commission stated that members of the then 
European Community were permitted to,  
act against restrictions of competition whose effects are felt within the territory under their 
jurisdiction, even if companies involved are locating and doing business outside the territory, and of 
foreign nationality, have no link with that territory, and are acting under an agreement governed by 
foreign law.
133
 
 
Is there debate on the effects principle? 
The scope of the effects principle is controversial, particularly regarding the proposition that a 
purely economic effect would suffice.
134
 Deborah Senz and Hilary Charlesworth have observed that 
‗the effects doctrine has been widely criticised‘,135 and that, ‗while courts, scholars and 
governments generally assume that there are limits to the enforcement of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction, there is little agreement as to what those limits are‘.136 
 
One of the key problems is that in expanding the jurisdiction of the regulating State, the effects 
principle fails to provide an effective framework for protecting the interests of other States who 
might be affected by this expansion. Parrish is also of the view that the effects principle has 
expanded the potential for jurisdictional conflict between States. He describes it as the ‗beginning 
of the end to meaningful territorial limits to legislative jurisdiction‘,137 and as ‗problematic for both 
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conceptual and pragmatic reasons‘.138 He argues that the effects principle is ‗unconstrainable‘,139 
and gives ‗license to near universal jurisdiction‘.140  
 
This principle is also too broad. Michael Akehurst describes the effects principle as a slippery slope 
towards unrestrained universal jurisdiction.
141
 He cites the example of a person committing arson 
and destroying a factory, and, as a result, the company owning the factory becomes insolvent, the 
effects of which could be felt all over the world.
142
 In his view, the effects principle is only 
workable if jurisdiction is limited to the State where the primary effect is felt, and even then only 
where the effect is substantial.
143
  
 
In summary, the effects principle is one of the most highly contentious bases on which to assert 
extraterritorial jurisdiction. Its scope is not well articulated, and it is prone to abuse. In an 
interconnected world, in theory, one thing can affect any other thing, and therefore the effects 
principle should not be considered a legitimate base upon which to assert extraterritorial 
jurisdiction. The principle is also superfluous in the sense that it is hard to imagine a state having a 
legitimate jurisdictional interest in a conduct that would not otherwise be covered by the objective 
territoriality or protective principles, or by other less contentious bases of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction.  
 
4. Observations  
Extraterritorial jurisdiction is useful in seeking to regulate transnational crime, such as child-sex 
tourism, money-laundering, drug-trafficking, human-trafficking and migrant-smuggling. These 
activities are not confined to territorial borders, and therefore, nor should the relevant legal 
frameworks.  Nonetheless, reliance on extraterritorial jurisdiction may have the following 
consequences:  
 An accused person may be subject to multiple prosecutions for the same conduct, with no 
foreseeable end point;  
 Persons may be unable to know or ascertain each and every law in each and every state that 
may have grounds for jurisdiction over their conduct, creating legal uncertainty; and 
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 Given that a country other than the country in which an offence occurred may assert 
jurisdiction and seek to prosecute, a government‘s plea bargains and promises of amnesties 
are undermined. 
 
These consequences could be greatly mitigated by extraterritorial jurisdiction being permitted only 
over crimes that are the subject of international treaties or customary international law. This thesis 
will also go on to suggest that overly broad exercises of extraterritoriality that give rise to legal 
uncertainty may be inconsistent with the chosen criteria of the rule of law and that the abuse of 
rights doctrine may be useful in resolving such inconsistencies.  
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CHAPTER THREE: JURISDICTIONAL RESTRAINTS 
Chapter Three introduces principles of jurisdictional restraint, such as comity or the need for a 
‗genuine connection‘ or for ‗reasonableness‘ in claiming jurisdiction. Generally speaking, these 
principles are concerned with rights as between States and not with the rights of individuals. This 
makes them inadequate regulators of extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction. Chapter Three then 
considers international human rights law and other legal principles that might potentially restrict 
assertions of extraterritorial jurisdiction, such as non-interference, proportionality, and the abuse of 
rights doctrine.  Ultimately, while all of these may have some capacity to regulate extraterritorial 
jurisdiction, this thesis is primarily concerned with the potential of the abuse of rights doctrine in 
regulating extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction. To that end, this Chapter suggests that there is a 
relationship between the abuse of rights doctrine, the rule of law and extraterritoriality.  
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1. Introduction  
Jurisdiction is generally concurrent, and there is no real hierarchy by which to classify exercises of 
extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction. However, both municipal and international law recognise, at 
70 
 
least to some extent, principles of jurisdictional restraint such as comity or the need for a genuine 
connection or for reasonableness in claiming jurisdiction. Generally speaking, these principles are 
concerned with rights as between States and not with the rights of individuals. Given that 
individuals are subject to exercises of extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction, this makes such 
principles inadequate regulators of extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction. International human rights 
law and legal principles such as non-interference, proportionality, and the abuse of rights doctrine 
may also function as restraints on extraterritorial jurisdiction.  In this context, this Chapter considers 
the nature of these principles, and the acceptance and usefulness of each as a restraint on 
extraterritorial jurisdiction.  Greater attention is given to the abuse of rights doctrine. This is 
because there is a relationship between the chosen conception of the rule of law and the abuse of 
rights doctrines in the regulation of extraterritorial jurisdiction.  Put another way, this Chapter 
suggests that an exercise of extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction by a State in a manner that 
derogates unnecessarily from the rights of an individual, or in a manner inconsistent with the chosen 
conception of the rule of law, is an abuse of that State‘s rights. This is because the right of States to 
exercises jurisdiction is not unyielding to individual rights.   
 
The ‗responsibility to protect‘ doctrine is not included in this analysis. This is because, although it 
is relevant to extraterritorial jurisdiction in that it obliges States to act extraterritorially to protect 
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity,
1
 its 
application is limited to those crimes and it does not function as a general principle of jurisdictional 
restraint.
2
  
2. Principles of Jurisdictional Restraint  
2.1. Comity  
Principle  
In essence, comity is concerned with relations between States. It seeks to strike a balance between 
the sovereign interests of an individual State on the one hand, and the reality that it is also a member 
of a broader community of States, on the other. In a jurisdictional context, the doctrine of comity 
may be used by a court to limit the reach of a State‘s laws in deference to another State that may 
have a stronger jurisdictional interest. The doctrine of comity is said to have developed during the 
seventeenth century in order to resolve jurisdictional uncertainties in the regulation of trade and 
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commerce.
3
 The doctrine is still used today, often in a private-law context, to ‗mediate between the 
pretensions of territorial sovereignty and the needs of international commerce‘.4 It is a discretionary 
concept based on the idea that ‗relations among sovereigns are relations among equals‘.5  Harold 
Maier has described comity as involving ‗considerations of high international politics concerned 
with maintaining amicable and workable relationships between nations.‘6 Given that the term 
incorporates concepts such as courtesy or politeness, or goodwill, it is difficult to define precisely 
what comity ought to look like, and where a balance struck in favour of comity should lie. Perhaps 
with this uncertainty in mind, Joel Paul describes comity as being a ‗constellation of ideas‘,7 used 
by courts to navigate international relations.  
Acceptance  
Comity is used more frequently by common-law courts, particularly in the United States, than in 
civil-law jurisdictions.
8
 While United States courts have employed the term extensively in private 
law disputes, comity in civil-law countries tends to arise in connection with public international 
law.
9
 Other equivalent terms for comity include the latin comitas gentium, the French courtoisie 
internationale, and the German Volkercourtoisie. The question as to whether comity simply 
requires courtesy and goodwill, or whether it is a substantive legal obligation to recognise the law 
of other sovereign nations is a matter of some academic and jurisprudential dispute.
10
 There is, 
however, sufficient agreement that the doctrine exists, and that it occupies some kind of place 
between custom and customary international law.
11
 
Usefulness  
For various reasons, comity is an unsatisfactory regulator of extraterritorial jurisdiction. For 
example, deference to the comity doctrine is discretionary and not obligatory.
12
 It is therefore 
unpredictable and uncertain. As Maier observes, comity is an ‗amorphous neverland whose borders 
are marked by fuzzy lines of politics, courtesy and good faith‘.13 Further, comity inappropriately 
expands the role of public policy and international politics in domestic courts. Decisions as to 
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comity are inherently political ones concerned with the international relations between States. Not 
only is this inconsistent with the judicial function of the courts, but courts are also ill-equipped to 
make these kinds of decisions. They are unlikely to have access to security-sensitive information 
relating to foreign relations. Judges ought to be guided by the law, not by politics. Comity is a 
political rather than and a legal tool, and therefore is an unsatisfactory regulator of extraterritorial 
criminal jurisdiction.  
 
2.2. Genuine Connection   
Principle  
The test of ‗genuine connection‘ or ‗effective link‘ is generally understood as a necessary element 
of nationality. It is therefore relevant to exercises of extraterritorial jurisdiction on the basis of the 
nationality principle.  In order for a person to have the nationality of a particular State that is 
opposable to other States, that person must have a genuine connection with that State. Put another 
way, a State may not be able to exercise nationality jurisdiction over persons with whom it has no 
genuine connection.  In Nottebohm,
14
 the ICJ described a genuine connection as ‗a legal bond 
having as its basis a social fact of attachment, a genuine connection of existence, interests and 
sentiments, together with the existence of reciprocal rights and duties‘.15  In that case, the 
Government of Liechtenstein had sought to grant Nottebohm protection against unjust treatment by 
the government of Guatemala. To that end, it petitioned the ICJ on his behalf. However, the 
government of Guatemala argued that Mr Nottebohm did not gain Liechtenstein citizenship for the 
purposes of international law. Ultimately, the ICJ rejected the claim by Liechtenstein that Mr 
Nottebohm had a genuine connection with it. In so finding, it was held:  
Different factors are taken into consideration, and their importance will vary from one case to the 
next: there is the habitual residence of the individual concerned but also the centre of his interests, 
his family ties, his participation in public life, attachment shown by him for a given country and 
inculcated in his children, etc.
16
 
 
According to the practice of States, nationality constitutes the juridical expression of the fact that an 
individual is more closely connected with the population of a particular State. Conferred by a State, 
it only entitles that State to exercise protection if it constitutes a translation into juridical terms of the 
individual's connection with that State … At the time of his naturalization, does Nottebohm appear 
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to have been more closely attached by his tradition, his establishment, his interests, his activities, his 
family ties, his intentions for the near future, to Liechtenstein than to any other State?
17
 
Acceptance  
The principle of genuine connection is widely understood to be a key element of determining 
nationality, and many lawyers ‗view nationality through the prism of that theory‘.18 In the case of 
Barcelona Traction, however,
 
the ICJ indicated that there was no absolute test for genuine 
connection.
 19 
Further, Robert Sloane has suggested that the reliance of the majority in Nottebohm 
on an absence of ‗genuine connection‘ was influenced by a perception that Mr Nottebohm had 
sought to acquire nationality in Liechtenstein for the sole purpose of avoiding characterisation as an 
enemy alien during World War II.
20
 It has also been suggested that Nottebohm‘s status as a member 
of the Nazi party may have influenced the decision.
21
 In Sloane‘s view, ‗the sociopolitical, 
romanticist vision of nationality articulated by the Nottebohm majority has also become 
increasingly anachronistic and misplaced today‘.22 Therefore, the genuine connection test cannot be 
said to enjoy absolute acceptance as a principle of jurisdictional restraint.  
Usefulness  
The requirement that a ‗genuine connection‘ exist between a State and a person whom it asserts to 
be a national may be useful in resolving competing claims between States over the nationality of a 
particular individual. James Crawford has suggested that, ‗[i]f there is a cardinal principle 
emerging, it is that of genuine connection between the subject-matter of jurisdiction and the 
territorial base or reasonable interests of the State in question‘.23 However, once that connection is 
established, there is not necessarily a requirement that the exercise of nationality jurisdiction, be it 
prescriptive, adjudicative or enforcement, be conducted in a manner that is fair to the individual.  
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2.3. Reasonable Jurisdiction 
Principle  
Cedric Ryngaert suggests that the cumulative effect of the doctrines of comity, non-interference, 
genuine connection, proportionality and abuse of law may justify the identification and 
development of a ‗reasonableness‘ test of jurisdiction under international law.24 In his view, the 
notion of ‗reasonable jurisdiction‘ may constitute opinio juris.25 In a similar vein, FA Mann 
suggested that the ‗overriding question is: does there exist a sufficiently close legal connection to 
justify, or make it reasonable for, a State to exercise legislative jurisdiction?‘26 This would appear to 
link it with notions of genuine connection, in that an assertion of extraterritorial criminal 
jurisdiction is only ‗reasonable‘ insofar as it is based on a genuine connection between the conduct 
and/or the nationality of the accused person and the asserting State.  
Acceptance  
The idea of ‗reasonableness‘ in international law could not be said to be a foundational principle. 
There is, however, some indication that States view themselves as having an obligation to exercise 
some sort of moderation in relation to jurisdiction. For example, § 403 of the Third Restatement of 
the Foreign Relations Law of the United States adopts a principle of reasonableness.
27
  It states that 
even when one of the bases for jurisdiction under international law is present, jurisdiction should 
not be exercised, ‗with respect to a person or activity having connections with another State when 
the exercise of such jurisdiction is unreasonable‘.28 Further, Justice Fitzmaurice‘s use of the words 
‗moderation‘, ‗restraint‘ and ‗undue encroachment‘ in Barcelona Traction,29 do point towards some 
judicial acceptance of ‗reasonableness‘:  
… [I]nternational law does not impose hard and fast rules on States delimiting spheres of national 
jurisdiction … It does however … involve for every State an obligation to exercise moderation and 
restraint as to the extent of the jurisdiction assumed by its courts in cases having a foreign element, 
and to avoid undue encroachment on a jurisdiction more properly appertaining to, or more 
appropriately exercisable by another State.
30
  
Usefulness  
If Ryngaert‘s construction of the ‗reasonable jurisdiction‘ paradigm were to include a requirement 
to ensure a fair and ‗reasonable‘ trial, then it may be of some use from the perspective of an accused 
individual. However, Ryngaert‘s analysis was undertaken with a view to developing mechanisms by 
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which to resolve jurisdictional conflicts between States, and not necessarily to ensure that 
individuals accused of extraterritorial conduct are treated fairly. Further, requirements of 
reasonableness are inherently vague and are of limited use in a criminal law context where the 
liberty of individual persons is at stake. Therefore, the principle of reasonableness is of limited 
usefulness in regulating the rights of individuals accused of extraterritorial criminal offences.  
3. International Human Rights Law 
Principle  
As a matter of first principles, ‗to have a right is to have a claim against someone whose recognition 
as valid is called for by some set of governing rules‘.31 For the purpose of international human 
rights law, the ‗governing rules‘ can be found in a number of international instruments. In 
particular, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR),
32
 recognises two types of human 
rights: civil and political rights on the one hand, and economic, social and cultural rights, on the 
other.
33
 In order to codify these into legal obligations, two separate international covenants were 
adopted, ‗which, taken together, constitute the bedrock of the international normative regime for 
human rights‘.34 These two conventions are the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR). Many other multilateral and regional treaties have been negotiated setting out human 
rights obligations.  In short, international human rights law recognises the individual person as a 
‗subject of international rights‘.35  For breaches of the ICCPR, individuals can bring legal 
proceedings before the Human Rights Committee.
36
 An individual complaints mechanism is 
provided for in an optional protocol to the ICESCR that came into force in 2013.
37
  In a regional 
context, the European Court of Human Rights, for example, can hear complaints by individuals of 
violations of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
38
 also 
widely known as the European Convention on Human Right (ECHR). 
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Acceptance  
International human rights law is widely accepted by States and has been the subject of extensive 
academic commentary.  By way of example, the ICCPR has 168 parties,
39
 and the ICESCR has 162 
parties. 
40
  This is not to say, of course, that States consistently conform to their obligations under 
international human rights law.  Rather, it is suggested, that international human rights law is 
accepted as a source of rights and duties.  
Usefulness  
The usefulness of international human rights law to the regulation of extraterritorial jurisdiction lies 
in the recognition of the rights of individuals, as opposed to merely the relative rights and interests 
of States in relationship to one another. As Hersch Lauterpacht observed in 1950:  
In traditional international law the individual played an inconspicuous part because the international 
interests of the individual and his contacts across the frontier were rudimentary. This is no longer the 
case … [f]or fundamental human rights are rights superior to the law of the sovereign State.41  
Ralph Wilde has written on the relationship between international human rights law and exercises 
of extraterritoriality.  He has considered the extent to which, ‗human rights law applies to 
extraterritorial State actions, thereby potentially offering a normative framework by which 
conformity to human rights standards can be judged‘.42 He concludes that international human 
rights law does and should apply extraterritorially. In so doing, he observes that: 
[C]ontemporary rights discourse is perhaps still focused on the nexus between the State and its 
territory … to be a ―human rights‖ lawyer is often understood in terms of being professional 
concerned with the application of standards of domestic or international human rights law governing 
the relationship between the State and those within its territory.
43
 
 
It was stated at the outset that this thesis is not directly focused on international human rights law. 
This is not because it is irrelevant to the subject. Rather, some human rights treaties can apply 
extraterritorially. For example, in Al-Skeini and Others v the United Kingdom,
44
 the European Court 
of Human Rights found that that the obligations of the UK under the ECHR applied in Iraq.  
Therefore, in failing to investigate the circumstances of the killings of Iraqi civilians by UK 
soldiers, the UK had breached its obligations under the ECHR. In an advisory opinion, Legal 
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Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (‗Wall 
Opinion’),45 the ICJ held that: 
[W]hile the jurisdiction of States is primarily territorial, it may sometimes be exercised outside the 
national territory. Considering the object and purpose of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, it would seem natural that, even when such is the case, States parties to the 
Covenant should be bound to comply with its provisions.
46
  
 
Further, Article 14 of the ICCPR provides for a number of ‗fair trial‘ rights and Article 9 of the 
ICCPR might be relevant to an exercise of extraterritoriality because it prohibits arbitrary arrest or 
detention.
47
 For example, the decision of the Human Rights Committee in Domukovsky v Georgia,
48
  
suggests that an impermissible exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction can lead to a finding of a 
violation of Article 9.
 
That case was brought by a number of complainants, of which Mr 
Domukovsky was one. Mr. Domukovsky, a Russian national, was one of 19 persons brought to trial 
before the Supreme Court of Georgia on charges of participating in terrorist acts. In 1995, he was 
found guilty and sentenced to 14 years imprisonment.  Domukovsky argued that the Government of 
Azerbaijan, where he had sought refuge, refused Georgia's request to extradite him and that in April 
1993, he was kidnapped from Azerbaijan and illegally arrested.  For this reason, Domukovsky 
argued, among other things, that his arrest was a violation of Article 9 of the ICCPR. In response, 
Georgia submitted that Domukovsky was arrested following an agreement with the Azerbaijan 
authorities on cooperation in criminal matters. The Human Rights Committee, however, found as 
follows:  
[T]he Committee notes that the State party has submitted that they were arrested following an 
agreement with the Azerbaijan authorities on cooperation in criminal matters. The State party has 
provided no specific information about the agreement, nor has it explained how the agreement was 
applied to the instant case. Counsel for Mr. Domukovsky, however, has produced a letter from the 
Azerbaijan Ministry of Internal Affairs to the effect that it was not aware of any request for their 
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arrest. In the absence of a more specific explanation from the State party of the legal basis of their 
arrest in Azerbaijan, the Committee considers that due weight should be given to the authors' 
detailed allegations and finds that their arrest was unlawful in violation of article 9, paragraph 1, of 
the Covenant.
49
 
 
By contrast, in Öcalan v. Turkey,
50
 a 2005 decision the European Court of Human Rights (EctHR), 
it was held that there had been no violation of article 5(1) of the ECHR, which prohibits unlawful 
deprivation of liberty.  In that case, after seeking asylum in a number of countries, Mr Öcalan had 
been arrested in Kenya by Turkish authorities in circumstances where he had simply thought he was 
being escorted to an airport. Among other things, Mr Öcalan complained that he had been deprived 
of his liberty unlawfully, without the applicable extradition procedure being followed. In its 
judgment, the EctHR accepted that, ‗an arrest made by the authorities of one State on the territory 
of another State, without the consent of the latter, affects the person concerned's individual rights to 
security under article 5(1)‘.51 Nonetheless, the EctHR went on to find that, ‗[t]he fact that a fugitive 
has been handed over as a result of cooperation between States does not in itself make the arrest 
unlawful and does not therefore give rise to any problem under article 5‘,52 and that, ‗even an 
atypical extradition cannot as such be regarded as being contrary to the Convention‘.53  It did find 
that contrary to article 5(3) of the Convention, Mr Öcalan had not been brought promptly before a 
judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power. 
 
The point here is that international human rights law, or, in the case of the ECHR, regional human 
rights law, can be useful in regulating extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction.  Nonetheless, 
international human rights law may not always be capable of resolving irregularities in extradition 
processes, or in addressing the lack of certainty to which an individual is subjected when 
susceptible to potentially multiple assertions of extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction, or even in 
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regulating competing or excessively broad claims of jurisdiction. For example in Domukovsky v 
Georgia,
54
 as discussed above, had there actually been an extradition agreement in place, there 
would have been no violation of article 9, regardless of the breadth of the assertion of 
extraterritoriality. And as noted above, the EctHR in Öcalan v. Turkey,
55
 expressly stated that ‗even 
an atypical extradition cannot as such be regarded as being contrary to the Convention‘.56  
 
Further, exercises of extraterritorial jurisdiction can raise issues not capable of resolution by 
international human rights law. By way of example, the United Nations Human Rights Committee 
has held that the protection against double jeopardy under the ICCPR,
57
 only applies within States 
and not between them.  In AP v Italy,
58
 the Human Rights Committee stated: 
[S]ince article 14, paragraph 7, of the Covenant...does not guarantee non bis in idem with regard to 
the national jurisdictions of two or more States. The Committee observes that this provision prohibits 
double jeopardy only with regard to an offence adjudicated in a given State.
59
 
The Committee again affirmed this finding in AR J v Australia:
60
 
The Committee recalls that article 14, paragraph 7, of the Covenant does not guarantee ne bis in 
idem with respect to the national jurisdictions of two or more States - this provision only prohibits 
double jeopardy with regard to an offence adjudicated in a given State.
61
 
 
Another issue to consider is that municipal courts, such as those in Australia, India and the United 
States, generally view international human rights law as yielding to inconsistent municipal and 
constitutional laws. This is further discussed in Chapters 4, 5 and 6, which each include a section 
discussing the relationship between municipal courts and international law.  
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4. Other Principles that may Restrain Extraterritorial Jurisdiction  
4.1. Non-intervention or Non-interference  
Principle  
The principle of non-intervention prohibits States from interfering in the sovereign affairs of 
another State.  In 1757, Emmerich de Vattel, a Swiss jurist, articulated the principle as follows:  
Foreign States have no right to interfere in the government of a foreign State. To govern oneself as 
one wishes is an attribute of independence.  A sovereign State may not be disturbed by another State 
unless it has given that State the right to intervene in its affairs.
62
  
 
While the principle of non-intervention is more commonly understood in a military context and as a 
manifestation of international law on the use of force, it could also be applicable to exercises of 
jurisdiction. For example, as David Gerber puts it, ‗when a State attaches legal consequences to 
conduct in another State, it exercises control over that conduct, and when such control affects 
essential interests in the foreign State, it may constitute an interference with the sovereign rights of 
that foreign State‘.63 Put simply, a State is not permitted to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction if to 
do so would interfere in the sovereign affairs of another State.  
Acceptance   
The principle of non-intervention is widely, if not universally, accepted as a foundational principle 
of international law.
64
 For example, the existence of a duty of non-intervention is acknowledged in 
the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,
65
 and in the 
Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the 
Protection of Their Independence and Sovereignty. There it is stated that ‗[n]o State or group of 
States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or 
external affairs of any other State.‘66 The principle of non-intervention has also been held by the 
International Court of Justice to represent customary international law.
67
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Usefulness  
As is the case with the principles of jurisdictional restraint discussed above, the principle of non-
intervention also remains concerned with the sovereign rights of States and not with the rights of 
individuals. It is conceivable that an individual may not receive a fair trial for extraterritorial 
conduct, and yet no State will view its sovereign rights as having being interfered with. The 
exception to this might be if the accused person was a State official and acting in an official 
capacity.  This is because, traditionally, international law recognised an immunity of the State and 
its representatives from the jurisdiction of other States.
68
 However, there is now sufficient State 
practice to suggest a more restrictive approach to immunity,
69
 and, for example, State officials are 
not immune from prosecution in the International Criminal Court or before other national courts 
once they no longer hold public office.
70
 In any event, this principle is of limited use in regulating 
exercises of extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction over individual persons who are not State officials 
and over conduct not considered to be an international crime. 
4.2. Proportionality  
Principle  
In international law, the principle of proportionality is invoked in various contexts, including the 
laws of war, countermeasures, human rights, and in the World Trade Organisation.
71
 The principle 
of proportionality has been said to govern   ‗the   extent   to   which   a   provocation   may, 
lawfully, be   countered by what might otherwise be an unlawful response‘.72  Proportionality is 
caught up with notions of necessity, the key issues being whether State action, jurisdictional or 
otherwise, exceeds what was necessary. Ryngaert suggests that although proportionality has not 
been explicitly invoked to determine the validity of a jurisdictional assertion, ‗it surely lends itself 
to it‘.73 In a jurisdictional sense, proportionality might operate to preclude disproportionately 
unnecessary exercises of jurisdiction. The question might be asked, is it necessary for a State to 
exercise jurisdiction over the extraterritorial conduct of its nationals, regardless of the values and 
laws of the community in which the conduct takes place?  
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Acceptance  
Proportionality has been described as the ‗golden rule‘ of law.74 In a paradigm where there is no 
hierarchy of rights, proportionality ‗makes the criterion of justice the litmus test of legitimacy in 
law‘.75 There is no disputing the existence of legal principles based on notions of proportionality. 
Proportionality as a principle of restraint on extraterritorial jurisdiction is, however, a relatively 
novel and unexplored idea. For this reason, it is not clear what standards would be appropriate to 
assess exercises of jurisdiction against, so as to determine whether the exercise is proportionate. In 
the human rights context, proportionality is used to assess derogation from, or limitations on, the 
enjoyment of rights. The principle of proportionality is also applied in criminal law. As Allison 
Danner observes ‗[p]roportionality … has become the leading guideline for calculating sentence 
lengths in many countries, and it may be considered the dominant sentencing model in international 
law.
76
 Susan Lamb, writing on international criminal tribunals, observes that even where procedural 
irregularities have occurred, where the crime is serious, ‗the presumption in favour of trying [the 
accused] is strengthened‘.77 This is also a type of proportionality analysis.  
Usefulness  
Proportionality is an exercise in balancing competing interests. Therefore, in order to assess the 
usefulness of this principle, particular competing interests must be identified. In the context of 
extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction, the interest that States (and victims) have in regulating 
extraterritorial criminal conduct through exercises of extraterritoriality competes with the interest of 
accused individuals in being able to know the law applicable to them at any given point, predict the 
jurisdiction in which they will be tried, be protected against multiple prosecutions and be treated 
equally to persons accused of territorial crimes.   In effect, the principle of proportionality suggests 
that no rights are entirely absolute, but instead, exist in balance with others. For example, Sarah 
Joseph, Jenny Schulz and Melissa Castan, in their commentary on the ICCPR, refer to a principle of 
proportionality and note that:  
Permissible derogation measures must limit ICCPR rights only [to] ―the extent strictly required‖, 
which incorporates a principle of proportionality into the determination of the validity of a 
derogation.
78
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Similarly, Joseph, Schulz and Castan also suggest that ‗[t]he obligation to limit any derogation to 
those strictly required by the exigencies of the situation reflects the principle of proportionality‘.79 If 
it could be said that broad assertions of extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction are sometimes required 
by the exigencies of a situation, then proportionality may be relevant to jurisdiction. There is, as yet, 
however, little evidence to support this in the absence of substantive principles by which to assess 
proportionality in a jurisdictional context.  
4.3. Abuse of Rights   
Principle  
In international law, the doctrine of abuse of rights prohibits States from making use of their rights 
if to do so impedes the enjoyment by other States of their own rights, or to achieve an end different 
from that for which the exercised right was created, to the injury of another State.
80
 Lassa (L.F.L) 
Oppenheim described this international law doctrine as occurring,  
when a state avails itself of its right in an arbitrary manner in such a way as to inflict upon another 
state an injury which cannot be justified by a legitimate consideration of its own advantage‘.81  
In a domestic context, abuse of rights operates much the same way. It prohibits the exercise of 
rights by legal persons in a manner that is detrimental to the rights and interests of other legal 
persons.
82
  
Acceptance  
This international law doctrine of abuse of rights has been used in arbitral and judicial decision 
making and ‗recognition of the doctrine has been increasing since the early decades of the twentieth 
century‘.83  As Chinthaka Mendis observes,  
[t]oday, under general international law, a well-recognized restraint on the freedom of action which a 
State in general enjoys by virtue of its independence and territorial supremacy is to be found in the 
prohibition of the abuse by a State of the rights enjoyed by it by virtue of international law.
84
 
 
 For example, in the Free Zones of Upper Savoy and District of Gex Case,
85
  the PCIJ considered, 
among other the things, arrangements at the Congress of Vienna in 1815 for the benefit of the 
Canton of Geneva, and the subsequent Treaty of Turin in 1860. In doing so, express reference was 
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made to the exercise of rights in question being subject to a reservation as regards the case of abuses 
of a right. According to the Court: 
A reservation must be made as regards the case of abuses of a right, since it is certain that France 
must not evade the obligation to maintain the zones by erecting a customs barrier under the guise of 
a control cordon. But an abuse cannot be presumed by the Court. 
86
 
 
Similarly, in the Corfu Channel Case,
87
 the ICJ considered the responsibility of Albania for mines 
which exploded within Albanian waters and which resulted in loss of life and damage to British 
vessels. In so doing, the Court referred to an obligation on states not to knowingly allow its territory 
to be used contrary to the rights of other States.
88
 From this it can be understood that for a State to 
knowingly allow its territory to be used contrary to the rights of other States is an example of the 
type of conduct which would likely constitute an abuse of rights.  Further, in the Trail Smelter 
Arbitration,
89
 the tribunal declared that ‗no State has the right to use … its territory in such a 
manner as to cause injury … in or to the territory of another or the properties or persons therein‘.90 
 
The World Trade Organisation has also engaged with the abuse of rights doctrine. Thomas Cottier, 
in the context of WTO law, describes the abuse of rights doctrine as having four constituent 
elements: the existence of a right, the exercise of that right, damage in the form of ‗one actors 
ability fully to enjoy the benefits of, or fully to exercise, her own rights‘,91 and causation of that 
damage by the abusive exercise of the right.
92
  
 
The doctrine has also been recognised in international treaties. For example, the Montevideo 
Convention on the Rights and Duties of States,
93
 provides that the exercise of the rights set out in 
the Convention have ‗no other limitation than the exercise of the rights of other States according to 
international law‘,94 and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea requires member 
States to ‗exercise the rights, jurisdiction and freedoms recognised in this Convention in a manner 
which would not constitute an abuse of rights‘.95   
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At a domestic level, the abuse of rights doctrine also appears to be more willingly embraced by 
domestic courts, rather than principles that are predominately, if not exclusively, creatures of 
international law (such as the principle of non-interference). This is because there are principles and 
doctrines analogous to the international abuse of rights doctrine in the domestic law of many civil-
law and common-law countries. Such principles may exist in a private law context, such as tort or 
property law, and others in a public law context, such as in administrative law. Either way, there are 
doctrines and principles prohibiting the exercise of rights by legal persons in a manner that is 
detrimental to the rights and interests of other legal persons.
 96
 
 
For example, a number of civil-law codes have provisions that prohibit the use of a right for a 
purpose other than for which it is intended. Article 226 of the German Civil Code prohibits the 
exercise of a right if the only purpose of such exercise is to cause damage to another.
97
 Other codes 
only recognise an abuse of a right where an element of bad intent is present. For example, article 
1912 of the Mexican Civil Code reads: ‗When damage is caused to another by the exercise of a 
right, there is only an obligation to make it good if it was proved that the right was exercised only to 
cause the damage.‘98 Similarly, article 833 of the Italian Civil Code prohibits the exercise of a right 
if the purpose is to harm or inconvenience others.
99
 Japan further requires an element of 
unreasonableness in order to establish an abuse of rights.
100
  
 
It is true that the principle is less well-known in common-law systems, and, therefore, more likely 
to meet with resistance from common-law jurists and academics. There are, however, analogous 
legal concepts, and Michael Byers suggests the notion of abuse of rights is the basis on which tort 
law developed.
101
 For example, in Australia, the tort of abuse of process has been described as ‗the 
clearest illustration in Australian law of what civil lawyers call an ―abuse of right‖.‘102 The idea of 
misfeasance in public office in tort law has been considered in a number of judicial decisions.
103
 As 
Robert Sadler has observed:  
Misfeasance in a public office is the only exception to the principle that, generally speaking, a public 
officer is not liable in tort unless the act complained of would, if done by a private individual, be 
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actionable. It is the only tort having its roots and application within public law alone. It cannot apply 
in private law; the defendant must be a public officer and the misfeasance complained of must occur 
whilst the public officer is purporting to exercise the powers of his or her office. The significance of 
the exceptional nature of the tort of misfeasance in a public office should not be understated. 
Malicious or wilful abuse of official power is socially intolerable. This social intolerability is 
compounded if the person injured as a result of the abuse is denied compensation. Indeed, if the 
abuse also gives rise to a tort known to the private law the tortfeasor will sometimes be "punished" 
by exemplary damages.
104
 
 
Further, the High Court of Australia has also drawn upon notions of ‗abuse of process‘ in 
considering the propriety of an extraterritorial criminal prosecution.
105
 In the United Kingdom, the 
‗abuse of discretion‘ doctrine in administrative law and the notion of malicious prosecutions in 
criminal law are both somewhat analogous.
106
 The abuse of rights doctrine was also raised by a 
United Kingdom Judge in the context of piercing the ‗corporate veil‘.107 Therefore, although it 
might be labelled differently, the basic principle underlying the abuse of rights doctrine does exist 
in the common-law world. To that end, this thesis adopts in generality the view expressed by Rick 
Bigwood in his discussion of abuse of rights in Anglo-Australian law:  
I am untroubled by the particular label that one chooses to capture what seems to be a common idea in 
relation to a universal legal problem. What one prefers as ‗unconscionability‘, another will favour as 
‗abuse of rights‘ or ‗bad faith‘… Acceptance of, or at least familiarity with, the idea behind the label is 
more important here than the label itself. Although it is true that no general ‗doctrine‘ of abuse of 
rights or good faith exists in Anglo-Australian law … there can be no denying that, in one guise or 
another, [such] notions … pervade discrete doctrines, rules and principles, and exceptions … 
throughout … common law and equity. 108 
 
Bigwood‘s point is that while there may be no doctrine entitled ‗abuse of rights‘ in common-law 
countries, the concept is inherent in a variety of common law and equitable principles. Similarly, 
although the doctrine varies throughout civil-law countries, one would not suggest that it does not 
exist in those jurisdictions. A variation in language or form is no argument against the existence of a 
substantive principle, that the right of one party should not be exercised to abuse the rights of the 
other. As early as the 1930s, Harold Gutteridge advanced the argument that the common law should 
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recognise an abuse of rights principle.
109
 In his view, if a legal right can be exercised ‗with impunity 
in a spirit of malevolence or selfishness‘,110 that is ‗one of the unsatisfactory features of our law.‘111 
Gutteridge was primarily concerned with the abuse of rights in a private law context. However, his 
description of ‗altruistic rights‘ as those that exist for the welfare of the community and not for the 
advantage of the beneficiary of that right,
112
 are analogous to the right of a State to criminally 
prosecute an individual. Gutteridge also explored the ‗relativity of rights‘, wherein the exercise of 
rights must conform to the social purpose for which they were created. In this way, ‗the exercise of 
a right must, therefore, be fixed, not by reference to the benefit which is conferred…but in its 
relation to the social complex as a whole‘.113 By analogy, the right of a State to prescribe, enforce 
and adjudicate extraterritorial criminal offences is not absolute. That right is relative to the rights of 
an individual to a fair trial, and to society‘s interest in the State acting in ways that are consistent 
with the rule of law.  
Usefulness   
From the perspective of international law, one of the foundational difficulties with the proposition 
that the abuse of rights doctrine may be helpful in regulating exercises of extraterritorial criminal 
jurisdiction is that the doctrine is generally understood in the context of rights between States and 
not with rights as between an individual and a State.  However, as Lauterpacht has advocated, 
‗[t]here is no legal right, however well established, which could not, in some circumstances, be 
refused recognition on the ground that it has been abused.‘114 Further, international law extensively 
recognises the rights of individuals, as is evidenced by the existence of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights,
115
 the ICCPR,
116
 the ECHR,
117
 and other regional human rights treaties. It is not 
such a great leap to suggest that a State that exercises jurisdictional rights over an individual in a 
manner inconsistent with the rule of law abuses its rights. The abuse of rights doctrine can be 
understood as an ‗omnibus term to describe certain ways of exercising a power which are legally 
reprehensible‘.118 The idea that abuse of rights doctrine may be ‗one possible technique to solve 
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conflicts of colliding rights‘,119 is a view that has also been expressed by Helmut Aust.   Further, as 
discussed above under the heading ‗usefulness‘, domestic courts have applied principles analogous 
to the abuse of rights doctrine to individuals.  
 
Therefore, the abuse of rights doctrine, applied in a manner that fully acknowledges that the 
individual is a subject of international law, may provide a useful paradigm through which to 
regulate assertions of extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction. Concerns, however, have been raised 
about the abuse of rights principle. For example, Georg Schwarzenberger queries whether an abuse 
of rights can be distinguished from a harsh, but an otherwise justified, exercise of rights.
120
  This is 
a fair criticism. As Gutteridge observed:  
To speak of an abuse of right without attempting to determine its nature is simply to indulge in a 
rhetorical flourish … [S]ome definite criterion is required which will enable us to fix the circumstances 
in which the purported exercise of a legal right will assume a wrongful aspect.
121
 
 
In response, it is suggested that a harsh-but-justified exercise of a jurisdictional right would still be 
consistent with the three rule of law criteria set out in Chapters One and Two. Put another way, the 
effect of an abuse of rights principle in a jurisdictional context is that an assertion of extraterritorial 
criminal jurisdiction that is inconsistent with the chosen conception of the rule of law could also 
amount to an abuse of rights. In this way, state practice may evolve into customary international 
law. That aside, however, for the purpose of this thesis, the abuse of rights doctrine is simply tested 
for its conceptual acceptability.  
 
In turn, this requires consideration of the chosen conception of the rule of law.  This will be 
followed by an analysis of the relationship between the rule of law, as understood in this thesis, and 
the abuse of rights doctrine.  
5. The Rule of Law and the Abuse of Rights Doctrine 
5.1. What is the Rule of Law? 
Albert (A.V.) Dicey is sometimes credited with introducing the term ‗rule of law‘.122 However, the 
concept of the rule of law has a far longer history. Fred Miller describes a Greek document from the 
fifth century B.C., the Gortyn Law Code. At its outset, the Code stated: ‗If anyone wishes to contest 
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the status of a free man or a slave, he is not to seize him before a trial‘.123  Another author has traced 
the idea back to Aristotle.
124
 Examples of adherence to, or aspiration towards, the rule of law can be 
found throughout the world, and at various points in the history of human affairs. Academics and 
philosophers have debated the concept for centuries. Geoffrey Walker may be correct when he 
suggests that the rule of law ‗is not easy to define with precision, because in part it manifests itself 
more as an absence than a presence‘.125  Fred Miller describes the rule of law as ‗a normative 
principle that political power may not be exercised except according to procedures and constraints 
prescribed by laws which are publicly known‘.126  James Harrington writes of an ‗empire of laws 
and not of men‘.127 And Friedrich Hayek offered what Brian Tamanaha describes as a ‗highly 
influential definition of the rule of law‘.128 Hayek posits:  
Stripped of all technicalities, this means that government in all its action is bound by rules fixed and 
announced before-hand – rules which make it possible to forsee with fair certainty how the authority 
will use its coercive powers in given circumstances and to plan one‘s individual affairs on the basis 
of this knowledge.
129
 
 
Joseph Raz has argued that, ‗the rule of law is a political ideal which a legal system may lack or 
may possess to a greater or lesser degree‘.130 By way of further example, Lon Fuller has argued the 
law should aspire to these eight qualities: generality; publicity; prospectivity; clarity; consistency; 
possibility of compliance; constancy; and congruence of the law and its administration.
131
  Some 
may argue that the content of the rule of law is subject to cultural relativism. Mortimer Sellers 
concedes this point: ‗[T]he social, historical, geographical and other circumstances in different 
societies will always differ, limiting what is appropriate, prudent and possible in practice.‘132 
Notably, this thesis adopts his view that ‗certain standards and basic institutions will be shared by 
every society that aspires to attain the government of laws and not of men.‘133 As Brian Z. 
Tamanaha has observed, ‗support for the rule of law is not exclusive to the West.‘134 In his view: 
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The reasons [articulated] for supporting the rule of law might differ, some in the interest of freedom, 
some in the preservation of order, many in the furtherance of economic development, but all identify 
it as essential.
135
  
 
The importance of the rule of law is widely recognised both in domestic and international 
frameworks. It is inherently linked with human rights. For example, the preamble to the UDHR 
describes it as essential that ‗human rights should be protected by the rule of law‘.136 The ECHR 
speaks of a ‗common heritage of political traditions, ideals, freedom and the rule of law‘.137 The 
American Convention on Human Rights does not specifically use the term ‗rule of law‘, but article 8 
confers the right to a fair trial, and article 9 provides protection against retrospective laws.
138
 
Similarly, the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights confers rights relating to fair trial,
139
 
equality and equal protection before the law,
140
 and states that ‗[n]o one may be deprived of his 
freedom except for reasons and conditions previously laid down by law‘.141 International 
organisations have also formally acknowledged the importance of the rule of law. For example, in 
2005, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) prepared an ‗Issues 
Brief‘ entitled Equal Access to Justice and the Rule of Law.142 Among other things, the brief asserts 
that ‗[t]he rule of law and access to justice are crucial to the immediate upholding of law and order, 
and to human security imperatives, stability and development.‘143  
 
There is also some contest between neutral and substantive conceptions of the rule of law. A neutral 
conception may be seen simply as the requirement for all to follow the law, regardless of content or 
morality. By contrast, a substantive conception requires content, such as principles of ‗certainty‘ 
and ‗equality before the law‘. These are sometimes referred to as ‗thin‘ and ‗thick‘ conceptions. As 
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George Fletcher states, ‗[w]hatever philosophers may argue, we know that the rule of law means 
more than the law of rules.‘144 Similarly, Jeremy Waldron has suggested that:  
Interfering with the courts, jailing someone without legal justification, detaining people without any 
safeguards of due process, manipulating the constitution for partisan advantage -all of these are seen 
as abuses of the rule of law.
145
 
 
This thesis does not seek to provide an exhaustive definition of the rule of law, a task better left to 
legal theorists and philosophers. However, it employs one conception of the rule of law as a 
benchmark by which to evaluate exercises of extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction in Australia, India 
and the United States, and, in turn, suggests there is relationship between the abuse of rights 
doctrine, the rule of law and jurisdiction. Support for the idea that ‗thinking in the terms of the rule 
of law … as a particular approach‘,146 rather than seeking to definitively agree on its content can be 
found in the work of Helmut Aust.  While Aust has expressed a lack of enthusiasm for what he 
describes as drawing up a ‗laundry list‘,147  of constituent elements of the rule of law, for this 
limited approach taken by this particular thesis, three basic criterion of the rule of law are 
nonetheless identified and adopted. 
5.2. The Criteria of the Rule of Law for the Purposes of this Thesis 
Principle 1: The law must be both readily known and available, and certain and clear 
This principle requires legal certainty. James Maxeiner has described legal certainty as ‗a central 
tenet of the rule of law as understood around the world‘. 148 Given the various bases on which 
extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction can be asserted, some prosecutions of extraterritorial criminal 
offences may undermine this principle. For example, if a national of State W interacts with a 
national of State X in the territory of State Y, in a manner that may affect the security interests of 
State Z, then States W, X, Y and Z all have a basis on which to assert extraterritorial jurisdiction. Is it 
fair to assume that each national is familiar with the nationality of each person with whom they 
interact? And if so, is it also fair to assume that each knows their legal obligations under the laws of 
that nation? As Tom Bingham has said: 
…[I]f you and I are liable to be prosecuted, fined, and perhaps imprisoned for doing or failing to do 
something, we ought to be able, without undue difficulty, to find out what it is we must or must not 
do on pain of criminal penalty. 
149
 
 
                                               
144
 Byers, above n 97, 413, citing George Fletcher (footnote omitted).  
145
 Jeremy Waldron, ‗The Concept and the Rule of Law‘ (2008) 43 Georgia Law Review 1, 5. 
146
 Aust, above n 120, 57. 
147
 Ibid.  
148
 James Maxeiner, ‗Some Realism About Legal Certainty in the Globalization of the Rule of Law‘ in Mortimer Sellers 
and Tadeusz Tomaszewski (eds), The Rule of Law in Comparative Perspective (Springer, 2010) 41.  
149
 Bingham, above n 123, 37. 
92 
 
In a similar vein, Jeremy Waldron, in seeking to describe what is meant by the rule of law, has 
observed:  
There may be no escaping legal constraints in the circumstances of modern life, but freedom is 
nevertheless possible if people know in advance how the law will operate, and how they must act to 
avoid its having a detrimental impact on their affairs. Knowing in advance how the law will operate 
enables one to plan around its requirements.
150
 
Waldron goes on to suggest that the:  
rule of law is violated when the norms that are applied by officials do not correspond to the norms 
that have been made public to the citizens, or when officials act on the basis of their own discretion 
rather than norms laid down in advance.
151
 
 In reality, it is unreasonable to demand that every citizen of the world be familiar with the laws of 
each nation. Yet, the rule of law demands that the content of the law should be ‗accessible to the 
public‘.152 It cannot be assumed that all laws of all nations are ‗knowable‘. Therefore, if the laws of 
a State are to apply extraterritorially, then a precondition of prosecution for extraterritorial criminal 
offences must be that the law is ascertainable. In turn, this suggests that extraterritorial jurisdiction 
should only be asserted for widely recognised crimes, such as those forming the subject of 
international agreements and treaties, and not for ad hoc criminal offences. While, this will not 
render such offences automatically ‗knowable‘, the same could equally be said of the inclusion of a 
criminal offence in any domestic law, where levels of literacy and education might vary. The point 
is that inclusion of a crime in an international treaty increased the chance of it being known between 
States and not simply in the specific cultural context of a particular State. 
 
Principle 2: The law should be applied to all people equally, and operate uniformly in 
circumstances that are not materially different 
Article 7 of the UDHR provides that ‗all are equal before the law and are entitled without any 
discrimination to equal protection of the law‘.153 As Walker has asserted, ‗the rule of law implies 
the precept that similar cases be treated similarly‘.154 The problem with extraterritorial jurisdiction 
is that persons who have committed extraterritorial crimes may be arbitrarily treated differently than 
those who commit territorial crimes. For example, in R v Hape,
155
 and R v Klassen,
156
 the Supreme 
Court of Canada held that some provisions of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms are limited to 
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Canadian provinces and territories, and do not apply extraterritorially to searches and seizures 
outside of Canada.  Further, as set out above, the protection against double jeopardy in the ICCPR 
has been held to apply only within States, and not as between them, and so a person accused of 
extraterritorial crimes does not enjoy the same level of protection against double jeopardy as a 
person accused of territorial crime. These particular examples will be discussed in greater detail in 
Chapters Four, Five and Six.  
Principle 3: There must be some capacity for judicial review of executive action and the Executive 
arm of government should be subject to the law and any action undertaken by the Executive 
should be authorised by law.  
It has been said that the ‗single greatest advance towards the rule of law occurs when judges secure 
their independence from executive and legislative power‘.157 The connection between judicial 
review and independence and the rule of law has also been noted by Waldron, who has suggested:  
[i]f someone is accused of violating one of the general norms laid down, they should have an 
opportunity to request a hearing, make an argument, and confront the evidence before them prior to 
the application of any sanction associated with the norm. The rule of law is violated when the 
institutions that are supposed to embody these procedural safeguards are undermined. In this way the 
rule of law has become associated with political ideals such as the separation of powers and the 
independence of the judiciary.
158
 
 
In regulating assertions of extraterritorial jurisdiction, courts should play a role in considering 
whether prosecutions of extraterritorial conduct are consistent with the rule of law, or whether they 
are an abuse of process.  Extradition arrangements and the exercise of prosecutorial discretion are 
often matters for the executive, and States may try to hide behind the ‗act of State‘ doctrine. 
However, courts can play a role in ensuring that the act of State doctrine is not an impenetrable veil. 
For example, in Moti v The Queen,
159
 the High Court of Australia considered whether proceedings 
could be maintained against a person who had not properly been brought within the jurisdiction by 
regular means, or whether such proceedings were an abuse of process. In so doing, a majority of 
six-to-one concluded that the act of State doctrine does not preclude findings as to the legality of the 
conduct of a foreign government, where those conclusions are a necessary step to determining a 
question within the competency of the court.    
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5.3. What is the relationship between the rule of law, as understood in this thesis, and the 
abuse of rights doctrine? 
This thesis is premised on the hypothesis that that there is a relationship between the rule of law and 
the abuse of rights doctrine.  There are two limbs evidencing a relationship between the two. The 
first is that both are concerned with achieving common ends. For example, both the rule of law and 
the abuse of rights doctrine are concerned with regulating arbitrary exercises of power and limiting 
discretion. As Suri Ratnapala and Jonathan Crowe suggest, ‗[t]he idea of the rule of law demands 
that government actions are subject to general laws and that officials do not have power to 
determine the law for the individual case in an ad hoc or capricious manner.‘160 Similarly, the abuse 
of rights doctrine is also concerned with regulating arbitrariness in the exercise of power and the 
misuse of power.  
 
The other common end is that the rule of law and the abuse of rights doctrine both seek in some 
way to constrain persons in a position of authority.  For example, as Waldron has stated, although 
the rule of law is a much contested concept, most: 
conceptions of this ideal, however, give central place to a requirement that people in positions of 
authority should exercise their power within a constraining framework of public norms, rather than 
on the basis of their own preferences, their own ideology, or their own individual sense of right and 
wrong.
161
 
 
Similarly, but in relation to the abuse of rights doctrine, Vaughan Lowe has observed the abuse of 
rights: 
[i]s likely to achieve much greater prominence as a check upon exercises of legal power by States. 
Through the influence of these principles, the whole character of international law and its relation to 
the most pressing problems of fairness and justice can be materially altered. 
162
 
 
The second limb of the relationship is that although distinct and stand-alone contents, the abuse of 
rights doctrine and the rule of law are able to give further content to one another, and in so doing, 
give content to potentially amorphous concepts. For example, Aust has argued that the ‗prohibition 
of abuse of rights is frequently considered to be an essential element of the rule of law.‘163 Although 
Aust made this Statement in the context of a State abusing its rights to the detriment of another 
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State, there is no obvious reason why this could not extend to a State exercising its rights to the 
detriment of an individual. There is ample evidence that both international and municipal law are 
concerned with the relationship between an individual and a State, not least of which is the large 
body of human rights law. Aust also suggests that the abuse of rights doctrine may assist in ‗the 
development of more particular rules or … the workability of primary rules.‘164 Further, if it is 
accepted that one of the criteria of the rule of law is that the law be ‗knowable‘ or ‗certain‘, then the 
abuse of rights doctrine is relevant in that it is a ‗safeguard in relatively undeveloped or overly-
inflexible parts of a legal system pending the development of precise and detailed rules.‘165  The 
regulation of extraterritorial jurisdiction has not kept pace with the exercise thereof and so it can be 
considered one of these undeveloped parts of the legal system. Further, Nollekaemper goes so far as 
to suggest, ‗compliance with international law has in itself become a key requirement of the rule of 
law as it applies at the domestic level‘.166 In this way, there is a relationship between the abuse of 
rights doctrine and the rule of law and this thesis considers that relationship in the context of the 
regulation of extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction in Australia, India and the United States.  
6. Observations and Summary 
In summary, Chapter Three suggests that if a State exercises extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction in 
a manner that is inconsistent with the three principles of the rule of law (as set out above), it has 
abused its right to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction.  To that end, the abuse of rights doctrine may 
be a useful in regulating extraterritorial jurisdiction. This means that there is a relationship between 
the abuse of rights doctrine and the rule of law. Although distinct concepts, both are concerned with 
constraints on the exercise of power. The chosen substantive conception of the rule of law consists 
of certainty, equality, and judicial review of executive action. This is particularly important when 
considering the relationship between the rights of an individual and the rights of States in criminal 
law. The ways in which criminal justice is administered goes to the very core of the legitimacy of 
the relationship between the State and an individual. Indeed, the ‗field of battle in which democracy 
and human rights are tested is the administration of criminal justice, which encompasses all 
processes and practices by which a State affects, curtails, or removes basic rights‘.167 Therefore, 
under such a doctrine, a State that asserts extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction in such a way as to 
deprive an individual of legal certainty, equality before the law, or so as to preclude judicial review, 
might be considered a State that abuses its rights.  
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Having now considered the grounds on which extraterritorial jurisdiction may be asserted in 
Chapter Two, and the principles of jurisdictional restraint in this, Chapter Three, the next three 
chapters of this thesis consider the ways in which extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction is regulated in 
Australia, India, and the United States, the relationship between the laws of those States and 
international law, and whether the courts in those States have considered and applied concepts 
analogous to the abuse of rights doctrine.  
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CHAPTER FOUR:  AUSTRALIA AND EXTRATERRITORIAL 
JURISDICTION 
Chapter Four provides a historical overview of Australia‘s legal system and then considers the 
regulation of extraterritorial jurisdiction in Australia. It does so by providing examples of assertions 
of extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction and analysing two significant decisions of the High Court of 
Australia. Following that analysis, the relationship between international law and Australian 
domestic law is considered to determine whether the abuse of rights doctrine as conceived in 
international law could have any role to play in Australia. To that end, the existence, or otherwise, 
of engagement by Australian courts with the abuse of rights doctrine, or any analogous principles, is 
explored. This Chapter will then conclude with an analysis of the regulation of extraterritorial 
criminal jurisdiction as against the stated criteria of the chosen conception of the rule of law.  
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1. Introduction  
 
Like India and the United States, Australia is a common-law and federal system. It is a very old, 
and yet, a very young country: the Indigenous peoples of Australia represent the ‗oldest living 
cultural history in the world‘,1 but the ‗modern‘ Australia is still relatively young. Australia has 
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inherited much of its legal heritage from the United Kingdom and only achieved full constitutional 
independence in 1986.
2
 It remains a constitutional monarchy and the Queen of England is still 
today, the Queen of Australia. Australia is the only western democracy to have no national bill of 
rights, either as a statute or entrenched as part of the national constitution.
3
 The superior court in 
Australia is known as the High Court of Australia (the High Court) and power is divided between 
the state governments and the central government, known as the Commonwealth government (‗the 
Commonwealth‘). As noted in Chapter 1, this thesis is primarily concerned with extraterritoriality 
and the federal level of government and does not extend to a separate consideration of assertions of 
extraterritoriality by the Australian states.   
 
This Chapter will provide a brief overview of Australian legal history to provide some context and 
then move to a discussion of extraterritorial jurisdiction in Australia. In so doing, examples of 
legislation with extraterritorial reach are considered, as are examples of judicial regulation of 
extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction. In that context, the relationship between Australian law and 
international law is then considered. This is so as to identify the extent to which principles of 
international law are relevant in regulating extraterritorial jurisdiction in Australia, particularly in 
relation to the protection of individual rights. To that end, the question as to whether or not 
Australian courts have engaged with principles analogous to the abuse of rights doctrine is 
considered. The conclusions that are to be drawn from this Chapter will be considered in Chapter 
Seven, the concluding Chapter, as will the conclusions to drawn from Chapters five and six, which 
consider extraterritoriality in India and the United States, respectively.  
 
2. Historical overview  
The story of ancient Australia is the story of Australia‘s indigenous peoples. Although it was not 
recognised at the time of colonalisation, Australian Aboriginals and Torres Strait Islanders do have 
laws and systems for administering those laws.
4
 These laws and systems are based on ‗one vast 
network of relationships which can be traced to the great Ancestor Spirits of Dreaming‘.5 They 
were, however, not codified in the way that colonising forces expected and so little, if any, regard 
was had to indigenous law at the time of colonisation. The first European claim to Australia was 
                                               
2
 Patrick Parkinson, Tradition and Change in Australian Law (Thomson Reuters, 2010) 6.  
3
 Emily Howe, Rachel Ball, Philip Lynch and Ben Schokman, ‗A Human Rights Act for All Australians‘, Human 
Rights Law Resource Centre, Submission to the National Human Rights Consultation, May 2009, 74.  
4
 See for example,  Deborah Rose, ‗The Saga of Captain Cook: Morality in Aboriginal and European Law‘ (1984) (2) 
Australian Aboriginal Studies, 24; Cheri Yavu-Kama-Harathunian, ‘Aboriginal Law and Spirituality Defined within a 
Specific Clan Perspective from within Panaboriginal Interpretations’ (1998), 
<http://www.aija.org.au/ac03/papers/cheriharathunian.pdf>.  
5
 Sandra Cutts, ‗Living the Dreaming: The Relationship to the Land for Aboriginal 
Australians‘,<http://www.bri.net.au/livingbysandra.html>.  
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made on behalf of Britain in 1770.
6
 In 1788, Australia was colonised by Britain as a prison for 
‗felons and other offenders‘.7 At the time, the governance of Australia was ‗autocratic and akin to a 
military dictatorship‘.8 As prisoners were either pardoned or completed their sentences, however, a 
generation of ‗Australian-born‘ children emerged and the move towards representative government 
began to emerge. The Australian Courts Act 1828 (Imp) established a legislative council and 
Australian Constitutions Act (No 1) 1842 (Imp) introduced representative government to part of the 
country.
9
  The Statute of Westminster was passed by the United Kingdom in 1931. The Statute of 
Westminster Adoption Act 1942 was not adopted by Australia until 1942, at which point it was 
backdated to 1939.
10
 Section 2(2) of that Act provided that no act of the Australian Parliament 
could be found invalid for the reason of repugnancy to the laws of the United Kingdom, and power 
to repeal any United Kingdom Act previously applied. Section 3 made it clear that the 
Commonwealth Parliament had power to act extraterritorially in its own right. In effect, this Act 
meant the Commonwealth of Australia was, ‗legally free from the Parliament of the United 
Kingdom‘.11  
 
Between 1890 and 1900, a series of conventions were held in order to formulate a draft constitution 
for Australia. In 1900, the British Parliament passed the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution 
Act 1900 (Imp), which came into force on 1 January 1901. Unlike the Constitution of the United 
States, the Australian Constitution was not drafted with a view to protect individual rights. Instead it 
was concerned with the distribution of power between state parliaments and the Commonwealth 
parliament. Further, the decision to not include a guarantee of equal protection before the law, for 
example, is also reflective of racist sentiments at the time. In relation to a proposal to include a right 
to equal protection before the law, it has been observed:  
These proposals were attacked both on the basis that such guarantees were unnecessary for the 
protection of the rights of citizens in a polity based on representative and responsible government, 
and because they were seen as having the potential to restrict colonial laws that limited the 
employment of Asian workers.
12
  
 
                                               
6
 Alexander Reilly et al, Australian Public Law (Oxford University Press, 2011) 28. 
7
 Ibid. 
8
 Ibid.  
9
 Ibid 36-37.  
10
 Sarah Joseph and Melissa Castan, Federal Constitutional Law (Thomson Reuters, Australia, 2010) 28-29.  
11
 Ibid 29. Notably, this only applied to the Commonwealth and the states of Australia remained subservient to the 
United Kingdom until the passing of the Australia Act 1986 (Cth). 
12
 Andrew Byrnes, Hilary Charlesworth and Gabrielle McKinnon, Bills of Rights in Australia: History, Politics and Law 
(University of New South Wales Press, 2009), 25. See also, George Williams, Human Rights under the Australian 
Constitution (Oxford University Press, 1999) 37-42.  
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Notably, due to a number of restrictions on the right to vote in elections, only 15 percent of the then 
total Australian population actually voted to approve the Constitution.
13
 Since that time there have 
been 44 referenda to change the Constitution, but only 8 have been successful.
14
   
 
In summary, while Australia inherited its legal tradition from the United Kingdom, there are now 
key points of difference including the division of power between state and federal governments and 
the existence of a written constitution. The latter is particularly significant because ‗unlike the 
United Kingdom, no Australian Parliament is absolutely sovereign.‘15 Instead, all parliaments in 
Australia are constrained by the Constitution. Therefore, exercises of extraterritorial criminal 
jurisdiction are as much questions of constitutional law as they are of criminal law or international 
law.  
 
3. Assertions of Extraterritorial Criminal Jurisdiction by Australia 
This section considers examples of legislation with extraterritorial reach and decisions by courts in 
Australia on assertion of extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction. This is done so as to gain insight as to 
the way in which extraterritoriality is regulated in Australia.  
 
3.1. Examples of legislation with extraterritorial reach 
Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) 
A number of offences in the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) (‗the Criminal Code’) have 
extraterritorial reach.  However, unlike India, as will be seen in Chapter Five, this is done on an ad-
hoc basis and the Criminal Code as a whole does not extend extraterritorially.  In Division 15, 
entitled ‗Extended geographical jurisdiction‘, the Criminal Code identifies four types of ‗extended‘ 
jurisdictional assertions, Categories A, B, C and D.  The categories are quite complex and lengthy, 
so rather than reproduce the relevant provisions, a summary is set out below.  
 
Category A offences are described in section 15(1) of the Criminal Code as those that extend to 
conduct that occurs wholly or partially in Australia,
16
 which is still a type of territorial jurisdiction. 
It also includes offences that occur wholly outside Australia, if a result of the conduct occurs wholly 
                                               
13
 Peter Botsman, The Great Constitution Swindle: A Citizen’s View of the Australian Constitution (Pluto Press, 2000) 
52.  
14
 House Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Inquiry into Constitutional Reform, (23 June 2008), 
chapters 2,8 
<http://www.aph.gov.au/parliamentary_business/committees/house_of_representatives_committees?url=/laca/constituti
onalreform/report.htm >.  
15
 Joseph and Castan, above n 10, 3. 
16
 ‗[O]r on an Australian aircraft or ship‘. See Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) s 15(1)(a). 
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or partly in Australia.
17
 This could be either objective territoriality jurisdiction or an assertion of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction based on the effects principle. Category A offences also includes 
conduct where an ancillary offence occurs wholly outside Australia, but the primary offence to 
which it relates occurs, or is intended to occur, wholly or partly in Australia.
18
 Ancillary offences 
are those that are an extension of or relate to another ‗primary‘ offence. For example, offences such 
as attempts, conspiracies, or incitement are ancillary offences. This means that a conspiracy outside 
the territory of Australia to commit an offence in Australia can be prosecuted under Australian law. 
Depending on the nature of the offence, this could be an assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction 
based on the protective or effect principles of jurisdiction. Where the accused person is not a citizen 
of, or a body corporate incorporated in, Australia, this will only apply if the primary offence to 
which the ancillary offence relates is also an offence in the jurisdiction in which it occurred.
19
 In 
extradition law, this is often referred to as a ‗dual criminality‘ or ‗double criminality‘ requirement. 
Notably, liability for Category A offences apply to Australian citizens and body corporates 
incorporated in Australia (‗Australian BCs‘) even where the conduct occurs wholly outside 
Australia. Examples of Category A offences include fraud offences such as dealing in or possessing 
fraudulent identification documents.
20
 For example, the misuse of Australian passports outside 
Australia may be caught by this offence, which would be an example of protective principle 
jurisdiction, or if the accused was an Australian national, nationality principle jurisdiction. Other 
Category A offences in the Criminal Code include and computer offences, such as unauthorised 
access, modification or impairment to data or electronic communication.
21
 
 
The extraterritorial scope of Category B offences are exactly the same as Category A offences, 
except that these offences extend to the conduct of Australian residents as well as Australian 
citizens and Australian BCs.
22
 This is significant because it effectively permits Australia to regulate 
the overseas conduct of persons who cannot even vote in Australia. While this could be considered 
an assertion of active nationality jurisdiction, it is not necessarily the case that residents are 
‗nationals‘ and they are certainly not considered so for the purposes of other parts of Australian law. 
Examples of Category B offences include conduct such as the importation, exportation, 
manufacture and possession of plastic explosives,
23
 document offences related to migrant 
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  Ibid.  
18
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 Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) s 15.1(2). 
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102 
 
smuggling and unlawful entry into foreign countries,
24
 urging violence against groups or members 
of groups,
25
 slavery offences,
26
 trafficking in persons offenses,
27
 and serious drug offences.
28
  
 
Category C offences extend outside Australia and do not require any territorial nexus to Australia. 
These provisions also apply to persons who are not Australian citizens, residents, or Australian 
BCs. These offences could be considered an example of universal jurisdiction, except that a person 
who is not a citizen or Australian BC will not be liable for either ancillary or primary Category C 
offences if the offence is not also an offence in the jurisdiction in which it occurred.
29
 Examples of 
Category C offences in the Code include ‗unwarranted demands‘,30 made of or by a Commonwealth 
public official with ‗menaces‘,31 causing harm to Commonwealth officials,32 impersonation of a 
public official,
33
 and crimes against the administration of the justice of the International Criminal 
Court.
34
  Therefore, although the extended geographical reach of Category C offences do provide 
for a considerable degree of extraterritoriality, none of these offences are particularly controversial, 
and all would fit into widely accepted assertions of the protective principle. And, for non-nationals 
at least, the reach of these offences are limited by a dual criminality requirement, which does have 
implications for criteria 1 of the rule of law, as will be further discussed below.  
 
Category D offences, on the other hand, are truly an example of universal jurisdiction. Unlike the 
complex array of qualifications for categories A, B, and C, the description of Category D offences 
simply reads as follows:  
If a law of the Commonwealth provides that this section applies to a particular offence, the 
offence applies: 
(a) whether or not the conduct constituting the alleged offence occurs in Australia; 
and 
(b) whether or not a result of the conduct constituting the alleged offence occurs in 
Australia. 
 
                                               
24
 Ibid div 73. 
25
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26
 Ibid div 270. 
27
 Ibid div 271. 
28
 Ibid div 300. 
29
 Ibid ss 15.3(2), 15.3(4). 
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 Ibid div 139. 
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 Ibid div 139. 
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There are a number of offences in the Code that are classified as Category D offences. However, 
most relate to offences against the Commonwealth or to internationally recognised crimes, such as 
treason and terrorism, and so are not particularly controversial. Nonetheless, the number of offences 
over which Australia asserts universal jurisdiction is quite extensive and far-reaching, particularly 
given the offences include attempts and incitement, as will be discussed further below. Examples of 
Category D offences in the code include, treason and of urging violence against the Constitution,
35
 
espionage,
36
 acts of terrorism,‘37 associating with terrorist organisations,38 financing terrorist 
organisations,
39
 theft of Commonwealth property,
40
 a range of property offences including robbery, 
burglary and the receipt of property stolen from the Commonwealth,
41
 obtaining property or 
financial advantage from the Commonwealth by deception, dishonestly obtaining a gain from a 
Commonwealth entity,
42
 false or misleading statements to the Commonwealth,
43
 bribery of or by 
Commonwealth officials,
44
 forgery of Commonwealth documents,
45
 genocide, crimes against 
humanity and war crimes,
46
 and torture.
47
 
 
It is significant that the word ‗offence‘ in each of these four categories is expressed in the Code as 
having a meaning extended by sections 11.2(1), 11.2A(1), 11.3 and 11.6(1), which, in essence, 
means they apply to ancillary offences too. The first three of these provisions create offences for: 
aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring the commission of an offence; joint commission of 
offences; and commission by proxy. Section 11.6(1) provides that a ‗reference in a law of the 
Commonwealth to an offence against a law of the Commonwealth (including this Code) includes a 
reference to an offence against sections 11.1 (attempt), 11.4 (incitement) or 11.5 (conspiracy) of this 
Code that relates to such an offence.‘ This quite considerably extends the range of extraterritorial 
conduct that could be subject to Australian law. Notably, any assertion of any of these categories of 
‗extended geographical jurisdiction‘ require the consent of the Attorney-General if the conduct in 
question takes place wholly outside Australia and the accused is not an Australian citizen or an 
Australian BC. Therefore, assertions of extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction by Australia over non-
nationals become a question of political discretion. Offences such as ‗associating with terrorist 
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organisations‘ has the potential to include a wide range of conduct and that conduct may be far 
removed from any malicious intent against Australia or Australians. This will be further explored in 
relation to the discussion of the rule of law further below.  
Child Sexual Offences 
The jurisdictional reach of child sexual offences are dealt with separately in Division 272 of the 
Criminal Code. The division is entitled ‗Child sex offences outside Australia‘ and contains various 
offences relating to sexual intercourse or sexual activity, even where that activity takes place 
overseas. The title of its predecessor (Part IIIA of the Crimes Act 1914) was ‗Child Sex Tourism‘. 
The scope of the offences under both Part IIIA and Division 272, however, extends to conduct that 
takes place overseas with no territorial nexus to Australia other that the Australian citizenship or 
residency of the offender. For example, an Australian citizen who is a resident of an overseas 
jurisdiction is caught by the offence provisions even where that citizen makes no attempt to re‐enter 
Australia. Therefore, while child sex tourism remains one of the concerns underlying the legislation, 
the title of Division 272 does acknowledge a broader agenda than the former title and includes child 
sexual offences, and offences against young people between the ages of 16-18, that are not of a 
commercial nature. In particular, section 272.6 provides that:  
A person must not be charged with an offence against this Division that the person allegedly 
committed wholly outside Australia unless, at the time of the offence, the person was: 
  (a) an Australian citizen; or 
  (b) a resident of Australia; or 
(c) a body corporate incorporated by or under a law of the Commonwealth or of a 
State or Territory; or 
  (d) any other body corporate that carries on its activities principally in Australia. 
 
Notably, the extraterritorial reach of child sexual offences were the subject of two significant 
decisions, in which the High Court of Australia (‗the High Court‘) was required to consider issues 
of extraterritorial jurisdiction. These will be discussed in further detail below. First, however, the 
extraterritorial reach of Australia‘s migrant smuggling legislation is considered by way of a further 
example of extraterritoriality.  
People smuggling offences 
The issue of migrant smuggling and the processing of asylum seekers is a highly politicised issue in 
Australia.
48
 For example, under section 73.4 of the Criminal Code,
49
 jurisdiction for people 
smuggling offences is enlivened on two alternate grounds: 
                                               
48
 Note people smuggling offences are distinct from human trafficking offences both in Australian law, and under the 
relevant treaties.  This is because trafficking does not necessarily require an illegal border crossing, and victims are 
generally considered commodities, rather than clients. Article 3(a) of the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants 
by Land, Sea and Air defines people smuggling (the smuggling of migrants) as ‘the procurement, in order to obtain, 
directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit, of the illegal entry of a person into a State Part of which 
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 the alleged perpetrator is an Australian citizen or resident and the conduct constituting the 
offence occurs wholly outside Australia; or  
 the conduct constituting the offence occurs wholly or partly in Australia and the results 
occurred (or were intended to occur) outside Australia, regardless of the alleged offender‘s 
nationality.   
 
In June 2010, further amendments to Australia‘s migrant smuggling laws came into effect.50 Among 
other things, the amendments established a new offence of providing ‗material support‘ towards a 
people smuggling venture. Given that receipt of a financial benefit is not a prerequisite to be liable 
under this offence, persons who are Australian citizens or residents who work in charities and 
NGOs that provide some form of ‗material support‘ could be caught by this provision, even where 
that conduct occurs overseas.
51
  
 
Many of these offences have extraterritorial scope. This has meant both engagement and tensions 
with regional governments such as Nauru, Papua New Guinea, Sri Lanka, Indonesia and 
Malaysia.
52
  For example, working groups were established between Australia and Malaysia, and 
Indonesia to ‗harmonise‘ legal frameworks, including issues of jurisdiction.53 This is because 
without corresponding extraterritorial components, ‗dual‘ or ‗double‘ criminality requirements can 
make extradition and mutual assistance requests complicated and protracted.
54
 While cooperation 
on transnational crime may be a legitimate pursuit in itself, Australia‘s regional ‗cooperative‘ 
activities on migrant smuggling may negatively impact on the human rights of asylum seekers.  It 
                                                                                                                                                            
the person is not a national or a permanent resident‘. Article 3(a) of the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish 
Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children defines trafficking of persons as ‗the recruitment, 
transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of 
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or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the 
purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or 
other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the 
removal of organs. 
49
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also suggests an uncomfortable dynamic where Australia is ‗buying‘ cooperation on transnational 
crime in exchange for aid much needed by its poorer neighbours.    
 
For example, after years of persistent urging by Australia, in 2011, the Indonesian Parliament 
passed legislation criminalising people smuggling activities. The legislation reportedly provides for 
the imposition of penalties between five and 15 years imprisonment for people smuggling 
offences
55
 and it is understood some provisions have extraterritorial components. Prior to the 
passing of these laws, persons found to be involved in people smuggling activities have been 
prosecuted for minor immigration or maritime offences.
56
 The then Australian Home Affairs 
Minister reportedly applauded the Indonesian parliament and asserted the laws will serve as a 
‗strong deterrent‘ against people smuggling activities.57 It is telling that Indonesian people 
smuggling laws were described by Australian media as ‗honouring an undertaking made by 
President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono to … the Australian parliament.‘58 Notably, any 
‗cooperative‘ relationship between Australia and Indonesia on the issue of people smuggling has 
since deteriorated after, in early 2014, Australia attempted extraterritorial enforcement of its asylum 
seeker policy and turned vessels with asylum seekers on board away from Australian waters, and 
towards or into, Indonesian waters.
59
 This is an example of the kind of extraterritorial regulation 
that sours international relations, and may breach human rights and other international obligations.  
Australia now has regional arrangements wherein persons seeking asylum in Australia are detained 
extraterritorially to Australia, in countries such as Nauru and Papua New Guinea. At the time of 
writing, this has been particularly controversial and attracted international criticism.
60
 For example, 
Ravina Shamdasani, spokeswoman for the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, was reported 
as saying that ‗'the practice of detaining migrants and asylum seekers arriving by boat on a 
mandatory, prolonged and potentially indefinite basis, without individual assessment, is inherently 
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arbitrary. Moreover, alternatives to immigration detention should always be considered.‘61 The 
desire to appear ‗tough‘ on immigration has resulted in assertions of extraterritoriality over migrant 
smuggling offences throughout the Asia-Pacific region, but in very little corresponding 
extraterritorial protections. This raises concerns as to the implications for the human rights of those 
persons subject to the extraterritorial legislation.  
 
In summary, there are a number of Australian criminal offences with extraterritorial reach. Many of 
these are uncontroversial in theory. However, in practice, there are broader political issues at play 
and the rights of individuals may be compromised. This will be discussed at greater length when 
assessing Australia‘s conformity with the rule of law, as regards its extraterritorial activities. First, 
judicial consideration of extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction is considered in order to make an 
assessment of the way in which extraterritoriality is regulated in Australia. In turn, that assessment 
will be used to inform conclusions as to the adequacy of regulation of extraterritorial jurisdiction 
and the potential usefulness of the abuse of rights doctrine.  
3.2. Australian Courts and Extraterritoriality  
This section considers the way in which questions of extraterritorial jurisdiction have been handled 
by courts in Australia. As a starting point, it is now accepted by Australian courts that the 
Commonwealth has the power to act extraterritorially.  For example, in Polyukhovich v 
Commonwealth,
62
 the High Court considered legislation that retrospectively created liability for 
certain war crimes committed outside Australia during World War II. The legislation applied to 
Australian citizens or residents at the time the charges were brought, but there was no requirement 
the perpetrator has any connection to Australia at the time the alleged offence was committed. A 
majority upheld the legislation on the basis that that the external affairs power in section 51(xxix) of 
the Constitution gave the Commonwealth a plenary extraterritorial power. For example, Mason CJ 
found it unnecessary to even consider the international law connection, given that it was enough 
that the conduct was ‗external to Australia‘. He said the: 
[E]xternality of the conduct which the law prescribes as the foundation of the criminal offence is 
enough without more to constitute it as a law with respect to external affairs. In this respect it makes 
no difference whether the law creates a criminal liability by reference to past or future conduct, so 
long as the conduct is external to Australia.
63
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Since then, the High Court has had cause to consider other exercises of extraterritorial jurisdiction 
by Australia. To that end, two key cases are considered, XYZ v Commonwealth,
64
 and Moti v The 
Queen.
65
 These decisions are chosen because they specifically consider issues of jurisdiction and, 
having been delivered in 2006 and 2012 respectively, are relatively recent.  
3.2.1. XYZ v The Commonwealth  
In XYZ v Commonwealth,
66
 an Australian citizen (XYZ) was committed to stand trial on three 
charges, each alleged to have been committed in Thailand. The charges included engaging and 
attempting to engage in sexual intercourse with a child under 16 years of age, contrary to provisions 
in the then Part IIIA of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth).  XYZ challenged the validity of the provisions 
on the basis that the Commonwealth did not have the authority to assert extraterritorial jurisdiction 
over offences that occurred in Thailand.  The case ultimately went to the High Court, where the 
issue was whether section 51(xxix) of the Constitution of Australia, the external affairs power, 
permitted the Commonwealth to assert extraterritorial jurisdiction over the conduct of its citizens or 
residents overseas. The Court concluded that given the conduct proscribed by the extraterritorial 
components of the relevant child sex offences occurs outside Australia, it was conduct within the 
scope of the external affairs power.
67
  For example, in arriving at his decision, Gleeson CJ noted 
that the territorial principle of legislative jurisdiction is not the only source of jurisdiction 
recognised by international law.
68
 He found that the principle of national sovereignty, according to 
the law of nations, grants Australia a right to ‗regulate, by legislation, the conduct outside Australia 
of Australian citizens or residents.‘69 The court also made reference to the decision in Polyukhovich 
v the Commonwealth,
70
 in which Mason CJ stated that the 'externality of the conduct which the law 
prescribes as the foundation of the criminal offence is enough without more to constitute it as a law 
with respect to external affairs',
71
 and held that the Court does not need to be satisfied that Australia 
has an interest or concern in the subject-matter of the legislation.
72
 Statements to similar effect were 
made by Deane, Dawson, Gaudron and McHugh JJ.
73
 In any event, the High Court in XYZ v 
Commonwealth confirmed that the Commonwealth may rely on section 51(xxix) of the Constitution 
of Australia to assert extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction over Australian citizens or residents. Such 
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assertions are also permitted under international law by virtue of the active nationality principle.
74
 
However, although useful in responding to transnational crime, assertions of extraterritorial 
criminal jurisdiction are sometimes overly politicised and vulnerable to abuses of process,
75
 as can 
be seen in the case below.  
3.2.2. Moti v The Queen 
In Moti v The Queen,
76
 the High Court of Australia considered whether proceedings can be 
maintained against a person who has not properly been brought within the jurisdiction by regular 
means, or whether such proceedings are an abuse of process.  In so doing, a majority of six to one 
concluded that the act of state doctrine does not preclude findings as to the legality of the conduct of 
a foreign government, where those conclusions are a necessary step to determining a question 
within the competency of the court. The decision is relevant to existing international jurisprudence 
on due process rights in prosecutions of extraterritorial conduct. It also suggests that, in operating 
extraterritorially, Australian officials will still be accountable in Australian courts. In that context, 
the background to the case is summarised and an analysis of the decision is presented.  
Background  
Mr Julian Moti, who holds Australian citizenship, was deported from the Solomon Islands in 
December 2007, and charged under Australian law for child sexual offences.
77
 The relevant conduct 
allegedly occurred in Vanuatu, and at a time when Mr Moti was a resident of Vanuatu. However, 
the relevant offence provisions under Commonwealth law have extraterritorial reach.
78
 Mr Moti 
was the Attorney-General of the Solomon Islands. Three days before his deportation to Australia, it 
was officially published in the Solomon Island Gazette that Moti had been removed from 
appointment as Attorney-General.  
The arguments 
In proceedings before the Supreme Court of Queensland, Mr Moti argued the prosecution was an 
abuse of process and applied for a stay of the indictment presented against him. He argued that his 
deportation was a disguised extradition and an unlawful removal, and that the investigation was 
politically motivated. Mr Moti also sought to characterise payments made by the Australian 
government to witnesses, described by the crown as living expenses, as an abuse of process. 
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Australia has no coercive powers to compel witnesses from overseas countries to give evidence, so 
the prosecution relied heavily on the willingness of witnesses. In deciding the application, Mullins J 
held there was no basis for the disguised extradition ground because the decision to deport was one 
for the Solomon Islands as a sovereign nation.
79
 The Court then went on to reject all other grounds, 
except one. The stay of prosecution was granted on the basis that payments made to the witnesses 
who lived in Vanuatu brought the administration of justice into disrepute.
80
 Mullins J found that 
while there may have been some justification for humanitarian support for the family of the 
complainant,
81
 the payments were of an amount that exceeded merely subsistence support,
82
 and 
constituted ‗an affront to the public conscience‘.83 On appeal, the Supreme Court of Appeal set 
aside the stay granted by Mullins J on the basis that the payments made to witnesses were not 
illegal, and not intended to procure evidence from the witnesses. Subsequently, Mr Moti applied for 
and was granted special leave to appeal to the High Court of Australia. Before the High Court, Mr 
Moti submitted that his deportation from the Solomon Islands was illegal, and therefore, his ensuing 
prosecution in Australia was an abuse of process. The Commonwealth argued the act of state 
doctrine precluded the Court from making a finding as to the legality of the deportation. It was also 
argued for Mr Moti that the Court of Appeal erred in overturning the finding of the primary Judge 
that the payments to witnesses were an abuse of process. The High Court ultimately rejected this 
latter element of the argument.  
The findings 
The High Court made a number of findings in Moti. The relevant findings relate first, to the extent 
to which the act of state doctrine will prevent the Court from making findings, and second, to the 
idea of an ‗abuse of process‘.  The discussion of the act of state doctrine in Moti v The Queen was a 
necessary precursor to a finding of an abuse of process.  To that end, the High Court made reference 
to the seminal articulation of the act of state doctrine by Fuller CJ in an 1897 decision of the 
Supreme Court of the United States, Underhill v Hernandez.
84
 There it was stated:  
Every foreign state is bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign state, and the courts 
of one country will not sit in judgement on the acts of the government of another done with in its own 
territory. Redress of grievances by reason of such acts must be obtained through the means open to be 
availed of by sovereign powers as between themselves.
 85
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In that case, Hernandez, the commander of a revolutionary force in Venezuela committed trespass 
and other wrongs to Underhill. At the time, Underhill was residing in Bolivar, a state in Venezuela, 
and Hernandez‘s forces were recognised by the United States as the government of Venezuela. The 
Supreme Court of the United States concluded that as the relevant acts of Hernandez were that of 
the Venezuelan state, it could not properly be the subject of adjudication in the Courts of another 
state. The majority in Moti v The Queen, consisting of French CJ, and Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, 
Kiefel, and Bell JJ parted ways with this doctrine and delivered a joint judgment concluding, 
‗‗…that the decision of a foreign official is called into question does not of itself prevent the courts 
from considering the issue.‘86 They agreed with the following assertion:87 
The Courts are free to consider and pronounce an opinion upon the exercises of sovereign power by a 
foreign government, if the consideration of those acts of a foreign government only constitutes a 
preliminary to decision of a question, which in itself is subject to the competency of the Court of law. 
 
The High Court found it was not bound by a ‗general and universally applicable rule‘,88 as to when 
it may, or may not, form a view about the lawfulness of conduct occurring outside Australia.
89
 It 
did, however, place significant emphasis on the fact that a decision on the conduct of the foreign 
State was a necessary prerequisite to the more significant decision on the lawfulness of conduct by 
the Australian State. Therefore, it could be that the Court intended to assert this as a necessary 
precondition – i.e. that the conduct of foreign States can only be considered where it is necessary to 
resolve a decision as to the lawfulness of the conduct of Australian (and not foreign) officials. To 
draw this conclusion from the judgment would seem at odds with the unwillingness of the Court to 
confine itself to a particular test. The Court declared itself to be of the view that issues of act of 
State are ‗better approached at a more particular level of inquiry than the level of generality 
reflected in the dictum of Fuller CJ [in Underhill v Hernandez].‘90 Nonetheless, limiting the Court‘s 
ability to pass judgment on the acts of a foreign government to matters of mere preliminary 
importance does provide some parameters for exercise of the doctrine. Having determined the act of 
State doctrine did not preclude it from deciding whether an unlawful deportation had occurred, the 
Court then found that the unlawful deportation rendered the prosecution an abuse of process. The 
Court‘s findings on the abuse of process will be discussed in further detail below when considering 
whether Australian courts have adopted principles analogous to the abuse of rights doctrine.  
                                               
86
 Moti v The Queen, above n 77, 407 [52]. 
87
 Ibid.  
88
 Ibid 407 [50]. 
89
 Ibid 393 [50]. 
90
 Ibid 407 [52]. 
112 
 
Broader Relevance of the Arguments and Findings 
The decision in Moti v The Queen has implications for prosecutors, law enforcement, and other 
government officials involved in the investigation and prosecution of conduct occurring 
extraterritorially. For example, the majority stated that where Australia seeks the extradition of a 
person from another country, so as to prosecute that person under Australian law, principles of 
double jeopardy will ordinarily apply.  
This could be interpreted as suggesting that as a general principle of law or state practice, principles 
of double jeopardy may apply both within, and as between nation States. However, it should be 
noted at this point that the Criminal Code (Cth) in Australia expressly extends protection against 
double jeopardy to persons accused of child sexual offences under Australian law, even when it 
occurs extraterritorially.
91
 This is not necessarily the case for all offences. This is significant 
because, as set out in Chapter 3, article 14(7) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR),
92
 is limited to multiple prosecutions in one state, and not as between States. Article 
20 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,
93
 does provide some protection against 
double jeopardy. However, this protection only applies to persons prosecuted for the crimes of 
genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and, potentially, the crime of aggression.
94
 
Therefore, it is generally not relevant to prosecutions of other kinds of transnational crime such as 
money laundering, people smuggling, trafficking in persons, child sex tourism, or cybercrime. The 
judgment is also relevant because it suggests that the ‗act of state doctrine‘ is not an impenetrable 
shield.  It indicates that if Australia is to assert jurisdiction extraterritorially, then there are 
obligations that will attach to that privilege.  
Having now identified that Australia has legislation with extraterritorial reach and having 
considered two examples of judicial regulation of jurisdiction, this Chapter will now analyse 
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extraterritoriality in Australia against the three principles of the ‗rule of law‘, as set out in Chapters 
1 and 3. Following that analysis, the relationship between international law and Australian 
municipal law is considered and the existence, or otherwise, of engagement by Australian courts 
with the abuse of rights doctrine, or any analogous principles, is explored.  
4. Australian Courts and International Law 
Australian courts have had an equivocal relationship with international law. Hilary Charlesworth, 
writing in 2004, went so far as to describe the High Court‘s understanding of international law as 
‗inherently, vague uncertain and open-ended.‘95 The Constitution of Australia does not expressly 
refer to international law as having a role in municipal law. It does contain section 51(xxix), under 
which the Australian Parliament can enact laws which implement international treaty obligations 
and which also permits the Commonwealth to act extraterritoriality, and section 75(ii), which refers 
to treaties. The Commonwealth, however, is under no obligation to implement treaties into 
municipal law and nor must it implement them precisely.  
 
The relationship between the laws of Australia and international law is relevant because it will 
assist in determining whether the abuse of rights doctrine, as it is conceived in an international law 
paradigm, might have a role in the regulation of extraterritoriality in Australia.  By way of 
background, Australia has signed, ratified or acceded to a number of significant international 
treaties, including the ICCPR,
96
 and treaties that either permit or oblige assertions of 
extraterritoriality, such as the United Nations Convention on Transnational Organised Crime,
97
 and 
the supplementary protocols,
98
 the Convention on the Rights of the Child,
99
 the Convention against 
Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
100
 the International 
Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombing,
101
 the International Convention for the 
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism
,,102
  the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees,
103
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and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.
104
  Notably, the provisions of an 
international treaty do not form part of Australian law unless validly incorporated into municipal 
law by statute.
105
 Reflecting on judicial authority, Hilary Charlesworth has observed that ‗an 
uncontroversial widely accepted norm of custom will be more readily regarded as part of Australian 
law by the High Court.‘106  
 
The role of international law in Australia has been considered in a number of decisions of the High 
Court, including Polites v Commonwealth,
107
 Polyukhovich v Commonwealth,
108
 Dietrich v The 
Queen,
109
 Mabo v Queensland (No 2),
110
 Horta v Commonwealth,
111
 Minister for Immigration and 
Ethnic Affairs v Teoh,
112
 and more recently in Al-Kateb v Godwin.
113
 Three key themes emerge in 
the jurisprudence. First, the extent to which international law can be used to interpret legislation. 
Second, the extent to which international law can be used to interpret the Constitution, and third, the 
extent to which municipal legislation purporting to implement an international treaty obligations 
must reflect the content of that treaty.  
 
It has generally been accepted that international law can be used to interpret legislation. For 
example, in Polites v Commonwealth,
114
 the Court considered whether the National Security Act 
1939-1943 (Cth) could impose compulsory military service on persons who were not Australian 
nationals, but whom were present in Australia. It was argued by two Greek nationals present in 
Australia that the National Security Act and the constitutional ‗defence‘ power, which authorized 
the making of such a law, should be interpreted in accordance with international law, and that it was 
a rule of customary law that States could not conscript aliens within their borders. Ultimately, the 
Court rejected a construction of the National Security Act that would have accorded with 
international law on the basis that the legislation clearly intended otherwise.  
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Dixon J held that, ‗unless a contrary intention appear, general words occurring in a statute are to be 
read subject to the established rules of international law‘.115 Similarly, many years later, Gummow J 
in Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade v Magno,
116
 held that ‗the Parliament may make no 
attempt to incorporate expressly into domestic law the terms of a convention which has been 
ratified by Australia. Nevertheless, the terms of the convention may be resorted to in order to help 
resolve an ambiguity in domestic primary or subordinate legislation. Prima facie the Parliament 
should be taken as intending to legislate in conformity and not in conflict with international law.‘ 117 
 
The Court did not accept that the same principle applied to interpretation of the Constitution. For 
example, Dixon J held:  
The contention that s 51(vi) of the Constitution [the defence power] should be read as subject to the 
same implication, in my opinion, ought not to be countenanced. The purpose of Part V of Chapter I 
of the Constitution is to confer upon an autonomous government plenary legislative power over the 
assigned subjects. Within the matters placed under its authority, the power of the Parliament was 
intended to be supreme and to construe it down by reference to the presumption is to apply to the 
establishment of legislative power a rule for the construction of legislation passed in its exercise.
118
  
 
Similarly, Starke J held:  
So to limit the constitutional power of sovereign States or their subordinate authorities denies the 
supremacy of those States within their own territory, which is contrary to the principles of the law of 
nations itself.
119
  
 
The inapplicability of international law to constitutional interpretation was later affirmed in AMS v 
AIF,
120
 where Gleeson CJ and McHugh J held, ‗as to the Constitution, its provisions are not to be 
construed as subject to an implication said to be derived from international law.‘121 
 
The decision in Dietrich v The Queen,
122
 considered whether a person accused of a drug trafficking 
offence was entitled to legal representation. The Court was unanimous in deciding that such a right 
did not exist in Australia by reference to international law because ‗no international instrument 
upon which the applicant may successfully rely has been incorporated by legislation into Australian 
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municipal law.‘123 The point being that international law is not part of Australian law unless 
specifically incorporated by legislation.  Notably, the High Court did go on to find the absence of 
legal representation had resulted in a miscarriage of justice for reasons other than any principle of 
international law.  
 
These decisions suggest that international treaties do not become part of Australian law unless 
specifically incorporated into municipal law by legislation. Further, even when the Commonwealth 
chooses to do so, it is not obliged to legislate in precise conformity with those treaties. In Horta v 
Commonwealth,
124
 it was held that the external affairs power in section 51(xxix) of the Australian 
Constitution did not require that the treaty be implemented consistent with international law. In 
Victoria v Commonwealth,
125
 however, the High Court held that although ‗it is for the legislature to 
choose the means by which it carries into or gives effect to the treaty‘,126 the law must nonetheless 
‗be reasonably capable of being considered appropriate and adapted to implementing the treaty.‘127   
 
Further, there has been some suggestion that Australia being party to a treaty is not necessarily of 
no effect in Australian law. In Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh,
128
 the High 
Court indicated that ratification of an international treaty created a legitimate expectation that 
Australia would act in accordance with that treaty, even where it had not been implemented by 
legislation into municipal law. For example, it was held: 
Ratification by Australia of an international convention is not to be dismissed as a merely 
platitudinous or ineffectual act, particularly when the instrument evidences internationally accepted 
standards applied by courts and administrative authorities in dealing with the basic human rights 
affecting the family and children. Rather, ratification of a convention is a positive statement by the 
executive government of this country to the world and to the Australian people that the executive 
government and its agencies will act in accordance with the Convention.
129
 
 
Subsequent decisions have not embraced this principle.
130
 As Nicholas Niarchos has observed ‗the 
reasoning behind that decision has also been subjected to strong criticism by a number of the … 
justices of the High Court and, if the opportunity arises, it may well be overruled.‘131 Further, the 
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legitimate expectations identified in the decision, even if it remains good law, extend only to the 
exercise of administrative power by the executive and not to the exercise of legislative power by the 
parliament or judicial power by the courts.  
 
It should be noted that not only has the High Court considered the relationship between 
international law and statues and the Constitution of Australia, but it has also considered the 
relationship between international law and the common law. In that context, where human rights are 
at as issue, international law may be of heightened importance. For example, in Mabo (No. 2), 
Brennan J suggested that:  
The common law does not necessarily conform with international law, but international law is a 
legitimate and important influence on the development of the common law especially when 
international law declares the existence of universal human rights.
132
  
 
Further, not all judges have been reticent in seeking to develop a more intimate relationship 
between international law and Australian law. For example, a High Court Justice, Michael Kirby, 
advocated a more incorporative approach. This can be seen in a number of his judgements. For 
example, in Newcrest Mining v The Commonwealth,
133
 he said: 
[I]nternational law is a legitimate and important influence on the development of the common law, 
especially when international law declares the existence of universal and fundamental rights. To the 
full extent that its text permits, Australia‘s Constitution, as the fundamental law of government in 
this country, accommodates itself to international law, including in so far as that law expresses basic 
rights. The reason for this is that the Constitution not only speaks to the people of Australia who 
made it and accept it for their governance. It also speaks to the international community as the basic 
law of the Australian nation which is a member of that community.
134
 
 
Similarly, in Kartinyeri v The Commonwealth,
135
 he said:   
There is no doubt that, if the constitutional provision is clear and if a law is clearly within power, no 
rule of international law, and no treaty (including one to which Australia is a party) may override the 
Constitution or any law validly made under it. But that is not the question here… Where there is 
ambiguity, there is a strong presumption that the Constitution, adopted and accepted by the people of 
Australia for their government, is not intended to violate fundamental human rights and human 
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dignity … In the contemporary context it is appropriate to measure the prohibition by having regard 
to international law as it expresses universal and basic rights.
136
 
 
As Niarchos has observed, however, ‗[t]he interpretative principle as expressed by Justice Kirby has 
attracted strong criticism from other justices of the High Court and is unlikely to command majority 
support any time soon.‘137 Therefore, overall, judicial consideration of the relationship between 
Australian law and international law is indicative of a ‗dualist‘ approach. The two are considered 
separate institutions and while international law can be used to interpret legislation, the High Court 
has resisted any attempt to argue that it ought to be used to interpret the Australian Constitution. 
The concern seems to be that international law is too vague and too broad to be useful or 
appropriate to have a role in judicial decision-making or that it is inconsistent with the intention of 
the drafters of the Constitution. Charlesworth has suggested that this concern is overstated because, 
generally speaking, only a small number of treaties will be relevant to any particular decision and 
further, because international law is no less vague and broad than common-law principles such as 
‗reasonableness‘ or ‗foreseeability‘. 138 Further, the Constitution was drafted at a time when 
Australia had no capacity to enter into treaties independently of the United Kingdom. Clearly, that 
is no longer the case and a fanatical adherence to the thinking of that time is now archaic and 
impractical. Nonetheless, a change to the relationship between the Australian Constitution and 
international law is likely to require constitutional change and not just a change in judicial thinking.  
 
5. Australian Courts and the Abuse of Rights Doctrine 
As set out in Chapter Three, while common-law countries do not necessarily speak in terms of an 
abuse of rights doctrine, analogous principles, such as procedural fairness and due process rights, do 
exist and are adopted by the courts.  As a starting point, there is no general guarantee of due process 
in Australia. As observed in Kruger v Commonwealth:
139
 
The Australian Constitution, with few exceptions and in contrast with its American model, does not 
seek to establish personal liberty by placing restrictions upon the exercise of governmental power. 
Those who framed the Australian Constitution accepted the view that individual‘s rights were on the 
whole best left to the protection of the common law and the supremacy of parliament … Thus the 
Constitution contains no general guarantee of the due process of law. The few provisions contained 
in the Constitution which afford protection against governmental action in disregard of individual 
rights do not amount to such a general guarantee. 
                                               
136
 Ibid 417–19. 
137
 Niarchos, above n 132, 5. 
138
 Charlesworth, above n 96, 12. 
139
 (1997) 190 CLR 1, 61. 
119 
 
 
As noted above, the High Court in Moti v The Queen, in effect, found that the right of the 
Commonwealth to assert jurisdiction extraterritorially was subject to the right of an accused to not 
be subject to an ‗abuse of process‘.  In considering whether an unlawful deportation rendered the 
prosecution an abuse of process, the majority described the principle in Williams v Spautz,
140
 that, 
‗Australian superior courts have inherent jurisdiction to stay proceedings which are an abuse of 
process‘,141 as a ‗well established rule‘.142 The Court did not consider that the notion of an abuse of 
process was confined to narrow or particular categories. Instead, abuse of process should be 
understood as a ‗basic proposition,‘143 that the end does not justify the means. The High Court 
observed,
144
 
And the use of words like ―connivance‖, ―collusion‖ and ―participation‖ should not be permitted to 
confine attention in that way. All should be understood as proceeding from recognition of the basic 
proposition that the end of criminal prosecution does not justify the adoption of any and every means 
for securing the presence of the accused.  
The conclusion that the deportation of Mr Moti was not conducted lawfully did not in itself 
constitute an abuse of process by Australian officials. Rather, the Court held a finding of abuse of 
process must be determined by reference to three propositions:
145
 
1. The trial of an indictable offence must generally be conducted in the presence of the 
accused;  
2. Where Australia seeks the extradition of a person from another country, so as to prosecute 
that person under Australian law, principles of double jeopardy and speciality ordinarily 
apply; and  
3. Public interest dictates that a court of law must ensure its processes are used fairly by state 
and citizen because a failure to do so will erode public confidence. Public confidence ‗refers 
to the trust reposed constitutionally in the courts to protect the integrity and fairness of their 
processes.‘146 
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In considering the first proposition, the Court observed that Mr Moti was only available in 
Queensland for charge and trial as a result of his unlawful removal from the Solomon Islands.
147
 
Therefore, determining whether an abuse of process had occurred necessarily required first 
determining whether Moti‘s deportation was illegal, and ‗why it was illegal‘.148  As for the second 
proposition, the Court found it was ‗neither necessary nor appropriate‘,149 to consider double 
jeopardy or speciality in this instance. However, the majority judgment suggests that prosecutions 
under Australian law for conduct occurring extraterritorially should comply with these principles. 
The obiter remark, ‗where the offences with which the appellant was charged were offences that it 
was alleged he had committed outside Australia, the question of double criminality may have been 
controversial‘,150 is significant. It sends a message to prosecutors that the High Court will not 
tolerate marked departures from ordinary due process, and fundamental principles of a fair trial.  
In moving to the third proposition, the Court found that the notion of abuse of process extends to 
the use of courts‘ processes in a way that is inconsistent with these ‗fundamental policy 
considerations‘.151  Therefore, the Court considered whether ‗what Australian officials did or did 
not do‘,152 was inconsistent with these principles. In so doing, three findings were pivotal: 
Australian officials knew that the opinion of the Acting High Commissioner was that Moti‘s 
deportation was not lawful; that opinion was right; and, in spite of that opinion being right, 
Australian officials facilitated the unlawful deportation by providing the travel documents used to 
effect the unlawful deportation.
153
 The High Court found,
154
 
The critical observation is that what was done by Australian officials not only facilitated the 
appellant‘s deportation, it facilitated his deportation by removal on 27 December 2007 when 
Australian officials in Honiara believed that this was not lawful and had told Australian officials in 
Canberra so. It follows that the maintenance of proceedings against the appellant on the indictment 
preferred against him on 3 November 2008 was an abuse of process of the court, and should have been 
permanently stayed by the primary judge.  
 
In his dissenting judgement, Heydon J was of the view that an ‗…accident of evil means should not 
disrupt the fulfilment of a just end.‘155 This view is consistent with that preferred in United States 
courts, where the Ker-Frisbie doctrine prevails. In essence, that doctrine provides that illegalities in 
the extradition process will not bar prosecution in United States Courts. This will be discussed 
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further in Chapter Six, which considers the regulation of extraterritorial jurisdiction in the United 
States.  
 
In addition to the decision in Moti, there have been other decisions where the High Court was 
willing to find that the rights of the State, had been exercised so as to ‗abuse‘ the rights of the 
individual. For example, Mason CJ and McHugh J in Dietrich v The Queen,
156
 stated: 
[T]he courts possess undoubted power to stay criminal proceedings which will result in an unfair trial, 
the right to a fair trial being a central pillar of our criminal justice system. The power to grant a stay 
necessarily extends to a case in which representation of the accused by counsel is essential to a fair trial, 
as it is in most cases in which an accused is charged with a serious offence.
157
 
 
Notwithstanding a lack of entrenched individual rights in Australia, the separation of powers does 
provide some level of accountability. For example, it could be said that the parliament and 
executive are capable of being held to account if found to be ‗abusing rights‘ in a way that 
undermines the ‗institutional integrity‘ or ‗public confidence‘ in the judiciary.158 In South Australia 
v Totani,
159
 a majority of the High Court struck down legislation that required the Magistrates 
Court, on application by the Commissioner of Police, to make a control order against a person if the 
Court was satisfied that the person was a member of a declared organisation. It did so, essentially, 
on the basis that the legislation authorised ‗the executive to enlist the Magistrates Court to 
implement decisions of the executive in a manner incompatible with that Court‘s institutional 
integrity‘.160 Chief Justice French has observed that the High Court has developed ‗a presumption 
against abrogation of fundamental rights and freedoms in construing legislation‘.161 Such a 
presumption falls victim to contrary legislative intent, however, as conceded by the Chief Justice 
who acknowledged that the court will look ‗for a clear indication that the legislature, having 
directed its attention to those rights, has consciously decided on their abrogation or curtailment.‘162 
If that clear intent is present, then there is little that the courts can do to protect the rights of 
individuals.  
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This is largely due to an absence of a bill of rights in Australia. Sir Anthony Mason, a former Chief 
Justice of the High Court, has expressed the view that: 
Australia‘s adoption of a Bill of Rights would bring Australian in from the cold, so to speak, and 
make directly applicable the human rights jurisprudence, which has developed internationally...That 
is an important consideration in that our isolation from that jurisprudence means that we do not have 
what is a vital component of other constitutional and legal systems, a component which has a 
significant impact on culture and thought, and is an important ingredient in the emerging world order 
that is reducing the effective choices open to the nation.
163
 
The impact of this on the ability of Australia to meet the three criteria of the rule of law is further 
considered in Chapter Seven, the concluding Chapter.  
 
6. The Criteria of the Rule of Law  
Criteria 1: The law must be both readily known and available, and certain and clear 
Australia, particularly when compared with the United States, as will be seen in Chapter Six, has 
generally been more conservative when exercising extraterritorial enforcement jurisdiction. As was 
seen in the analysis of the Criminal Code, Category D assertions are very broad, represent exercises 
of prescriptive universal jurisdiction, and apply to, for example, the offence of associating with 
terrorist organisations.
164
 Given the kind of conduct that could be included in ‗associating‘ is quite 
broad, it may not always be possible for persons in other States to anticipate that Australia would 
have a jurisdictional interest in their conduct. By way of further example, jurisdiction for migrant 
smuggling offences is extraterritorial and the offence of providing ‗material support‘ towards a 
people smuggling venture is similarly broad.
165
  As noted above, given that receipt of a financial 
benefit is not a prerequisite to be liable under this offence, persons who are Australian citizens or 
residents who work in charities and NGOs that provide some form of ‗material support‘ could be 
caught by this provision, even where that conduct occurs overseas and in circumstances where 
Australian law would not ordinarily be expected. Further, given the resistance of Australian courts 
to using international law to interpret the Australian Constitution, it is also not clear to what extent 
Australia will choose to follow its obligations under international law. What is clear, however, is 
that the external affairs power in section 51(xxix) of the Australian Constitution has been 
interpreted as providing the Commonwealth legislature with a plenary power over things that are 
geographically external to Australia, including extraterritorial conduct. This means that the courts 
are unlikely to be in a position to restrain the Commonwealth from excessive exercises of 
                                               
163
 Sir Anthony Mason ‗Rights, Values and Legal Intentions: Reshaping Australian Institutions‘ (1997) 1 Australian 
International Law Journal 13. 
164
 Above n 65, div 102. 
165
Anti-People Smuggling and Other Measures Act 2010 (Cth). 
123 
 
jurisdiction, even if such exercises were not permitted under international law. This makes 
Australia‘s extraterritorial legislative reach quite unpredictable and potentially very broad.    
Criteria 2: The law should be applied to all people equally, and operate uniformly in 
circumstances that are not materially different 
Patrick Keyzer, writing on Australian constitutional law, has observed, ‗some judges have 
suggested there is an implied constitutional right of equality before the law‘.166 Keyzer goes on to 
note that a majority of the Court in Leeth v Commonwealth,
167
 rejected this on the basis that ‗[t]here 
is no general requirement contained in the Constitution that Commonwealth laws should have a 
uniform operation‘.168 Therefore, as a starting point, there is no right to equal treatment before the 
law in Australia. This could be problematic for persons charged with extraterritorial offences who 
are not normally part of the Australian community and therefore, may have little in the way of 
political influence or access to legal advice. By way of example, Australia‘s use of off-shore 
processing for asylum seekers may be used to deny rights in a way that is somewhat analogous to 
the way in which the United States sought to exclude the applicability of legal and due process 
rights from inmates in Guantanamo Bay. While courts may be able to make use of doctrines of 
separation of power to protect individuals from undue influence in judicial proceedings by the 
executive, this is of very limited application and would not apply to limit the extraterritorial 
operation of the offences discussed earlier in this Chapter. There has been no evidence that courts 
will choose to treat persons accused of extraterritorial offences differently from those who are 
accused of territorial offences. Further, the decision in Moti v The Queen indicates that courts will 
not simply turn a blind eye to the extraterritorial conduct of public officials, and that courts in 
Australia are willing to pierce the ‗act of state‘ doctrine if to do so provides a link with a subsequent 
prosecution by Australia.   
Criteria 3: There must be some capacity for judicial review of executive action and the Executive 
arm of government should be subject to the law and any action undertaken by the Executive 
should be authorised by law.  
As noted above, there are a number of offences in the Criminal Code that are classified as Category 
D offences. These offences apply outside Australia regardless of the nationality of the persons 
involved.  As also noted, most relate to offences against the Commonwealth or to internationally 
recognised crimes, such as treason and terrorism, and so are not necessarily controversial. Any 
enforcement of any of these categories of ‗extended geographical jurisdiction‘ requires the consent 
of the Attorney-General if the conduct in question takes place wholly outside Australia and the 
accused is not an Australian citizen. While the purpose of this is likely a mechanism to allow for the 
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executive to make informed decisions based on Australia‘s international relations, it does mean the 
exercise of jurisdiction becomes a question of political discretion, and that this discretion may not 
be subject to judicial review. Once a matter is before the courts,  however, the decision of the High 
Court in Moti v The Queen does indicate that courts can undertake judicial review of the process by 
which a person was brought to prosecution, and may even set aside that prosecution if there has 
been an abuse of process.
169
 As noted above, the High Court indicated that a finding of abuse of 
process is to be determined by reference to three propositions:
170
 
1. The trial of an indictable offence must generally be conducted in the presence of the 
accused;  
2. Where Australia seeks the extradition of a person from another country, so as to prosecute 
that person under Australian law, principles of double jeopardy and speciality ordinarily 
apply; and  
3. Public interest dictates that a court of law must ensure its processes are used fairly by state 
and citizen because a failure to do so will erode public confidence. Public confidence ‗refers 
to the trust reposed constitutionally in the courts to protect the integrity and fairness of their 
processes.‘171 
These propositions are likely to provide some opportunity for judicial review of executive action in 
an extraterritorial context. Ultimately, however, the lack of a bill of rights, including the lack of a 
right of due process or to equal protection before the law does limit the ability of the courts in 
Australia to comprehensively review executive action.  
7. Observations and Summary  
Chapter Four provided an overview of the history that has led to the Australia of today. It then 
considered examples of legislation in Australia extending extraterritorially and of judicial regulation 
of extraterritoriality.  From these examples, it can be concluded that Australia‘s constitutional 
frameworks will permit broad extraterritorial assertions. This Chapter then moved to consider the 
relationship between municipal law and international law in Australia. This revealed a somewhat 
recalcitrant attitude to international law. From this it can be inferred that courts in Australia are 
limited in the extent to which they could apply principles of jurisdictional restraint in international 
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law. It was then considered whether Australian courts had engaged with any principles analogous to 
an abuse of rights doctrine. That analysis revealed that the High Court has been prepared to subject 
the rights of the State to a requirement that prosecutions not constitute an abuse of process or that a 
trial is not fundamentally void of ‗fairness‘. Further, the executive and the parliament are capable of 
being held to account by the courts if they act in such a way as to undermine institutional integrity 
or public confidence in the courts. However, the absence of a bill of rights means that the courts are 
limited in the extent to which they can protect individual rights, either under international law or 
municipal law. It can be argued that while an abuse of process doctrine may exist in Australia and 
does offer individuals some protection of their procedural rights if accused of extraterritorial 
offences, substantive rights can be abrogated by legislation. This is problematic and suggests the 
need for constitutional amendment in Australia.  
 
Having now considered the regulation of extraterritorial jurisdiction in Australia, the next chapter of 
this thesis, Chapter Five, will consider the regulation of extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction in 
India. 
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CHAPTER FIVE:  INDIA AND EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION 
 
Chapter Five provides a historical overview of India‘s legal system and then considers the 
regulation of extraterritorial jurisdiction in India. It does so by providing examples of assertions of 
extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction and analysing two significant decisions of the Supreme Court of 
India.  Following that analysis, the relationship between international law and Indian domestic law 
is considered to determine whether the abuse of rights doctrine could have any role to play in India. 
To that end, engagement by Indian courts with the abuse of rights doctrine, or any analogous 
principles, is explored. This Chapter then concludes with an analysis of the regulation of 
extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction as against the stated criteria of the chosen conception of the rule 
of law. 
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1. Introduction  
 
The Constitution of India was enacted in 26 November 1949 and came into effect on 26 January 
1950. It has been amended over 90 times and India‘s superior court is called the Supreme Court of 
India (‗the Supreme Court‘). Power is divided between state and federal governments. Arguably, 
however, the balance of power favours the central government, known as the ‗Union of India‘. India 
is a republic and has both a President and Prime Minister.  India has a rich and complex legal 
history. It is not intended that this Chapter provide an exhaustive explanation of the entirety of 
Indian constitutional frameworks or of the criminal justice system. As Abashek Singhvi observes:
1
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Considering that India is the world‘s largest democracy and has arguably the world‘s greatest 
aggregation of diversities (of race, colour, religion, language, caste, culture, ethnicity, food, and 
dress), it would be impossible for any author to adequately address every aspect of the Indian legal 
system. 
Instead, it is intended that this Chapter provide a brief historical context, identify examples of 
criminal legislation with extraterritorial reach and consider how the courts have regulated questions 
of jurisdiction.  Then, to determine whether principles of international law will be helpful in such 
regulation, the relationship between municipal and international law is considered. Following that, 
an attempt is made to answer the question as to whether courts in India have engaged with any 
principles analogous to the abuse of rights doctrine.  
2. Historical Overview 
The Indian subcontinent has a rich, diverse and complex history. Ancient Sanskrit ‗Vedas‘/ 
Sashtras‘, Koranic influences, British colonialism and the realities of the modern nation State are all 
still reflected in India‘s modern legal system. It has been remarked that, ‗[l]ike India‘s culture and 
character, its law expresses … [a] combination of assimilationist and indigenous values‘.2 The 
people of India have had a continuous civilization since approximately 3300 BC,
 3
 beginning with 
the Indus Valley people who resided near the Indus River - after which India is named.
4
 Around 
2000 BC, the Aryans, who are thought to have come from the region between the Caspian and 
Black Seas,
5
 arrived in India, and established various kingdoms.
6
 These people are considered to 
have been the ancestors of the Greek, Germanic, English, Celtic, Iranian, Sanskrit and Hindi-
speaking people.
7
 A political map of ancient and medieval India would depict a ‗myriad of 
Kingdoms with fluctuating boundaries‘.8   
 
Between 1200 – 500 BC, prominence was given to the ‗Vedas‘, which form the basis of Hinduism, 
and regulated all aspects of life, including the settlement of legal disputes.
9
 The rule of law 
manifested as the rule of ‗dharma‘. Dharma included doctrine not only on what was legal, but also 
what was just, moral and natural.
10
 From this arose ‗rajyadharma‘, the law setting out the ‗powers, 
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duties and responsibilities of the king‘.11 In this way, the King was not necessarily above the law. 
The subordination of power to Dharma is an eminent theme of the Indian Scriptures. In ancient 
Hindu republics, the government recognized constitutionalism as its overriding obligation, 
compositely subsuming the moral supremacy of law, the binding nature of procedure, and the 
recognition of people's participation and individual rights. Indeed, ancient constitutional documents 
may well have contained a greater emphasis on individual rights than documents of the medieval 
era.‘12 V.D. Kulshrestha has said that this ‗embedded the germs of administrative law in India‘.13 
Medieval India, in turn, is best understood by reference firstly, to the spread of Islam as a result of 
invasion of India by Turks and Afghans, and secondly, the subsequent invasion by the Moghul 
descendants of Genghis Khan.
14
 During this period, the legal systems of Hinduism and Islam had 
lasting influences on one another, in what is described as a ‗process of Hindu Islamic synthesis‘.15  
India was also subject to British occupation. The first British outpost in the region was as early as 
1619,
 16
 and this set the stage for over a century of occupation in Modern India.  While the Dutch, 
French, and Portuguese also pursued territorial and trading interests in India,
17
 by 1823 the greater 
part of India was under British control.
18
 The East India Company, operating out of London, was in 
the ‗novel and highly ambiguous position of collecting revenue and so administering‘19 a large and 
prosperous part of India. As stated by Judith Brown ‗its servants were part of the structure of 
authority and power of the subcontinent.‘20 This meant India‘s existing governance mechanisms 
were either fused with, or replaced by those adopted by the British.   
 
In the late 18
th
 century, Indian judges were substituted with British judges on the basis that all 
‗reform of the department would be useless and nugatory whilst the execution of them depends on 
any native whatsoever‘.21 In practice, however, Indian legal officers remained attached to all 
courts,
22
 and regard was had to some aspects of Islamic and Hindu law. In this way, through a 
process of cross-referencing and cross vesting, the law of the people of India was transformed in 
‗Anglo-Indian law‘.23  Originally a commercial venture, the territory controlled by the East India 
Company became so extensive that the British Parliament enacted the Charter Act (1833) (Charter 
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Act) to divest the company of its commercial character, and establish formal governance 
mechanisms.
24
 In 1858, the Better Government of India (1858) was passed, transferring control of 
the East India Company to Queen Victoria.
25
 The Indian states all became considered parts of a 
single charge, and were required to recognise the supremacy of the British Crown.
26
 This, in itself, 
laid the foundations for Indian federalism.  In 1947, India won independence,
27
 and by the 1990s, 
India had emerged as a ‗significant technological and economic power‘.28  
 
3. Assertions of Extraterritorial Criminal Jurisdiction by India  
This section considers examples of legislation with extraterritorial reach and decisions by courts in 
India on assertion of extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction. This is done so as to gain insight as to the 
way in which extraterritoriality is regulated in India. There is limited literature available on the 
subject matter, so the following material is largely drawn from primary resources. 
 
3.1. Examples of legislation with extraterritorial reach 
Indian Penal Code (1860) 
As is the case with Australia and the United States, India has legislation with extraterritorial reach. 
For example, section 3 of the Indian Penal Code (1860) provides that offences that violate the 
Code, where the conduct is outside India, can still be tried within India. Specifically, it states as 
follows:  
Any person liable, by any Indian law, to be tried for an offence committed beyond India 
shall be dealt with according to the provisions of this Code for any act committed beyond 
India in the same manner as if such act had been committed within India.  
 
The reference to a ‗person liable‘ is not defined. This raises the question as to whether a ‗person 
liable‘ means a citizen or resident or whether, instead, it includes all persons, even aliens. The 
inclusion of section 4 of the Indian Penal Code, which expressly applies to Indian nationals outside 
India and to persons on Indian ships or aircraft, may indicate that the scope of section 3 is not 
limited to Indian nationals. If it were, then section 4 would not be necessary. The judgment of the 
Supreme Court of India in GVK INDS. LTD.  v The Income Tax Officer,
29
 and Article 245 of the 
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Constitution of India may also give some guidance as to the scope of extraterritorial jurisdiction 
intended here. This will be discussed in more detail further below.  
 
As noted, section 4 of the Indian Penal Code also contemplates extraterritorial reach. It is entitled 
‗Extension of Code to extra- territorial offences‘ and it provides as follows:  
The provisions of this Code apply also to any offence committed by (1) any citizen of India in any 
place without and beyond India; (2) any person on any ship or aircraft registered in India wherever it 
may be. 
 
This is an expression of both the active nationality principle and a special form of the territorial 
principle over ships and aircraft. Indian nationals can be tried for extraterritorial crimes, as 
demonstrated by the inclusion in section 4 of the Indian Penal Code of an example where a person, 
who ‗is a citizen of India, commits a murder in Uganda. He can be tried and convicted of murder in 
any place in India in which he may be found.‘ The reference to being ‗found‘ in India may indicate 
a requirement that a person be present in India in order to be prosecuted under Indian law.  
 
The Indian Penal Code is a comprehensive document and includes over 300 offences that, which 
according to sections 3 and 4, are capable of applying extraterritorially. By way of example, it 
includes offences such as section 366A, ‗Procuration of minor girl‘ and 366B, ‗Importation of girl 
from foreign country‘. These sections provide as follows:   
 
366A. Procuration of minor girl 
Whoever, by any means whatsoever, induces any minor girl under the age of eighteen years to go from 
any place or to do any act with intent that such girl may be, or knowing that it is likely that she will be, 
forced or seduced to illicit intercourse with another person shall be punishable with imprisonment 
which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine. 
 
366B. Importation of girl from foreign country 
Whoever imports into India from any country outside India [or from the State of Jammu and Kashmir] 
any girl under the age of twenty-one years with intent that she may be, or knowing it to be likely that 
she will be, forced or seduced to illicit intercourse with another person, shall be punishable with 
imprisonment which may extend to ten years and shall also be liable to fine. 
 
These sections are gendered and do not expressly apply to similar offences committed against boys. 
India does, however, have other legislation relevant to the nature of these offences, such as the 
Immoral Trafficking Prevention Act 1986, which applies to children of both genders. However, that 
act only applies ‗to the whole of India‘, which seems to suggest that, unlike the Indian Penal Code, 
it does not apply extraterritorially. Notably, the Immoral Trafficking Prevention Act provides for a 
distinct sentencing regime for female perpetrators.  
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Code of Criminal Procedure (1973) 
The Code of Criminal Procedure also provides for the prosecution in India of offences committed 
extraterritorially. Section 188 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is entitled, ‗Offences committed 
outside India‘ and it provides that:  
When an offence is committed outside India –  
 
a) By a citizen of India, whether on the high seas or elsewhere; or  
b) By a person, not being such citizen, on any ship or aircraft registered in India. 
 
He may be dealt with in respect of such offences as if it had been committed at any 
place within India at which he may be found.  
 
Further, section 188 of the Code of Criminal Procedure extends the application of the Indian Penal 
Code to the Exclusive Economic Zone, which includes the area 200 nautical miles from the baseline 
of the coast of India. States are generally considered not to have sovereignty over the Exclusive 
Economic Zone, but do have some sovereign rights. Therefore, this could be considered an 
assertion of extraterritoriality of sorts. However, India would more likely argue that this section is 
merely an assertion of quasi-territorial jurisdiction over ships and aircraft, as was at issue in 
Republic of Italy v Union of India.
30
 This decision will be discussed in detail further below.  
 
Prevention of Terrorism Act (2002) 
The Prevention of Terrorism Act (2002) also has extraterritorial reach. Section 1(4) states that any 
‗person who commits an offence beyond India which is punishable under this Act shall be dealt 
with according to the provisions of this Act in the same manner as if such act had been committed 
in India.‘ Arguably, this section is not limited to Indian nationals, but applies to any person who 
commits an act of terrorism against India. This is because the following subsection, section 1(5), 
states that the provisions of the act ―apply also to citizens of India outside India‘. If Section 1(4) 
only applied to Indian nationals, then section 1(5) would not be necessary. Therefore, section 1(4) is 
an example of the protective principle of jurisdiction or even the effects principle, as discussed in 
Chapter Two.  
Prevention of Corruption Act (1988) 
Section 1(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act (1988) expressly applies to ‗the whole of India 
except the State of Jammu and Kashmir and it applies to all citizens of India outside India.‘ This is 
an assertion of the active nationality principle, in that the provisions in the act continue to apply to 
citizens who commit offences outside India.  
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Therefore, not only does the Indian Penal Code apply extraterritorially, but there are also other 
examples of legislation in which India asserts extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction.  
3.2. Indian Courts and Extraterritoriality  
This section considers the way in which questions of extraterritorial jurisdiction has been handled 
by courts in India. To that end, two key cases are considered, GVK INDS. LTD. v The Income Tax 
Officer
31
 and Republic of Italy v Union of India.
32
 These decisions are chosen because they 
specifically consider issues of jurisdiction and, having been delivered in 2011 and 2013 
respectively, are relatively recent.  
3.2.1. GVK INDS. LTD. v The Income Tax Officer  
The Supreme Court of India in GVK INDS. LTD.  v The Income Tax Officer
33
 had opportunity to 
consider the implications of Articles 245(1) and (2) of the Constitution of India. Those provisions 
read: 
Article 245(1): Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, Parliament may make laws for the 
whole or any part of the territory of India, and the Legislature of a State may make laws for the 
whole or any part of the State. 
Article 245(2):  No law made by Parliament shall be deemed to be invalid on the ground that it 
would have extra-territorial operation.   
In considering whether the Income Tax Act 1961 could apply extraterritorially, the Supreme Court 
held the Parliament of India is not constitutionally permitted to legislate on ‗extra-territorial aspects 
that have no impact on or nexus with India‘.34 The extent to which an extraterritorial cause or aspect 
could be said to have such an impact on or nexus with India was defined very broadly. For example, 
the Supreme Court held:   
Parliament may exercise its legislative powers with respect to extra-territorial aspects or causes – 
events, things, phenomena (however commonplace they may be), resources, actions or 
transactions, and the like – that occur, arise or exist or may be expected to do so, naturally or on 
account of some human agency, in the social, political, economic, cultural, biological, environmental 
or physical spheres outside the territory of India and seek to control, modulate, mitigate or 
transform the effects of such extra-territorial aspects or causes, or in appropriate cases, 
eliminate or engender such extra-territorial aspects or causes, only when such extra-territorial 
aspects or causes have, or are expected to have, some impact on, or effect in, or consequences 
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for: (a) the territory of India; or (b) the interests of, welfare of, wellbeing of, or security of 
inhabitants of India, and Indians.
35
  
 
This is a broad statement of jurisdiction. The reference in this passage to  ‗effects‘ and 
‗consequences‘ and to ‗security‘, ‗welfare‘ and ‗interests‘ describes a conception of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction reminiscent of both the ‗effects principle‘ and the ‗protective principle‘ of jurisdiction 
under international law.  Further, the reference to the ‗interest of, welfare of, wellbeing of, or 
security‘ of both Indian citizens and residents of India could be construed as a statement of the 
passive nationality principle.  
3.2.2. Republic of Italy v Union of India  
The decision of the Supreme Court of India in Republic of Italy v Union of India,
36
 dealt with legal 
aspects of coastal State jurisdiction and sovereign immunity under international law.
 
 It concerned 
an incident between the M.V. Enrica Lexie, an Italian merchant vessel, and the St. Antony, an Indian 
fishing boat.  On board the Enrica Lexie were members of the Italian Armed Forces (the marines), 
authorised by Italian law to deploy on the vessel to protect it from pirate attacks. Two of the 
marines are alleged to have mistaken the St. Antony for a pirate vessel and opened fire. The shots 
fired are alleged to have caused the death of two Indian fishermen on board the boat.  The incident 
took place at a distance of about 20.5 nautical miles from the coastline of the state of Kerala, a unit 
within the federal ‗Union of India‘.  Both Italy and India commenced criminal proceedings against 
the accused under their respective domestic laws.   
By way of background, under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS),
37
 
the maritime areas adjacent to a nation State are divided into three key zones: the territorial sea up 
to 12 nautical miles, the contiguous zone up to 24 nautical miles, and the exclusive economic zone 
(EEZ) up to 200 nautical miles. Nation States have varying rights in those three zones, and beyond 
those are the High Seas, over which no nation State can assert sovereignty. The incident occurred 
approximately 20.5 nautical miles from the coast of India, and so outside the territorial sea, but 
within India‘s contiguous zone and EEZ.  Section 188A of the Indian Code of Criminal Procedure, 
in conjunction with section 7 of the Indian Maritime Zones Act (1976), provides that when an 
offence is committed by any person in the EEZ, that person may be dealt with in any place in which 
he is found or in any other place as the central government of India may direct.
38
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In that context, the arguments made by both Italy and India, and the findings of the Supreme Court 
are summarised below.
39
  The relevance of the decision and any lessons that can be drawn from it 
are then identified.   
The Arguments  
In essence, the arguments made by Italy centred on three key themes: that because the incident 
occurred between two nation States, Kerala had no jurisdiction in the matter; that the incident 
occurred in a place where India had sovereign rights, not sovereignty and, therefore, any assertion 
of jurisdiction by India would be contrary to the UNCLOS and general principles of international 
law; and, finally, that the marines were carrying out official functions and, therefore, Italy had 
exclusive jurisdiction.  Italy argued that, according to UNCLOS, it, as the flag State of the Enrica 
Lexie, had a pre-emptive right to try the accused, and an assertion of jurisdiction by India would 
negate the right of innocent passage. This point was either confused in translation or misconceived, 
because the right of innocent passage applies only in the territorial sea and is a more restricted right 
for vessels, than the freedom of navigation, which applies in the EEZ.
40
  Further, Italy submitted 
that any principle of concurrent jurisdiction that may have been recognised as a principle of public 
international law stands displaced by express provisions of UNCLOS.
41
 Italy, in acknowledging the 
‗permissive‘ approach to jurisdiction taken in the Lotus case,42 argued that it continues to be good 
law, except to the extent that it is overridden by article 97 of UNCLOS. Article 97 provides that in 
the event of a collision or any other incident of navigation concerning the ship on the high seas, etc., 
no penal or disciplinary proceedings may be instituted except before the judicial or administrative 
authorities either of the flag State or of the State of which such a person is a national. Further, Italy 
asserted the conduct of the marines had ‗been carried out in the fulfilment of their official duties in 
accordance with national regulations‘,43 and claimed ‗jurisdiction in respect of the said military 
personnel‘,44 on the basis that ‗the conduct of Italian Navy Military Personnel officially acting in 
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the performance of their duties should not be open to judgment scrutiny in front of any court other 
than the Italian ones.‘45 
 
India considered the case before the Supreme Court to consist of two key issues. The first was 
whether the Indian courts have territorial jurisdiction to try the marines under the provisions of the 
Indian Penal Code. The second issue was whether the Marines were entitled to claim sovereign 
immunity. Specifically, in responding to Italy‘s argument that article 97 of UNCLOS grants 
exclusive jurisdiction over the incident to Italy, as the flag ship and the State of which the marines 
are nationals, India argued that article 97 did not apply to the incident. This was because Article 97 
expressly refers to collisions or ‗any other incident of navigation‘, and homicides are neither 
collisions nor incidents of navigation. In any event, the relevant voyage was not that of Enrica 
Lexie, but rather that of St Antony, the Indian boat that the deceased Indian fisherman were on, and 
therefore India should have jurisdiction. To that end, the offences set out in the Indian Penal Code 
apply to ‗any citizen of India in any place without or beyond India or to any person on any ship or 
aircraft registered in India, wherever it may be.‘46 India also argued that even if both the Republic 
of Italy and India had jurisdiction, that it was more convenient and appropriate for the trial to be 
conducted in India, having regard to the location of the incident and nature of the evidence and 
witnesses.
47
 According to India, article 59 of UNCLOS, in expressly recognising that there will be 
circumstances where it does not resolve all questions of jurisdiction, permits States to assert rights 
or jurisdiction beyond those specifically provided in the Convention. India also submitted that the 
Lotus case continued to be good law and that under the passive personality principle, States may 
claim jurisdiction to try an individual where actions might have affected nationals of the State. As 
to Italy‘s submission that the actions of the marines were an act of State, and therefore protected by 
sovereign immunity, India agreed on the existence of a rule of sovereign immunity, but argued that 
it was for each country to determine the bounds of such immunity for itself. Given that the relevant 
provisions in the Indian Penal Code begin with the words ‗any person‘, under Indian law all 
offenders are punishable.  
The Findings  
The judgment in the Indian Fishermen Case was given by Chief Justice Altamas Kabir and Justice 
Chelameswar.  On the question as to whether Kerala had jurisdiction in the matter, Kabir CJ and 
Chelameswar J found that it did not, but that the Union of India did. In what somewhat resembled 
deference to the principle of comity, Kabir CJ noted that the accused are marines of the Italian Navy 
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and that they were on the Enrica Lexie pursuant to an Italian Decree of Parliament. Therefore, his 
Honour observed, the dispute is taken ‗to a different level where the governments of the two 
countries become involved.‘48  In particular, he observed that Italy had already commenced 
proceedings against the accused and, in such a scenario, Kerala, being merely one unit in a larger 
federal unit, would not have authority to try the accused when it was outside of the state unit.  
 
As to whether the courts of Italy or the Indian courts have jurisdiction to try the accused, his 
Honour found that the laws governing the EEZ also govern incidents occurring within the 
contiguous zone.
49
 Referring to article 97, which relates to the penal jurisdiction in matters of 
collision or any other incident of navigation,
50
 the question then became whether the firing at the 
fishermen was an ‗incident of navigation‘.  His Honour found that the expression ‗incident of 
navigation‘ cannot be extended to a criminal act ‗in whatever circumstances‘.51 He went on to find 
that the issue as to whether the accused acted on a misunderstanding that the St Antony was a pirate 
vessel, was a matter of evidence to be established at trial. Therefore, article 97 did not apply, and 
article 100, which provides that all States shall cooperate to the fullest possible extent in the 
repression of piracy on the high seas, or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any State, 
would only apply if a trial court accepted that the accused acted on that misunderstanding.
52
 His 
Honour rejected the argument by India that UNCLOS permits States to assert rights of jurisdiction 
beyond those specifically provided in the Convention.
 53
  He did, however, find that:  
[W]hile India is entitled both under its Domestic Law and the Public International Law to exercise 
rights of sovereignty up to 24 nautical miles from the baseline of the basis of which the width of 
Territorial Waters is measured, it can exercise only sovereign rights within the Exclusive Economic 
Zone for certain purposes. The incident … having occurred within the Contiguous Zone, the Union 
of India is entitled to prosecute the two Italian marines under the criminal justice system.
54
 
 
His Honour directed the Union of India, in consultation with the Chief Justice of India, to set up a 
Special Court to try this case in accordance with the law of India and UNCLOS, but only where 
there is no conflict between UNCLOS and the municipal laws of India.  Chelameswar J, agreeing 
with the conclusions of Kabir CJ, identified the key issue as being the territorial limits of the 
authority of the sovereign to make laws and enforce them.
55
 His Honour noted that Article 1 of the 
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Constitution of India defines the geographical territory of India and Article 297 defines maritime 
territory. In so doing, his Honour observed a lack of clarity on the extent of territorial waters: 
That the sovereignty of a ‗coastal State‘ extends to its territorial waters, is also a well-accepted 
principle of International Law, though there is no uniformly shared legal norm establishing the limit 
of the territorial waters – maritime territory. Whether the maritime territory is also a part of the 
national territory of the State is a question on which difference of opinion exists.
56
  
 
Despite defining the parameters of the issues as being territorial, his Honour also acknowledged the 
issue of extraterritoriality. For example, he referred to Article 245(2) of the Constitution of India, 
which expressly declares: ‗No law made by Parliament shall be deemed to be invalid on the ground 
that it would have extra-territorial operation.‘  The point Chelameswar J seems to make is that this 
Article functions as a limit on the jurisdiction of the courts to declare a law invalid or to decline to 
give effect to a law on the grounds that it extends extraterritorially,
57
 regardless of competing 
jurisdictional claims. His Honour then went on to acknowledge why nation States may seek to 
assertion extraterritorial jurisdiction: 
The increased complexity of modern life emanating from the advanced technology and travel 
facilities and the large cross border commerce made it possible to commit crimes whose effects are 
felt in territories beyond the residential borders of the offenders.
58
 
 
Justice Chelameswar considered the relationship between extraterritorial rights and extraterritorial 
responsibility. For example, his Honour reasoned that if constitutional protections in India apply to 
non-citizens, it follows that India must also have the authority to legislate extraterritorially. He 
states: 
The protection of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution is available even to an alien when sought to 
be subjected to the legal process of this country.  This court on more than one occasion held so on 
the ground that the rights emanating from those two Articles are not confined only to or dependent 
upon the citizenship of this country. As a necessary concomitant, this country ought to have the 
authority to apply and enforce the laws of this country against the person and things beyond its 
territory when its legitimate interests are affected. In assertion of such a principle, various laws of 
this country are made applicable beyond its territory.
59
  
 
Giving examples of various legislative provisions extending extraterritorially, Chelameswar J stated 
‗it is amply clear that Parliament always asserted its authority to make laws, which are applicable to 
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persons, who are not corporeally present within the territory of India (whether or not they are 
citizens) when such persons commit acts which affect the legitimate interests of this country.‘60  
Broader Relevance of the Arguments and Findings 
This case is relevant to this thesis because the decision either makes or illustrates a number of key 
points. First, both India and Italy seemed to accept that Lotus is still good law. This is in the context 
of considerable academic criticism that it does not adequately regulate competing claims to 
jurisdiction, or account for any hierarchy of claims. This is so even though Italy and India are not 
part of any common regional body, and neither do they come from a common legal heritage.   
Second, the judgment and surrounding media reports illustrate the tensions that competing claims to 
jurisdiction can cause. Notably, the competing claims to jurisdiction between India and Italy in this 
case caused tension between the two nations and attracted the ‗attention of the press, public and 
politicians‘,61 with media reports describing the competing claims to jurisdiction as a ‗diplomatic 
crisis‘.62  Manimuthu Gandhi has asked: 
Could the entire process leading to the trial of Italian marines in India be criticised as a wasteful 
exercise that only facilitated the straining of the relations between two otherwise friendly 
countries?
63 
These tensions point to a need for clearer guidance on resolving competing claims to jurisdiction 
and for a better articulation of the principles of jurisdiction at international law. The provisions of 
the UNCLOS did not necessarily bring any clarity. The closest the Supreme Court of India came to 
articulating any such guidance was to state that ‗(c)rimes should be dealt with by the States whose 
social order is most closely affected‘,64 but it did not pose any criteria by which such an affect 
would be measured or compared.  
Third, the finding by Chelameswar J, that Article 97, being in Part VII of UNCLOS and Part VII 
applying only to that part of the sea not included in the exclusive economic zone or territorial 
waters, has no application to the exclusive economic zone,
65
 may provoke a reaction from scholars 
of UNCLOS. This is because Article 58 expressly provides that Articles 88 to 116, which are 
actually contained in Part VII, do apply in the EEZ, as long as they are not incompatible with Part 
V. 
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Fourth, other than some passing references by Chelameswar J and India, the choice by both the 
judges and the parties to conceptualise the dispute as competing claims to territorial jurisdiction, 
rather than considering other grounds of extraterritorial jurisdiction, such as active or passive 
personality, or the protective principle,
66
 indicates an acceptance of the primacy of territorial 
jurisdiction and/or a lack of understanding or engagement with the principles of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction under international law. Notwithstanding that, Italy and India and Kabir CJ all alluded, 
in their own way, to principles of comity and as noted above, all accepted the decision in Lotus as 
good law.  
At the time of writing, various aspects of the case are ongoing and the circumstances surrounding 
the legal proceedings are still the subject of media coverage.
67
 Nonetheless, the decision by the 
Supreme Court remains relevant and instructive because of the findings on jurisdiction and the 
questions of international law it raises, some of which may be the subject of debate among both 
practitioners and academics. As Manimuthu Gandhi has suggested, if the ‗legal issues relating to the 
Enrica Lexie incident, including extraterritorial jurisdiction, are taken before an international 
adjudicatory forum, a different decision could emerge given that the subject matter of the dispute 
involves certain grey areas of international law‘.68 
Having identified that India has legislation with extraterritorial reach and having considered 
examples of judicial regulation of jurisdiction in India, the relationship between international law 
and Indian domestic law is considered.  Following that, the existence, or otherwise, of engagement 
by Indian courts with the abuse of rights doctrine, or any analogous principles, is explored. Finally, 
extraterritoriality in India is considered against the three criteria of the ‗Rule of Law‘, as set out in 
Chapters One and Three. 
4. Indian Courts and International Law 
By way of background, India has signed, ratified or acceded to a number of international treaties, 
including, for example, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
69
 and treaties that 
either permit or oblige assertions of extraterritoriality, such as the United Nations Convention on 
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Transnational Organised Crime,
70
 and the accompanying protocols,
71
 the Convention on the Rights 
of the Child,
72
 the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment,
73
 the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombing,
74
 and the 
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism.
75
  There are also a 
number of significant international treaties that India has not signed, including, for example, the 
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees,
76
 the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness,
77
 
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,
78
 and Protocol I and II Additional to the 
Geneva Conventions.
79
  
 
 An examination of judicial decision-making in India reveals a degree of openness to the integration 
of international law into municipal law. For example, in Maganbhai Ishwarbhai Patel v Union of 
India,
80
 it was held that unless there is a law in conflict with an international treaty, the treaty must 
stand. Taking the recognition of treaties a step further, the Court in Vishaka v State of Rajasthan,
81
 
proposed that international conventions and norms are to be read into constitutional rights which are 
absent in the municipal law of India, so long as there is no inconsistency with such domestic law. In 
that case, a group of activists and non-governmental organisations brought a matter before the 
Supreme Court of India in relation to the breach of a number of fundamental rights guaranteed by 
Part III of the Constitution of India. Article 32 of the Constitution of India provides the right to seek 
a remedy for a breach of the fundamental rights conferred by Part III. In this case, the rights in 
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question related to equality before the law under Article 14, the right to practice any profession 
under Article 19 and the right to personal liberty under Article 21. The action was bought 
‗following the alleged gang rape of a social worker in Rajasthan, and in view of the prevailing 
climate in which the violation of working women‘s rights was not uncommon‘.82 
 
In prescribing guidelines for dealing with sexual harassment in the workplace, the then Chief 
Justice Verna and Justices Manohar and Kirpal held in a joint judgment that the rape, which itself 
was the subject of separate criminal proceedings, was a violation of Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the 
Constitution.  To that end, it was necessary that ‗some guidelines should be laid down for the 
protection of these rights to fill the legislative vacuum‘.83 In determining the content of such 
guidelines and the nature of the rights granted in the Constitution, the Court held that ‗the contents 
of international conventions and norms are significant for the purpose of … interpretation‘.84 In 
particular, it was held:  
It is now an accepted rule of judicial construction that regard must be had to international 
conventions and norms for construing domestic law when there is no inconsistency between them 
and there is a void in domestic law. The High Court of Australia in Minister for Immigration and 
Ethnic Affairs v Teoh… has recognised the concept of legitimate expectation of its observance in the 
absence of a contrary legislative provision, even in the absence of a Bill of Rights in the Constitution 
of Australia.
85
  
  
Notably, as discussed in Chapter Four, there is now some doubt as to whether the decision in 
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh,
 86
 to which the judgment refers, is still good 
law in Australia. Nonetheless, the principle was embraced by the Indian Courts, who arguably are 
better able to do so given the express reference to international law in Article 51 of the Constitution 
of India. By contrast, the Constitution of Australia makes no express reference to international law, 
other than to vest in the High Court original jurisdiction in matters arising from any treaty.  
 
The Supreme Court also considered the relationship between international law and domestic law in 
Gramaphone Co. of India vs. Birenda Bahadur Pandey.
87
  That case concerned the movement of 
cassettes from Singapore to Nepal via India. The cassettes were suspected of being unauthorised 
copies of copyrighted materials. The question at issue was whether the cassettes could be inspected 
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on the basis that they were being imported, or rather, whether, since they merely entered India en 
route to Nepal, there was no true importation of the goods. The issue arose as to whether there was 
any rule of international law granting land-locked States, such as Nepal, the right to innocent 
passage of goods across the territory of another State or whether India had a right to intercept such 
goods as if they were imports in to India. In turn, the question then arose as to whether such a 
principle of international law could be drawn into the law of India without the aid of a municipal 
statute.  
 
The Court found that as a matter of international law, States are free to impose restrictions on the 
passage of goods for the purpose of protecting, among others, industrial, literary or artistic property 
and for purposes such as preventing false marks or false indications of origin. As to whether a 
principle of international law could be drawn into India, the Court held that provided that there be 
no inconsistency with municipal laws, treaties and conventions can also be used to interpret 
municipal laws so as to bring them in consonance with international law. Specifically, it was held:  
There can be no question that nations must march with the international community and the 
municipal law must respect rules of international law even as nations respect international opinion. 
The comity of nations requires that rules of international law may be accommodated in the municipal 
law even without express legislative sanction provided they do not run into conflict with Acts of 
Parliament. But when they do run into such conflict, the sovereignty and the integrity of the republic 
and the supremacy of the constituted legislatures in making the laws may not be subjected to 
external rules except to the extent legitimately accepted by the constituted legislatures themselves … 
But the courts are under an obligation within legitimate limits, to so interpret the municipal statute as 
to avoid confrontation with the comity of nations or the well-established principle of international 
law.
88  
 
Therefore, based on decisions by the Supreme Court of India, and in light of Article 51(c) of the 
Constitution of India, it can be concluded that principles of international law, such as the abuse of 
rights doctrine, are capable of application in India. This is only the case where such incorporation is 
not inconsistent with an Indian statute, in which case the latter would apply. In that context, this 
Chapter now considers where the abuse of rights doctrine, or any analogous doctrine, has been 
applied by courts in India.  
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5. Indian Courts and the Abuse of Rights Doctrine 
While courts in India may not necessarily speak in terms of an ‗abuse of rights‘ doctrine, it has been 
accepted that the power of the executive is subject to constitutionally guaranteed fundamental rights 
and an exercise of power that abuses those rights may, for example, give rise to a claim for civil 
compensation. Put another way, the right of the executive to act as the State is not to be exercised in 
a manner that is detrimental to the fundamental rights of individuals.  For example, in Rudal Shah v 
State of Bihar,
89
 the Supreme Court of India held that violation of a constitutional right can give rise 
to a civil liability enforceable in a civil court. In that case, Rudal Shah sought compensation for 
being wrongly imprisoned for more than fourteen years. Similarly, in Nilabati Behra v State of 
Orissa,
90
 the Court, in awarding compensation to the petitioner for the death of her son in police 
custody, expressly held that the principle of sovereign immunity does not apply to the public law 
remedies under Article 32 and Article 226 of the Constitution of India for the enforcement of 
fundamental rights.
91
 One commentator has gone so far as to describe these decisions as ‗opening 
up the development of public law torts‘.92  In this way, the Supreme Court of India has enunciated 
principles that are at least analogous to the notion of an abuse of rights.  
As for whether there is a right to due process in India capable of ‗abuse‘, the drafters of the 
Constitution specifically chose not to include the words, ‗due process‘.  This is reportedly because 
one of the members of the drafting committee was heavily influenced by Felix Frankfurter, a Judge 
of the Supreme Court of the United States. Frankfurter held strong views on the ‗pitfalls of due 
process‘93 and saw it ‗as weakening the democratic process by creating a super judiciary or a super-
executive.
94
  Consequently, the words ‗due process‘ in the original draft of Article 15, which later 
became Article 21, were replaced by the phrase ‗according to procedure established by law.‘ 
Notwithstanding this deliberate omission of a right to ‗due process‘, Abhinav Chandrachud argues 
that:  
…the due process clause found a backdoor entry into Indian constitutional analysis in the late 1970s 
through the right to equality, which has ever since become a conduit for activist constitutional 
interpretation.
95
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Chandrachud supports his argument by reference to decisions such as that in Maneka Gandhi v 
Union of India,
96
 in which it was held that the Constitution of India requires fair, just and 
reasonable procedure when rights are deprived. He also refers to Selvi v Karnataka,
97
 in which the 
Chief Justice held that the guarantee of substantive due process … is part and parcel of the idea of 
personal liberty protected by Article 21 of the Constitution.‘98  In so doing, his Honour also referred 
to the: 
… multiple dimensions of personal liberty under Article 21, which include guarantees such as the 
`right to fair trial' and `substantive due process'. It must also be emphasized that Articles 20 and 21 
have a non-derogable status within Part III of our Constitution because the Constitution (Fourty-
Fourth amendment) Act, 1978 mandated that the right to move any court for the enforcement of 
these rights cannot be suspended even during the operation of a proclamation of emergency.
99
  
 
Therefore, given that the constitutional frameworks in India are inclusive of international law, and 
that principles analogous to the abuse of process doctrine and due process rights exist in judicial 
thinking, the abuse of rights doctrine may be of use in regulating extraterritorial jurisdiction in 
India. In essence, if in asserting extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction over an individual, that 
individual will be protected in a manner consistent with the three principles of the rule of law, and if 
denied that protection, there is scope for the judiciary to find a breach of due process, or a breach by 
the government, of the abuse of rights doctrine.  
6. The Criteria of the Rule of Law  
Criteria 1: The law must be both readily known and available, and certain and clear 
The Indian Penal Code expressly states that it applies extraterritorially. Therefore, in this sense, the 
law is readily known. The description of the extraterritorial authority of India by the Supreme Court 
in GVK INDS. LTD.  v The Income Tax Officer,
100
 is very broad. For example, the extent of 
activities by non-citizens that could ‗have, or are expected to have, some impact on, or effect in, or 
consequences for: (a) the territory of India; or (b) the interests of, welfare of, wellbeing of, or 
security of inhabitants of India, and Indians‘, and therefore be the subject of Indian law, is unclear. 
Further, the Supreme Court of India is expressly forbidden by Article 245(2) of the Constitution of 
India from finding a law of India invalid on the basis that it extends extraterritorially. Indian courts 
have an inclusive approach to international law, and this may serve as some sort of limit on far-
reaching legislation, as might the obligation under Article 51 of the Constitution of India, to 
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‗maintain just and honourable relations between nations‘ and to ‗foster respect for international law 
and treaty obligations‘. Further, Indian courts may find recognition of a doctrine of ‗abuse of rights‘ 
useful in regulating extraterritorial jurisdiction. This will also be discussed in further detail below.  
Criteria 2: The law should be applied to all people equally, and operate uniformly in 
circumstances that are not materially different 
Assertions of extraterritoriality in India appear, at least in theory, to apply to all people equally, and 
to operate uniformly.  This is largely because all legislation in India is subject to Article 14. Article 
14 is included in a list of ‗Fundamental Rights‘ in Part III of the Constitution of India and is entitled 
‗Right to Equality‘. Article 14 reads as follows:  
The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws 
within the territory of India.  
The use of the words ‗within the territory of India‘ could be read as only offering equal protection 
before the law for conduct committed within India. Therefore, any protections offered to Indian 
citizens (or non-citizens for that matter) while in India could be argued to not apply to the conduct 
of Indian nationals outside India.  Further, Article 15, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of 
religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth, is expressed as applying only to citizens of India. 
Notwithstanding this, Chelameswar J in Republic of Italy v Union of India,
101
 affirmed the 
application of Article 14 to persons who are not citizens of India. He stated:  
The protection of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution is available even to an alien when sought to 
be subjected to the legal process of this country.  This court on more than one occasion held so on 
the ground that the rights emanating from those two Articles are not confined only to or dependent 
upon the citizenship of this country (footnotes omitted). As a necessary concomitant, this country 
ought to have the authority to apply and enforce the laws of this country against the person and 
things beyond its territory when its legitimate interests are affected. In assertion of such a principle, 
various laws of this country are made applicable beyond its territory.
102
  
Therefore, by analogy, the finding above that ‗this country ought to have the authority to apply and 
enforce the laws of this country against the person and things beyond its territory when its 
legitimate interests are affected‘, could be argued to imply an extraterritorial extension of both 
legislative authority and constitutional protections, such as that in Article 14.  
 
Further, in Nagaraj v. Union of India,
103
 equality was held to be inherent to the principle of rule of 
law.
104
 The primary concern of Article 14 was held to be not with the nature and content of law but 
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with its enforcement and application. Equality was described as the essence of democracy and part 
of the basic features of the constitution.
105
  For example, the Court held:  
 
At the outset, it may be noted that equality, rule of law, judicial review and separation of powers are 
distinct concepts. They have to be treated separately, though they are intimately connected. There 
can be no rule of law if there is no equality before the law; and rule of law and equality before the 
law would be empty words if their violation was not a matter of judicial scrutiny or judicial review 
and judicial relief and all these features would lose their significance if judicial, executive and 
legislative functions were united in only one authority, whose dictates had the force of law.  
 
In the case of Minerva Mills (footnote omitted), Chandrachud, C.J., speaking for the majority, 
observed that Articles 14 and 19 do not confer any fanciful rights. They confer rights which are 
elementary for the proper and effective functioning of democracy. They are universally regarded by 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. If Articles 14 and 19 are put out of operation, Article 32 
will be rendered nugatory. In the said judgment, the majority took the view that the principles 
enumerated in Part-IV are not the proclaimed monopoly of democracies alone. They are common to 
all polities, democratic or authoritarian. Every State is goal-oriented and every State claims to strive 
for securing the welfare of its people. The distinction between different forms of Government 
consists in the fact that a real democracy will endeavour to achieve its objectives through the 
discipline of fundamental freedoms like Articles 14 and 19…  
 
From these observations, which are binding on us, the principle which emerges is that "equality" is 
the essence of democracy and, accordingly a basic feature of the Constitution.
106
 
 
On the issue of double jeopardy, Article 20(2) of the Constitution of India provides that ‗no person 
shall be prosecuted for the same offence more than once‘. Although this article is not expressly 
limited to prosecutions within India, it is not clear whether this protection against double jeopardy 
would apply to persons who had been prosecuted for offences outside India. Given that the Indian 
Penal Code expressly provides for extraterritorial reach, and that Articles 14 and 21 have been held 
to apply to persons who are not citizens of India, it could be inferred that this protection of double 
jeopardy applies extraterritorially. However, the courts in India have held that international law will 
inform interpretation of constitutional provisions, and the protection against double jeopardy in the 
ICCPR has been held to only apply within nation States and not between them.
107
 Therefore, the 
courts may choose to adopt this position.  
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On balance, the inclusion of constitutional protections such as the right to equality before the law 
and protection against double jeopardy, indicate that the regulation of extraterritoriality in India is 
consistent with Principle 2, that the law should be applied to all people equally, and operate 
uniformly in circumstances that are not materially different. The extent to which these protections 
apply to extraterritorial conduct is not clear, and awaits further analysis by the Supreme Court of 
India.  
Criteria 3: There must be some capacity for judicial review of executive action and the Executive 
arm of government should be subject to the law and any action undertaken by the Executive 
should be authorised by law.  
The Government of India is subject to judicial review.  This is made clear in Article 300 of the 
Constitution of India, which provides that the Government of India may sue or be sued. The 
executive in India is not entitled to sovereign immunity where breaches of fundamental rights are 
concerned. For example, in Nilabati Behra v State of Orissa,
108
 the Supreme Court of India 
expressly held that the principle of sovereign immunity does not apply to the public law remedies 
under Article 32 and Article 226 for the enforcement of fundamental rights. Article 32 grants a right 
to seek remedy from the Supreme Court and lists the kinds of remedies available. Article 226 
empowers superior courts in India to enforce the fundamental rights conferred in Part III. Further, in 
Nagaraj v. Union of India,
109
 the Supreme Court of India held that judicial review was an essential 
feature of the constitutional framework in India. For example, it was stated:  
 [the] rule of law and equality before the law would be empty words if their violation was not a 
matter of judicial scrutiny or judicial review and judicial relief and all these features would lose their 
significance if judicial, executive and legislative functions were united in only one authority, whose 
dictates had the force of law. The rule of law and equality before the law are designed to secure 
among other things justice both social and economic. Secondly, a federal Constitution with its 
distribution of legislative powers between Parliament and State legislatures involves a limitation on 
legislative powers and this requires an authority other than Parliament and State Legislatures to 
ascertain whether the limits are transgressed and to prevent such violation and transgression. As far 
back as 1872, Lord Selbourne said that the duty to decide whether the limits are transgressed must be 
discharged by courts of justice. Judicial review of legislation enacted by the Parliament within 
limited powers under the controlled constitution which we have, has been a feature of our law and 
this is on the ground that any law passed by a legislature with limited powers is ultra vires if the 
limits are transgressed. The framers conferred on the Supreme Court the power to issue writs for the 
speedy enforcement of those rights and made the right to approach the Supreme Court for such 
enforcement itself a fundamental right. Thus, judicial review is an essential feature of our 
constitution because it is necessary to give effect to the distribution of legislative power between 
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Parliament and State legislatures, and is also necessary to give practicable content to the objectives 
of the Constitution embodied in Part-III and in several other Articles of our Constitution.
110
 
 
Fulfilment of this criterion also requires a genuine separation of judicial power from executive 
and/or legislative power.  If there is to be a genuine capacity for judicial review of executive action, 
then the judiciary must be free from undue influence or interference from the arm of government it 
is reviewing. Article 50 of the Constitution of India expressly provides for the separation of the 
judiciary from the executive. It requires that the ‗State shall take steps to separate the judiciary from 
the executive in the public services of the State‘.  Notably, under Article 124(2), judges of the 
Supreme Court of India can only be appointed by the President after consultation with the Chief 
Justice. Further, judges have security of tenure until 65 years of age, and Article 124(4) only 
permits removal from office for ‗proved misbehaviour or incapacity.‘ Abhishek Singhvi goes so far 
as to claim that, in India:  
The constitutional scheme has been reinforced by one of the most independent and aggressive 
judiciaries in the world, which has expanded the boundaries of judicial review far beyond the 
framers‘ imaginations.111 
 
Sunil Khilnani suggests that Singhvi‘s analysis gives an,  
overly optimistic sense of the status and progress of fundamental individual rights in India and of 
how the relationship between the legislature and the judiciary works toward upholding those 
rights.
112
 
 
Khilnani instead argues that judicial power has expanded too far: 
Equally, the scope of judicial review has steadily expanded to encompass not just amendments and 
fundamental rights, but legislation across a range of issues, some quite vague and subject to highly 
discretionary political definition. The court has taken upon itself the role of defining a range of 
political values and ends.
113
 
 
On the basis of the constitutional guaranteed separation of judicial power and tenure and given that 
Khilnani‘s concerns are that the judiciary is too powerful, rather than not powerful enough, it is 
reasonable to conclude that the judiciary in India is sufficiently independent from the executive, and 
is therefore in a position to review administrative action.  Therefore, on balance, exercises of 
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extraterritorial jurisdiction by India are likely to be the subject of judicial review and therefore, 
meet criterion three, that is, that there must be some capacity for judicial review of executive action 
and the executive arm of government should be subject to the law and any action undertaken by the 
executive should be authorised by law. 
7. Observations and Summary   
Chapter Five has provided a brief overview of Indian legal history. It then considered examples of 
legislation in India extending extraterritorially and of judicial regulation of extraterritoriality.  From 
these examples, it can be concluded that India‘s constitutional frameworks will permit broad 
extraterritorial assertions, and in fact, that a court, in India, cannot strike down legislation on the 
basis that it applies extraterritorially. This Chapter then moved to consider the relationship between 
municipal law and international law in India. This revealed a very progressive and inclusive attitude 
to the incorporation of international law in judicial interpretation. From this it can be inferred that 
courts in India may be receptive to the abuse of rights doctrine as a means of regulating 
extraterritorial jurisdiction. To that end, it was then considered whether Indian courts had engaged 
with any principles analogous to an abuse of rights doctrine. That analysis revealed that the courts 
in India have been prepared to find that sovereign immunity does not apply if the sovereign is 
abusing fundamental rights, and that courts have been prepared to accept the existence of due-
process-type rights. It can be argued that an abuse of rights doctrine may exist in India and that it 
may offer individuals some protection of their substantive and procedural rights if accused of an 
extraterritorial offence. Notwithstanding that, the inability of a court to find a law invalid for 
reasons of extraterritorial reach is a significant limitation.  
 
The regulation of extraterritorial jurisdiction in India was then measured against the three 
fundamental criteria of the rule of law, as identified in Chapter Three.  The result of that analysis 
was that the three criteria are generally met, but there were some possible issues and gaps. For 
example, in the context of criterion one, that the law must be certain and capable of being known, 
the courts have adopted a potentially very broad conception of extraterritoriality, one that most 
resembled the effects doctrine, which is considered controversial, and uncertain. Further, as to 
criterion two, the requirement that the law apply equally to all persons, while the courts have also 
held that the principle of equality is an essential part of India‘s constitutional frameworks, it is not 
clear whether the constitutional protection against double jeopardy would also apply to persons who 
had been prosecuted for offences outside India or whether, like the guarantee in the ICCPR, it 
simply applies within India. Finally, as for criterion three, that executive action is subject to judicial 
150 
 
review, India has an entrenched separation of powers, and a judiciary that has held that judicial 
review to be an essential part of the constitutional frameworks.  
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CHAPTER SIX:  THE UNITED STATES AND EXTRATERRITORIAL 
JURISDICTION 
 
Chapter Six provides a historical overview of the legal system of the United States and then 
considers examples of exercises of extraterritorial jurisdiction. It does so by providing examples of 
assertions of extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction and analysing significant judicial decisions on 
extraterritoriality. This Chapter will then analyse the regulation of extraterritoriality in the United 
States against the three criteria of the ‗rule of law‘, as set out in Chapters 1 and 3. Following that 
analysis, the relationship between international law and the municipal law of the United States is 
considered and engagement by United States‘ courts with the abuse of rights doctrine, or any 
analogous principles, is explored.  
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1. Introduction  
The United States, like Australia and India, has a federal system of governance and is a common-
law country. As Allan Farnsworth has observed, ‗American law has two distinctive ingredients: a 
singular variety of federalism and a common law tradition‘.1  The Constitution of 1787 is the ‗basic 
governing document of the United States‘.2  Like Australia, the United States was formed when 
separate colonies joined together to form a federation.  Farnsworth has suggested:  
No adequate comprehension of the American legal system is possible without an understanding of 
the way in which these individual colonies were welded together into a single nation under a 
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Constitution which has, with relatively little amendment, withstood the stress of diversity and the 
strain of change from 1789 until today.
3
  
It is not intended that this Chapter provide an exhaustive explanation of the entirety of American 
constitutional frameworks or of the criminal justice system. Instead, it will attempt to provide a 
brief overview of American history, identify examples of criminal legislation with extraterritorial 
reach, and to consider how the courts have regulated questions of extraterritorial criminal 
jurisdiction.  Then, to determine whether principles of international law will be helpful in such 
regulation, the relationship between municipal and international law is considered. Following that, 
an attempt is made to answer the question as to whether courts in the United States have engaged 
with any principles analogous to the abuse of rights doctrine.  The Chapter then concludes with an 
analysis of the conformity of regulation of extraterritoriality with the conception of the rule of law 
as identified in Chapters 1 and 3.  
 
Notably, there is far more literature and judicial consideration on extraterritoriality and individuals 
rights in the United States than there is for India and Australia.  While every effort has been made to 
ensure consistency of analysis between the three, because of the volume of available materials, this 
Chapter adopts an approach of considering lines of judicial authority, rather focusing only on one or 
two individual cases.  As a further preliminary matter, the term ‗United States‘ and ‗America‘ are 
both used interchangeably and are taken to refer to the United States of America, and the Supreme 
Court of the United States (‗the Supreme Court‘) is sometimes described in the literature as an 
‗Article III‘ court.4 
 
2. Historical Overview  
Prior to European settlement, the United States was home to indigenous peoples with their own 
laws and customs for thousands of years.
5
 After that point, the history of the United States is best 
understood in terms of the ‗colonial era‘ from 1600 and 1775; the ‗revolutionary era‘ from 1775 and 
1783, the adoption of a new constitution and a bill of rights between 1789 and 1791; the American 
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Civil War between 1861 and 1865; the ‗reconstruction era‘ between 1863 and 1877; the 
‗progressive era‘ from around 1890 to 1920; the ‗super-power‘ era in the twentieth century; and the 
‗post-September 11 era‘. A comprehensive explanation of the history of the United States is beyond 
the scope of this thesis because such an explanation does not necessarily have a bearing on the way 
in which the United States regulates extraterritorial jurisdiction in the twenty-first century. 
Nonetheless, as with Australia and India, a brief summary is provided below so as to provide 
historical context to the legal system in which extraterritoriality is considered in the United States 
today.  
 
The colonial era saw Spanish and French settlements in various parts of the United States from 
around 1600.
6
 The first English settlement occurred in Virginia,
7
 and by the 1760s, most colonies 
were British.
8
 The legacy of the British remains in the form of the common-law. Kermit Hall, Paul 
Finkelman and James Ely have observed:  
The English who came to America brought a well-developed legal culture with them. Their cultural 
‗baggage‘ included English statutes, case law and common law, as well as local rules, customs and 
usages. They came from a legalistic society…9 
During the colonial era, governments developed in each colony.
10
  A series of taxes and commercial 
regulations imposed in the 1700s by the British were resisted by these colonies.  Representatives of 
nearly all colonies met as part of the first and second constitutional congress in 1774 and 1775, by 
which point fighting between the colonies and the British had commenced.
11
 In 1776, Congress 
adopted a declaration of independence and thereby founded a new country, the United States of 
America.
12
 In 1777, Articles of Confederation were drafted and subsequently ratified in 1781.
13
 A 
peace treaty was then signed in 1783, after the Patriots won the revolutionary war, with support 
from France and under the military leadership of George Washington.
14
 However, the Articles of 
Confederation were controversial, perhaps because ‗each state was jealous of its newly asserted 
sovereignty, conscious of its own special interests, and hopeful of its own distinctive kind of 
reform‘.15 As a result, sporadic rebellion ‗erupted in several states‘,16 and resulted in ‗economic, 
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political, social and diplomatic crises‘.17 Consequently, Congress held a constitutional convention 
in 1787. This resulted in a new constitution.  
 
Hall, Finkelman and Ely have observed that ‗[r]atification of the constitution marked the beginning, 
not the end, of controversy over the new government‘s powers, particularly those that involved 
conflict with state authority‘.18 In 1789, Congress proposed the first 10 amendments to the 
constitution, all of which were ratified by 1791. These amendments were largely concerned with 
individual rights and freedoms and became popularly known as a ‗Bill of Rights‘. Slavery was a 
central theme in national and interstate relations from 1787 until the end of the Civil War. A 
pressing humanitarian issue in and of itself, the issue of slavery was also a platform in the 
exploration of constitutional relationships between the federal and state governments.
19
  The 1860 
election of Abraham Lincoln, who took an anti-slavery stance,
20
  triggered the secession of eleven 
slave states, who then founded the Confederacy in 1861.
21
 This triggered the American Civil War, 
which lasted between approximately 1861 and 1865.
22
 The federal government emerged from the 
war stronger than before, largely because ‗the Civil War destroyed forever the once commonly 
accepted theory of state sovereignty. Federal supremacy was secured.‘23 Then followed what is 
often referred to as the ‗reconstruction era‘, in which a number of constitutional amendments 
occurred, including the fourteenth amendment. Among other things, the fourteenth amendment is 
concerned with due process, and includes a guarantee that, ‗[n]o state shall make or enforce any law 
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws‘.24    
 
The period between around 1890 and 1920 is described as the progressive era because of the social 
and political reforms that either took place during that time or soon after.
25
 Further, the United 
States began to emerge as a nation of significance. It has been suggested that, ‗America in 1899 
looked almost nothing like the America of 1800 … a weak, powerless nation … was now a world 
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super power with vast military potential... the American economy of 1899 looked very modern.‘ 26 
By the 1900s, the United States had emerged as a global superpower. 
 
At the turn of the twenty-first century, in events commonly referred to as ‗9/11‘, the United States 
suffered a high-profile terrorist attack in which approximately 3000 people were killed.
27
 In 
response, the United States increased military spending and entered into a number of armed 
conflicts. The United States has also sought to enhance the extraterritorial legal and military 
regulation of terrorism. As Sara Solow has observed: 
Since 9/11, the United States has deployed many strategies to combat global terrorism. It has 
pursued wars in Afghanistan and in Iraq; launched drone strike campaigns over regions of Pakistan; 
and frozen the assets of individuals and organisations purportedly linked to terrorism. Additionally, 
one very powerful tool that the United States has deployed has been the prosecution and punishment 
of persons for overseas acts of terrorism, a strategy that makes use of both the country‘s Article III 
courts and its newly created military commissions.
28
  
In turn, this has resulted in more exercises of extraterritorial jurisdiction and in institutions such as 
Guantanamo Bay, a controversial military prison. This will be discussed in further detail below at 
heading 5, ‗United States Courts and the Abuse of Rights Doctrine‘.  
 
3. Assertions of Extraterritorial Criminal Jurisdiction by the United States  
This section considers examples of legislation with extraterritorial reach. It then provides examples 
of judicial consideration of extraterritoriality. This is done so as to gain insight into the way in 
which extraterritorial jurisdiction is regulated in the United States.  
 
3.1. Examples of legislation with extraterritorial reach 
In the United States, once federal legislation is passed, it is consolidated into the United States Code 
(USC).  The USC is organised by subject matter and is prepared by the Office of the Law Revision 
Counsel of the United States House of Representatives.
29
 There are a number of provisions in the 
USC that extend extraterritorially. For example, Chapter 115 of the USC contains provisions 
relating to ‗treason, sedition and other subversive Activities‘.30 These provisions are not limited to 
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American territory, but instead apply, for example, ‗within the United States or elsewhere‘,31 for the 
offence of treason, and ‗within the United States or in any place subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof‘,32 for the offence of enlistment to serve against the United States. As noted in Chapter 1, 
the Supreme Court of the United States (the ‗Supreme Court‘) has accepted that the legislature ‗has 
the authority to enforce its laws beyond the territorial boundaries of the United States.‘33 The 
extraterritorial application of United States‘ laws has generally been determined by reference to 
legislative intent, either express or implied.
34
  Therefore, places subject to the ‗jurisdiction thereof‘ 
can include places outside the United States if the relevant legislative intent is present.   
 
Related to these types of offences are the provisions in Chapter 37 of the USC, which could be 
described as espionage type offences. For example, sections 793 and 794 set out a comprehensive 
range of conduct constituting criminal offences.
35
 Jennifer Elsea has observed that there is, 
no express indication that [these provisions are] intended to apply extraterritorially, but courts have 
not been reluctant to apply it to overseas conduct of Americans, in particular because Congress in 
1961 eliminated a provision restricting the act to apply only ―within the admiralty and maritime 
jurisdiction of the United States and on the high seas, as well as within the United States‖. 36 
For example, in United States v Zehe,
37
 it was held:  
Espionage against the United States, because it is a crime that by definition threatens this country‘s 
security, can therefore be punished by Congress even if committed by a noncitizen outside the 
United States.
38
  
 
There are also a number of terrorism offences which extend extraterritoriality.
39
 For example, 
section 2332B, entitled ‗acts of terrorism transcending national boundaries‘ expressly extends 
extraterritorially. Subsection 2335B(e) reads as follows:  
(e) Extraterritorial Jurisdiction.— There is extraterritorial Federal jurisdiction—  
(1) over any offense under subsection (a), including any threat, attempt, or conspiracy to 
commit such offense; and  
(2) over conduct which, under section 3, renders any person an accessory after the fact to an 
offense under subsection (a).
40
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There are also offences prohibiting the financing of terrorism.
41
 For example, section 2339C, 
entitled ‗prohibitions against the financing of terrorism‘, creates a number of offences and contains 
a subsection setting out the extent of jurisdiction asserted.
 42
  Where the offence takes place outside 
the United States, jurisdiction is asserted if a ‘perpetrator is a national of the United States‘.43 This 
is an example of active nationality jurisdiction and relatively uncontroversial.  There is also 
jurisdiction asserted where a perpetrator is found in the United States,
44
 even where there is no other 
nexus. This appears to be an assertion of ‗conditional‘ universal jurisdiction.45  Jurisdiction is also 
asserted where the offence takes place outside the United States, but is ‗directed toward or resulted 
in the carrying out of a predicate act against a national of the United States‘. 46   This is an example 
of passive personality jurisdiction, because the only nexus to the United States is the nationality of 
the victim.   Broader still is the assertion of jurisdiction where an offence takes place outside the 
United States, but is ‗directed toward or resulted in the carrying out of a predicate act committed in 
an attempt to compel the United States to do or abstain from doing any act‘.47 Here, the only nexus 
to the United States is an ‗an attempt to compel‘. This, in theory, could extend to a range of political 
activism or lobbying by any national anywhere in the world. It is not immediately clear what 
principle of jurisdiction this is. It could arguably be an assertion of protective principle jurisdiction 
if the attempt to compel relates to a matter of national security, or ‗effects‘ principle jurisdiction if 
the attempt actually had an effect on the United States, although the section itself does not require 
this.  
 
Section 2332F, entitled ‗bombings of places of public use, government facilities, public 
transportation systems and infrastructure facilities‘,48 also has broad extraterritorial application. 
Where the offences take place outside the United States, jurisdiction is still asserted where ‗a 
perpetrator is a national of the United States or is a stateless person whose habitual residence is in 
the United States‘.49 This is active nationality jurisdiction. There is jurisdiction where ‗a victim is a 
national of the United States‘,50 regardless of where the offence takes place. This is passive 
personality jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is also asserted where ‗a perpetrator is found in the United 
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States‘,51 again, regardless of where the offence takes place or the nationality of the victims. As 
noted above, this is an example of conditional universal jurisdiction.  
 
Section 2339B makes it an offence to provide material support or resources to ‗designated foreign 
terrorist organisations‘.52  The provision expressly applies extraterritorially, including where an 
offender is brought into or found in the United States, ‗even if the conduct required for the offense 
occurs outside the United States‘.53 
 
The broad extraterritorial extension of terrorist bombing offences is perhaps less controversial than 
the broad assertion of jurisdiction for the provision of material assistance or resources. This is 
because bombing offences are likely to be a genuine threat to security interests and there is also a 
greater likelihood of terrorism being accepted, as a matter of State practice and international treaty 
content, as a universal crime. The provision of material support, however, could cover a broad 
range of conduct and persons, who by their circumstances, have little choice in the conduct and no 
direct connection with any act of terrorism. In theory, these offences arguably extend to a range of 
activities that will not, or are not intended to, result in any security threat to the United States or 
United States‘ national. This is discussed later in this Chapter.  
Some of these offences were inserted and expanded by the Uniting And Strengthening America By 
Providing Appropriate Tools Required To Intercept And Obstruct Terrorism (the ‗USA PATRIOT 
Act‘).54 Notably, the extraterritorial consequences of the USA PATRIOT Act were considered in a 
Canadian report, ‗Privacy Matters: The Federal Strategy to Address Concerns About the USA 
PATRIOT Act and Transborder Data Flows‘.55 This report was primarily concerned with privacy of 
data and noted that concerns about the extraterritorial scope of the USA Patriot Act, ‗raised larger 
questions about the safeguarding of privacy in an era of economic globalization, widespread fear of 
terrorism, and transborder data flows.‘56 However, it further noted that privacy is at risk ‗whenever 
a transborder data flow occurs since there are anti-terrorism laws and security measures in many 
other countries that contain powers similar to those of the USA PATRIOT Act‘.57  
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In addition to terrorism offences, the United States has enacted provisions regulating extraterritorial 
sexual conduct. These offences include transportation with intent to engage in criminal sexual 
activity,
58
 travel with intent to engage in illicit sexual conduct,
59
 engaging in illicit sexual conduct 
in foreign places,
60
 travel with intent to engage in illicit sexual conduct,
61
 
production of child pornography outside the United States,
62
 and  
sex trafficking of children by force, fraud, or coercion.
63
   In Chapter Four, it was observed that the 
authority to prescribe and prosecute extraterritorial child sexual offences in Australia derives from 
the ‗External Affairs‘ power in the Australian Constitution. American courts have taken a similar, 
but slightly different approach and have held that Congress may regulate sex tourism under the 
‘trade and commerce‘ power in the United States Constitution.  For example, in United States v. 
Clark,
64
 the Court found:  
Instead of slavishly marching down the path of grafting the interstate commerce framework onto 
foreign commerce, we step back and take a global, common-sense approach to the circumstances 
presented here: The illicit sexual conduct reached by the state expressly includes commercial sex 
acts performed by a U.S. citizen on foreign soil. This conduct might be immoral and criminal, but it 
is also commercial. Where, as in this appeal, the defendant travels in foreign commerce to a foreign 
country and offers to pay a child to engage in sex acts, his conduct falls under the broad umbrella of 
foreign commerce and consequently within congressional authority under the Foreign Commerce 
Clause.
65
 
 
The United States also has other trafficking in persons offences with extraterritorial reach. For 
example, sections 1581, 1583, 1584, 1589, and 1590, contain offences relating to, for example, 
servitude, kidnapping and other forms of recruitment for trafficking. Section 1596 expressly 
provides for additional jurisdiction in certain trafficking offences. This section asserts active 
nationality jurisdiction,
66
 and conditional universal jurisdiction.
67
 Notably, however, there is an 
express transnational double jeopardy limitation, albeit a discretionary one.  Section 1596(b) 
provides that: 
No prosecution may be commenced against a person under this section if a foreign government, in 
accordance with jurisdiction recognized by the United States, has prosecuted or is prosecuting such 
person for the conduct constituting such offense, except upon the approval of the Attorney General 
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or the Deputy Attorney General (or a person acting in either such capacity), which function of 
approval may not be delegated.
68
 
 
The United States also has laws regulating computer and cyber-crime. For example, sections 1028-
1030, 1037, 1343, and 1362 relate to fraud and identity theft,
69
 sections 2251 and 2252 are 
concerned with the online exploitation and sexual abuse of children,
70
 and misleading domain 
names and images,
71
 2319 with copyright offences and section 605, with ‗unauthorized publication 
or use of communications‘.72  Another significant provision is section 798, entitled ‗Disclosure of 
classified information‘.73 It reads as follows and does not appear to be limited territorially: 
(a) Whoever knowingly and willfully communicates, furnishes, transmits, or otherwise makes 
available to an unauthorized person, or publishes, or uses in any manner prejudicial to the safety or 
interest of the United States or for the benefit of any foreign government to the detriment of the 
United States any classified information— 
(1) concerning the nature, preparation, or use of any code, cipher, or cryptographic system of 
the United States or any foreign government; or 
(2) concerning the design, construction, use, maintenance, or repair of any device, apparatus, 
or appliance used or prepared or planned for use by the United States or any foreign 
government for cryptographic or communication intelligence purposes; or 
(3) concerning the communication intelligence activities of the United States or any foreign 
government; or 
(4) obtained by the processes of communication intelligence from the communications of 
any foreign government, knowing the same to have been obtained by such processes— 
Shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both.
74
 
 
Notably, the Securing Human Intelligence and Enforcing Lawful Dissemination bill (the ‗SHIELD‘ 
bill) was introduced on February 10, 2011, in a previous session of Congress, but did not make it 
out of committee and it was not enacted.
75
 The SHIELD bill would have amended section 798 of 
the USC, which relates to the disclosure of ‗classified information‘.  The amendments create 
offences that would purportedly apply to journalists who publish leaked confidential documents.
76
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Ironically, the term ‗shield‘ legislation is usually used to describe legislation that protects journalists 
from having to name their sources.
77
 The SHIELD bill extended extraterritorially and targeted 
‗transnational activity ... that threatens the security of the United States,‘78 and would have applied 
to ‗any individual or group,‘79 engaging in that activity. It is unclear whether this conduct must be 
undertaken knowingly to incur punishment, or whether liability would have been absolute. The 
scope of the offence provisions in the Bill were not limited to United States nationals, but appear to 
assert extraterritorial jurisdiction on the basis of the protective principle. The legislation was likely 
a reaction to the dissemination of diplomatic cables and communiqués on the website 
‗WikiLeaks‘.80 The report by the Congressional Research Service itself acknowledges:  
The publication of the leaked documents by WikiLeaks and the subsequent reporting of information 
contained therein raise questions with respect to the possibility of bringing criminal charges for the 
dissemination of materials by media organisations following an unauthorised disclosure, in particular 
when done by non-US national overseas.
81
 
 
If the SHIELD bill had passed, it may have been subject to constitutional challenge. As observed in 
a report on the issue prepared by the Congressional Research Service, although unauthorised 
acquisition of information may be punished, the issue remains open as to whether the 
criminalisation of the publication of unlawfully obtained information would be consistent with First 
Amendment rights relating to freedom of speech.
82
 Relevantly, it was reported in March 2014 that a 
‗supporter of a bill to protect reporters and the news media from having to reveal confidential 
sources said Friday the measure has the backing of the Obama administration and the support of 
enough senators to move ahead this year.‘83 However, the protections reportedly only extend to 
particular types of ‗covered journalists‘,84 and would appear not to apply organisations like 
WikiLeaks. For example, at the time of writing, the bill states that the protection ‗does not include 
any person or entity‘,85 
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whose principal function, as demonstrated by the totality of such person or entity‘s work, is to 
publish primary source documents that have been disclosed to such person or entity without 
authorization.
86
  
 
In any event, it is clear there are a number of criminal offences in the United States which have 
extraterritorial reach and that this is not likely to change.  Charles Doyle suggested that:  
A surprising number of federal criminal statutes have extraterritorial application, but prosecutions 
have been few. This may be because when extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction does exist, practical 
and legal complications, and sometimes diplomatic considerations, may counsel against its 
exercise.
87
 
 
In that context, judicial regulation of the prosecution of extraterritorial criminal conduct is now 
considered.  
3.2. United States Courts and Extraterritoriality  
As noted in Chapter 1, the Supreme Court has held that ‗all legislation is prima facie territorial.‘88  
In this way, there is a presumption against extraterritoriality in the United States. As Wade Estey 
has stated:  
Although there is growing conflict abroad over the proper scope of extraterritorial jurisdiction, this 
conflict is belied by the fact that under U.S. law, the presumption against extraterritoriality assumes 
that all laws are prima facie territorial and should not be applied extraterritoriality absent a clear 
congressional mandate.
89
 
The Supreme Court has also confirmed that ‗Congress has the authority to enforce its laws beyond 
the territorial boundaries of the United States.‘90 Since then, the extraterritorial application of laws 
has generally been determined by reference to legislative intent, either express or implied.
91
 In 
Wade Estey‘s view, ‗Congress is not always capable of determining when a statute should apply 
extraterritorially‘.92 Consequently, Estey advocates for a presumption of territoriality that may be 
rebutted on the basis of the active and passive nationality principle, the effects doctrine, universal 
jurisdiction and protective jurisdiction.
93
 This paradigm of extraterritoriality is a broad one, 
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particularly given the inclusion of the passive nationality principle and the effects doctrine, both of 
which can be controversial. In any event, as a starting point and as a matter of municipal law, it is 
clear that a United States legislator has domestic authority to exercise jurisdiction extraterritorially.  
In that context, examples of the way in which questions of extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction has 
been handled by courts in the United States are now identified. There has been significantly more 
judicial consideration of extraterritorial jurisdiction in the United States, than in Australia or India. 
For this reasons, rather than simply identifying two significant cases as was done in Chapters Four 
and Five, the judicial analysis will be presented in themes. These themes are: acceptance of the 
passive personality doctrine; the Ker Frisbie and dual sovereignty doctrines; and assertions of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction over terrorism offences.  
3.2.1. Acceptance of the passive personality doctrine  
As discussed in Chapter Two, the passive personality principle is highly controversial. Therefore, it 
is significant that United States courts have accepted its use. For example, the decision of the 
Supreme Court in United States v Yunis,
94
 concerned a resident and citizen of Lebanon, who was 
apprehended and charged with offences relating to the hijacking of a Jordanian civilian aircraft. The 
only connection with the United States was the presence of United States nationals on the flights. 
Mr Yunis argued that the Court did not have jurisdiction. Among other reasons, this was because 
the mere presence of United States nationals was an insufficient basis for extraterritorial 
jurisdiction. The Court disagreed on the basis that the international community recognised the 
passive personality doctrine, particular in relation to hostage takers.
95
  A similar conclusion was 
reached in Ahmad v Wigen.
96
 In that case, the Court rejected a submission that a naturalised United 
States citizen could not be extradited to Israel for crimes that occurred outside of Israel.  It found 
Israel‘s reliance on the passive personality doctrine to be valid. Notably, the Restatement (Third) of 
the Foreign Relations Law of the United States provides that the passive personality principle, while 
not applicable to torts and ordinary crimes is accepted ‗as applied to terrorist and other organised 
attacks on a state‘s nationals‘.97 
3.2.2. The ‘Ker-Frisbie’ and ‘Dual Sovereignty’ doctrines  
The Ker-Frisbie doctrine provides that illegalities in the extradition process will not bar prosecution 
in United States Courts. The Ker-Frisbie doctrine stands in stark contrast to the decision of the 
Australian High Court in Moti v The Queen, as discussed in Chapter Four. The doctrine derives 
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from two decisions of the Supreme Court. In Ker v. Illinois,
98
 the Supreme Court held that ‗such 
forcible abduction is no sufficient reason why the party should not answer when brought within the 
jurisdiction of the court which has the right to try him for such an offence, and presents no valid 
objection to his trial in such court.‘99 This was upheld in Frisbie v. Collins.100 The doctrine has been 
subject to criticism.
101
 As Jonathon Bush observed, 
… most media commentary condemned the decision as condoning a lawless policy akin to the 
practices of terrorist States like Libya and Iran and at odds with the normal of international 
behaviour.
102
  
The doctrine, although modified over time, is still the applicable law in the United States. For 
example, in United States v Alvarez-Machain,
103
 the Supreme Court effectively upheld the Ker-
Frisbie doctrine and found that the kidnapping of Dr Alvarez-Machain from Mexico by bounty 
hunters hired by a US government agency did not preclude his prosecution in the United States. 
Andrew Strauss, in a commentary on the decision, has suggested: 
The Court, in its disregard for the international law of jurisdiction, confused the recognized 
international jurisdictional paradigm. In so doing, the Court failed to provide any semblance of a 
normative alternative. The Supreme Court's decision suggests jurisdictional nihilism. If used by other 
nation-States to legitimize engagement in overseas abductions and then applied by other judiciaries to 
permit jurisdiction over abductees, the decision can only lead to global regulatory confusion.
104
 
It could be argued that this is consistent with the ‗Male Captus, Bene Detenus’ doctrine in 
international law.
105
 That doctrine provides that a ‗person improperly seized may nevertheless 
properly be tried‘.106 As Lori Damrosch, Louis Henkin, Sean Murphy, and Hans Smit observe, 
however, this rule follows from the principle that only the State in which the person was captured 
may complain of an improper exercise of jurisdiction.
107
 In the United States v. Alvarez-Machain 
decision, Mexico, the State in whose territory the accused was seized did object.
108
 So, even if the 
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Male Captus, Bene Detenus doctrine has a basis in international law, the United States acted beyond 
the scope of the doctrine in this case. In any event, the idea that only a State, and not an individual, 
can complain about improper jurisdiction further illustrates the inadequacies of international law in 
protecting the interests of individuals accused of extraterritorial criminal offences.  
The ‗dual sovereignty doctrine‘ allows each sovereign State to prosecute criminal conduct 
regardless of previous action in relation to the same conduct by other sovereign States.
109
 This 
doctrine is ‗inequitable and ineffective at protecting the rights of criminal defendants‘.110 By way of 
example, consider the prosecution of Gabe Watson in the United States for conduct that had already 
been the subject of a conviction and subsequent term of imprisonment in Australia. Mr Watson, a 
citizen of the United States, served 18 months‘ imprisonment in Australia for the manslaughter of 
his wife on a diving trip in Australia in 2003.
111
 Dissatisfied with the lenient sentence, an Alabama 
court indicted Mr Watson for murder for money, and kidnap by trick,
112
 and was successful in 
seeking his extradition from Australia.
113
 Under Australian law, there is an ‗extradition objection‘ if 
a person has undergone punishment under the law of Australia in respect of the extradition offence, 
or another offence constituted by the same conduct as the extradition offence.
114
 Therefore, 
although the offences for which Mr Watson was indicted in the United States were technically 
different from those in Australia, the conduct in question was the same conduct and should have 
been caught by this extradition objection.  Nonetheless, he was extradited. Ultimately, the case 
against Mr Watson was dismissed on the basis of insufficient evidence.
115 
If the case had gone to 
trial, he may have been tried, convicted and punished in two different jurisdictions.  
By contrast, in January 2012, a court in Mexico refused to extradite Ms Sandra Ávila-Beltrán to the 
United States for drug charges, on the basis that the charges related to conduct that had already been 
the subject of a prosecution in Mexico.
116
 Perhaps the key difference between Ms Ávila-Beltrán and 
Mr Watson is that the former is a citizen of Mexico, whereas Watson was not a citizen of Australia. 
Perhaps Australia would have gone further to protect its own citizen from another trial arising out of 
                                               
109
 D E Lopez, ‗Not Twice for the Same: How the Dual Sovereignty Doctrine is Used to Circumvent Non Bis In Idem‘ 
(2000) 33 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 1263, 1266. 
110
 Ibid.  
111
 See R v Watson; Ex parte A-G [2009] QCA 279.  
112
 T. Thompson, ‗California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger Signs Extradition Order on Gabe Watson‘, The Courier 
Mail (online), 15 November 2010 <http://www.couriermail.com.au/news/queensland/california-governor-arnold-
schwarzenegger-signs-extradition-order-on-gabe-watson/story-e6freoof-1225953440198>. 
113
 Note, the State of California also sought extradition from Australia, and ordered Watson‘s extradition to Alabama.  
114
 Extradition Act 1988 (Cth) s 7(e).  
115
 J Coglan, ‗Gabe Watson Murder Trial Thrown Out‘, ABC News (online), 24 February 2012 
<http://www.abc.net.au/news/2012-02-24/gabe-watson-murder-trial-thrown-out/3849836?section=qld>. 
116
 H. Nelson Goodson, ‗Mexican Federal Judge cited Double Jeopardy to Prevent Female Druglord Extradition to 
the US‘, on Hispanic News Network USA Blog (12 January 2012) 
<http://hngwiusa.wordpress.com/2012/01/13/mexican-federal-judge-cited-double-jeopardy-to-prevent-female-druglord-
extradition-to-the-u-s>. 
166 
 
the same conduct. If so, that in itself is problematic, as it creates uncertainties and is inconsistent 
with the notion that all persons are equal before the law. Notably, international law does not 
obligate a sovereign State to enforce another State‘s penal judgments.117  The continued acceptance 
of the Ker-Frisbie and Dual Sovereignty doctrines by United States‘ courts has implication for an 
analysis in relation to both the abuse of rights doctrine and the chosen conception of the rule of law.  
3.2.3. Assertions of extraterritorial jurisdiction over terrorism and ‘terrorism-associated’ 
offences  
The exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction in relation to terrorism or terrorism-associated offences 
is chosen here for analysis.
118
 Such exercises are chosen because they are capable of providing a 
particular insight into the regulation of jurisdiction in American courts and the impact this has on 
individuals accused of these types of offences.  For example, of the 804 defendants charged by the 
United States with terrorism-associated crimes between 2001 and 2009, 531, or 66%, were not 
citizens of the United States.
119
 Further, of the individuals with a specific target alleged, 67% were 
planning to attack targets overseas.
120
 Such exercise has largely taken place in the politically and 
emotionally-charged era following the events of 9/11, where concern for the due process of accused 
persons was unlikely to attract a great deal of public sympathy.  
Guantanamo Bay Naval Base in Cuba 
In the context of extraterritorial activity by the United States, the military prisons operated by the 
United States in the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base in Cuba and the use of military commissions to 
try terrorism offences, should at least be acknowledged.  The Guantanamo Bay prison was 
established in January 2002 in the aftermath of the events of 9/11.
121
 Detainees captured, primarily 
in Afghanistan, but also from other places, were transported to the prison for interrogation, 
prosecution and detention.
122
  Reportedly, Guantanamo Bay was chosen because it was outside the 
territory of the United States, and this was thought to remove the inmates from any legal protections 
available in the United States.
123
 Robert Wagstaff has observed that:  
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Such military commissions as were implemented in Guantanamo were conducted in secret with 
secret evidence and secret witnesses. There was no appeal to any civilian court. There was no choice 
of counsel. Communication was restricted. Bush was to be the final decider.
124
 
In Hamdan v Rumsfield,
125
 however, the Supreme Court found that the military commissions lacked 
power to proceed because their structures and procedures violated the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice and the four Geneva Conventions signed in 1949.
126
  Since then, the United States 
administration has vacillated over decisions whether to prosecute terrorism offences in Article III 
courts or before military commissions.
127
  The detention and treatment of suspects in military 
prisons and the role of military commissions has been highly controversial and gives rise to serious 
human rights concerns, including allegations of torture.
128
  Johan Steyn has stated that the persons 
detained in Guantanamo Bay were ‗beyond the rule of law, beyond the protection of any courts‘,129 
and that the situation was a ‗legal black hole‘.130 Much has been written on this.131 As Solow has 
suggested, ‗despite all the attention that has been paid toward military commissions, the real 
adjudicative action vis-à-vis foreign terrorists since 9/11 has been in Article III courts‘. 132 Solow 
refers to data indicating that, as at 2011, the military commissions had reached convictions in only 6 
cases, whereas there have been at least 150 convictions of serious terrorism offences in Article III 
courts.
133
 Therefore, for present purposes, this analysis focuses on the regulation of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction by Article III courts, rather than by military commissions.
134
 In particular, three 
decisions are considered, United States v Al Kassar,
135
 United States v Warsame,
136
 and Hamdi v 
Rumsfeld.
137
 These decisions were chosen because they all concern exercises of jurisdiction over 
extraterritorial activities that gave rise to liability for terrorism or terrorism-related offences, took 
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place after the events of 9/11, and all are relatively recent, in that they were handed down between 
2004-2008.  
In United States v Al Kassar,
138
 three foreign nationals were charged with conspiracy to murder, 
money laundering and the provision of material support for terrorism. The federal government 
alleged that the three accused helped broker an arms deal with an undercover agent pretending to 
represent a Columbian group that had been classified as a foreign terrorist organisation by the 
United States. The alleged conduct took place in Lebanon, Spain and Columbia, but not in the 
United States. The United States justified this assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction on the basis 
that the weapons brokered could be used to harm American nationals in Columbia. This, then, was 
jurisdiction asserted on the basis of a hypothetical scenario. The accused persons filed a motion to 
dismiss. The motion was denied and the case was sent to trial.  Solow suggests that there were 
serious due process concerns that were not resolved by the court in denying the motions to dismiss. 
She has observed: 
As per the United States‘ description of the facts, [the accused] … were far removed from the 
commission of violence: they worked for a weapons seller, not for any terrorist group; they were 
functionaries and aides to Al Kassar, not persons with authority to broker a deal; and they were not 
shown to harbour personal animosity towards the United States. Judge Rackoff sent both cases to 
trial, but he never discussed why, from a due process perspective, it was fundamentally fair to hold 
these two foreigners responsible under American criminal law when, according to the governments 
own indictments, they were so many steps removed from the commission of violence against 
Americans.
139
 
Solow continues on: 
In short, [two of the accused] … lived in foreign countries and did not look to the United States legal 
system as the source of rules to govern their primary conduct.  Thus, what level of activity and what 
level of mens rea, with respect to harming Americans, is needed to make jurisdiction fair?
140 
What is alluded to here is the lack of certainty or ‗notice‘ of the applicability of foreign laws to 
these accused persons. In the case of a direct terrorist attack against a State, it is likely that an 
individual would know, or at least suspect, that the attacked State is likely to take some form of 
legal action against them. For persons who are not directly connected to such acts, and whose 
conduct falls in the broad notion of ‗material support‘, the extraterritorial reach of foreign laws 
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might be less foreseeable. This has implications for the rule of law analysis, as will be discussed 
further below.  
The decision in United States v Warsame,
141
 also did not consider the due process aspects of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction. In that case, Mr Warsame, a Canadian citizen, was charged by the 
United States with the provision of ‗material support‘ for terrorism. Specifically, Mr Warsame had 
provided English lessons in an Al Qeada clinic in Afghanistan, so as to assist nurses in reading 
English medicine labels, and had also sent money to an Al Qaeda member to repay a loan. Mr 
Warsame filed a motion to dismiss on the basis that the provision of medical training and the 
loaning of money was constitutionally protected by first amendment of the United States 
Constitution.
142
 The motion was dismissed. Mr Warsame did not argue against his prosecution on a 
jurisdictional or due process basis. As Sollows states, this raises serious questions. For example: 
Should a Canadian citizen like Warsame be expected to comply with United States law over and 
above Canadian law assuming that the former bans English training to nurses at Al Qaeda camps by 
the latter does not? Given that Warsame‘s direct activities did not involve any likelihood of causing 
imminent harm to Americans, why should a person in his situation expect that he might be punished 
in an American court and limit his conduct accordingly?
143
 
These concerns are much the same as those raised in relation to Al Kassar, in that the assertion of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction by the United States could not be reasonably anticipated by either 
accused. This lack of reasonable anticipation in turn could be said to result in a lack of due process, 
because the accused could not have been ‗on notice‘ of the extraterritorial interests and reach of the 
United States, a State with which the accused had little or no connection.  
In the decision in Hamdi v Rumsfeld,
144
 the accused, Mr Hamdi, was a citizen of the United States 
who had been classified as an ‗enemy combatant‘ as a result of his alleged extraterritorial activities 
in Afghanistan. In 2001, Mr Hamdi went to Afghanistan, traveling on his own for the first time. He 
claimed to have been doing relief work for less than two months before being captured by Afghan 
forces. He was then turned over to American military authorities, at which point he was detained in 
the United States, initially in Guantanamo Bay, and then subsequently at a naval facility.  
 
The question before the Court was whether, in the context of a resolution in which Congress 
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authorized the President to ‗use all necessary and appropriate force … in order to prevent any future 
acts of international terrorism against the United States,
145
 an American citizen could challenge 
their detention as an ‗enemy combatant‘. The government argued that Hamdi‘s status as an enemy 
combatant justified holding him in the United States indefinitely without formal charges or 
proceedings.
146
 There was no single majority decision. Justice O‘Connor announced the judgment 
of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which three other judges, including the Chief Justice, 
joined. In that judgment, it was held that: 
[A]lthough Congress authorized the detention of combatants in the narrow circumstances alleged here, 
due process demands that a citizen held in the United States as an enemy combatant be given a 
meaningful opportunity to contest the factual basis for that detention before a neutral decision maker.
147
 
 
Therefore, a United States citizen would appear to have the right to challenge a determination made 
by the executive branch of government as to their status as an enemy combatant, and therefore, to 
their continued detention as such. The Court declined to find whether a non-citizen ought to be 
given the same opportunity. For example, the Court stated:  
The threshold question before us is whether the Executive has the authority to detain citizens who 
qualify as ‗enemy combatants.‘ There is some debate as to the proper scope of this term, and the 
Government has never provided any court with the full criteria that it uses in classifying individuals as 
such. It has made clear, however, that, for purposes of this case, the ‗enemy combatant‘ that it is seeking 
to detain is an individual who, it alleges, was ‗part of or supporting forces hostile to the United States or 
coalition partners‘ in Afghanistan and who ‗engaged in an armed conflict against the United States‘ 
there. We therefore answer only the narrow question before us: whether the detention of citizens falling 
within that definition is authorized.
148
 
 
Notably, in the same year as Hamdi, the Supreme Court also delivered its judgment in Rasul v 
Bush.
149
 The petitioners in Rasul were two Australians and twelve Kuwatis held in Guantanamo 
Bay who sought to review the legality of their imprisonment.
150
 This decision will be further 
considered below in relation to the third criterion of the chosen conception of the rule of law, that 
there must be some capacity for judicial review of executive action and the Executive arm of 
government should be subject to the law and any action undertaken by the Executive should be 
authorised by law.  
                                               
145
 Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub L No 107-40, 115 Stat 224 ( 2001).  
146
 Hamdi v Rumsfeld 542 US 507 (2004). 
147
 See Ibid (O‘Connor, Kennedy, Breyer JJ and Rehnquist CJ). 
148
 Ibid. 
149
 542 US 466 (2004). 
150
 Kermit Roosevelt III, ‗Application of the Constitution to Guantanamo Bay‘ (2005) 153 University of Pennsylvania 
Law Review 2017, 2019. 
171 
 
 
This section has considered examples of the regulation of extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction by 
courts in the United States. First, the acceptance in the United States of the passive personality 
principle, one of the more controversial and contested grounds of jurisdiction, was shown. Second, 
a description of the Ker-Frisbie and dual sovereignty doctrine was provided. In summary, those 
doctrines allow for pre-trial irregularities and multiple prosecutions of extraterritorial conduct that 
would not otherwise be tolerated in the prosecution of territorial conduct.  Finally, the 
extraterritorial reach of terrorism offences was considered. From Warsame and Al Kassar, it would 
appear that courts have not acknowledged the due process issues that might arise out of assertions 
of extraterritorial jurisdiction over conduct not directly connected with terrorist attacks on the 
United States or United States citizens. From Hamdi, however, it is clear that the courts are still, at 
least to some extent, willing to review the actions of the executive branch of government, at least 
for citizens of the United States.  
 
The relationship between international law and judicial consideration in the United States is now 
considered.  
 
4. United States Courts and International Law 
The relationship between United States courts and international law is quite different as between 
customary international law and treaty law. For example, under Article VI of the United States 
Constitution ‗all treaties‘ made ‗under the authority of the US, shall be the supreme law of the 
land‘.  Some such treaties are self-executing. As noted by Michael Garcia: 
Self-executing treaties have a status equal to federal statute, superior to U.S. state law, and inferior 
to the Constitution. Depending upon the nature of executive agreements, they may or may not have a 
status equal to federal statute. In any case, self-executing executive agreements have a status that is 
superior to U.S. state law and inferior to the Constitution. Treaties or executive agreements that are 
not self-executing have been understood by the courts to have limited status domestically; rather, the 
legislation or regulations implementing these agreements are controlling. 
151
 
 
While non-self executing treaties do not bind courts in matters of municipal law, early courts were 
willing to consider customary international law as part of the law of the United States. For example, 
in a decision of the Supreme Court in 1804, Chief Justice Marshall held that, ‗an act of Congress 
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ought never be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains‘.152 
In 1900, Justice Gray went even further and pronounced that: 
International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice 
of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right depending on it are duly presented for their 
determination.
153
 
 
Perhaps for these reasons, Harold Koh has described the early Supreme Court as seeing ‗the judicial 
branch as a central channel for making international law part of U.S. law‘.154 In his view, this was 
because the ‗global legitimacy of a fledgling nation crucially depended upon the compatibility of its 
domestic law with the rules of the international system within which it sought acceptance‘.155 
Customary international law has been described as part of the body of ‗federal common law‘.156 
Further, according to the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, 
customary international law has the status of a federal law, and will override inconsistent state 
laws.
157
 As Louis Henkin has observed:  
It is not that international law is superior to an act of Congress; in U.S. law, this is not true. But 
customary law is ‗self-executing‘, and like a self-executing treaty it is equal in authority to an act of 
Congress for domestic purposes.
158
  
 
In any event, even if customary international law has the status of common law, statute law is 
superior to common law and the United States Constitution is superior to both the common law and 
to statute law. So, in the context of regulating exercises of extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction in the 
context of due process rights, which will be discussed further below, the relevant issue is really to 
what extent the American courts are willing to draw upon international law in order to interpret the 
United States Constitution. In the decision of the Supreme Court in Yunis,
159
 in 1991, the Court 
appeared reticent in its approach to international law, at least more so than in 1900. The Court in 
Yunis said that: 
Our duty is to enforce the Constitution, laws and treaties of the United States, not to conform the law of 
the land to norms of customary international law.‘160 
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The United States while having signed, ratified or acceded to a number international treaties, has 
also declined to sign a number of significant ones. For example, the United States has signed and 
ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
161
 and a number of treaties that 
either permit or oblige assertions of extraterritoriality, such as the United Nations Convention on 
Transnational Organised Crime,
162
 and the supplementary protocols,
163
 the Convention against 
Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
164
 the International 
Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombing,
165
 the International Convention for the 
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism
,166
  the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees.
167
 
The United States, however, withdrew its signature of the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court,
168
 and has signed, but failed to ratify a number of other significant treaties. For 
example, the United States has not ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child.
169
 the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
170
 and the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women.
171
   
 
With occasional exceptions, United States practice, however, is generally consistent with these 
treaties. Nonetheless, in the view of Human Rights Watch:  
                                               
161
 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171 
(entered into force 23 March 1976), art 49. 
162
 United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, opened for signature 15 November 2000, 2225 
UNTS 209 (entered into force 29 September 2003). 
163
 Protocol to Prevent, Supress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, opened for 
signature 15 November 2000, 2237 UNTS 319 (entered into force 25 December 2003); Protocol against the Smuggling 
of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, opened for signature 15 November 2000, 2241 UNTS 507 (entered into force 28 
January 2004). 
164
 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, opened for signature 
10 December 1984, 1465 UNTS 85 (entered into force 26 June 1984). 
165
 International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, opened for signature 15 December 1997, 2149 
UNTS 256 (entered into force 23 May 2001). 
166
 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, opened for signature 9 December 1999, 
2178 UNTS 197 (entered into force 10 April 2002). 
167
 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature 28 July 1951, 189 UNTS 150 (entered into force 
22 April 1954). 
168
 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, opened for signature 17 July 1998, 2187 UNTS 3 (entered into 
force 1 July 2002). 
169
 Convention on the Rights of a Child, opened for signature 20 November 1987, 1577 UNTS 3 (entered into force 2 
September 1990). For ratification status, see United Nations Treaty Collection, Treaty Participation Search 
<https://treaties.un.org/Pages/TreatyParticipantSearch.aspx?tab=UN>. 
170
 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, 993 
UNTS 3 (entered into force 3 January 1976).  
171
 Convention of the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, opened for signature 18 December 
1979, 1249 UNTS 13 (entered into force 3 September 1981). 
174 
 
The failure of the US to join with other nations in taking on international human rights legal 
obligations has undercut its international leadership on key issues, limiting its influence, its stature, 
and its credibility in promoting respect for human rights around the world.‘172 
 
While United States courts have traditionally taken a progressive and complementary approach to 
international law, some recent decisions, and the failure to ratify a number of significant treaties, 
signals a contemporary reticence towards international law. Such an approach is at odds with 
historical attitudes in the United States to international law. As Harold Koh has argued:  
[T]hose who advocate the use of international law in U.S. constitutional interpretation are not mere 
‗international majoritarians‘ who believe that American constitutional liberties should be determined 
by a world-wide vote. Rather, transnationalists suggest that particular provisions of our Constitution 
should be construed with decent respect for international and foreign comparative law. When 
phrases like ‗due process of law‘, ‗equal protection‘, and ‗cruel and unusual punishments‘ are 
illuminated by parallel rules, empirical evidence, or community standards found in other mature 
legal systems, that evidence should not simply be ignored. Wise American judges did not do so at 
the beginning of the Republic, and there is no warrant for them to start now.
173
 
 
Not all scholars, however, would agree with the importance of international law in American legal 
development. For example, Jack Goldsmith and Eric Posner argue that, ‗[i]nternational law is a real 
phenomenon, but international law scholars exaggerate its power and significance‘,174 and that 
‗much of customary international law is simply coincidence of interest‘.175   
 
5. United States Courts and the Abuse of Rights Doctrine 
Unlike Australia, the United States Constitution expressly guarantees due process rights.  As noted 
at the outset of this Chapter, the fourteenth amendment includes a guarantee that: 
[n]o state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens 
of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
176   
This is arguably analogous to an ‗abuse of rights‘ doctrine in the sense that the guarantee of due 
process operates as a restraint on the right of a government to deprive any person of their life, 
liberty or property. In a constitutional sense, a government that exercises such a right without giving 
due process has abused its right. There is a rich body of judicial analysis and literature on due 
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process rights in the United States. However, the ‗Ker Frisbie‘ and ‗Dual Sovereignty‘ doctrines set 
out above indicate that notions of due process are not given the same status or weight when it comes 
to the deprivation of life, liberty or property extraterritorially, and/or for extraterritorial conduct. 
This is consistent with what Solow has described as a ‗lack of a due process test for regulating the 
extraterritorial application of United States criminal law‘,177 and the ‗impoverished nature of the 
due process doctrine‘,178 in the ‗large majority of cases involving extraterritorial crimes‘.179  
 
This absence is particularly so in the case of persons who are not citizens of the United States. In 
US v Verdugo-Urquidez,
180
 the United States obtained an arrest warrant for Mr Verdugo-Urquidez, 
a Mexican citizen and resident, whom it was believed had been involved in drug smuggling.  He 
was apprehended by Mexican police and transported to the United States, where he was arrested. 
Following his arrest, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agents, working with Mexican 
officials, searched his residences in Mexico and seized a number of documents. Mr Verdugo-
Urquidez applied to have the evidence suppressed on the basis that the Fourth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution,
181
 which protects ‗the people‘ against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, applied to the searches. The Supreme Court held that the fourth amendment does not apply 
to the search and seizure by United States agents of property owned by a nonresident alien and 
located in a foreign country.
182
  In the view of the Court, the drafting history of the fourth 
amendment indicates that that the use of the term ‗the people‘ was limited to the people of the 
United States, and the purpose of its enactment was to protect them against arbitrary action by their 
own government. The Court found that it was not intended to restrain the federal government's 
extraterritorial actions against non-citizens.
183
  
 
In a private law context, courts have insisted that in order for a non-citizen to be held legally 
accountable, he must have been given some ‗notice‘ of the legal consequences of his choice. For 
example, in International Shoe Company v Washington,
184
 the court was of the view that exercises 
of jurisdiction should be consistent with ‗traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice‘.185 
While persons who are in United States territory are considered to have ‗notice‘ of the laws of the 
country, where a person is not physically present, the courts will consider whether or not they have 
                                               
177
 Solow, above n 27, 1487. 
178
 Ibid. 
179
 Ibid. 
180
 494 US 259 (1990). 
181
 United States Constitution amend IV. 
182
 US v Verdugo-Urquidez 494 US 259 (1990), 264-75. 
183
 Ibid 266-8. 
184
 International Shoe Company v Washington (1945) 326 US 310. 
185
 Ibid 319. 
176 
 
a sufficient level of ‗minimum contact‘,186 or whether they sought to avail themselves of the benefit 
of a jurisdiction, and therefore should also be subject to the responsibilities put upon them by law. 
For example, in Hanson v Denckla,
187
 the court held that, in determining jurisdiction, the due 
process clause is satisfied if there is ‗some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of 
the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus involving the benefits and 
protections of its laws‘.188 In this way, courts have recognised a relationship between due process 
rights and jurisdiction. This is analogous to the abuse of rights doctrine in that an attempt by a 
government to assert private extraterritorial jurisdiction over a person in the absence of ‗minimum 
contact‘ or ‗purposeful availment‘ would be seen to be an ‗abuse‘ of the right to assert jurisdiction. 
Courts in the United States, however, seem to have confined this ‗jurisdictional architecture‘ to 
private law matters. Consideration of due process and jurisdiction for the purpose of extraterritorial 
criminal jurisdiction does not appear to have yet been taken up in any significant way. Nonetheless, 
the architecture for considering due process and ‗fairness‘ in the context of jurisdiction does exists, 
and therefore, the abuse of rights doctrine, may be a useful tool for courts in the United States to 
employ in the regulation of extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction.  
6. The Criteria of the Rule of Law  
Criterion 1: The law must be both readily known and available, and certain and clear 
Some exercises of extraterritorial jurisdiction by the United States are not readily ‗knowable‘. The 
facts giving rise to the decisions in Warsame and in Al Kassar, as discussed above, illustrate this 
point. In Warsame, jurisdiction was asserted on the basis that the conduct in question was in some 
way connected to conduct that could hurt United States citizens overseas. The risk to United States 
citizens was hypothetical. The passive personality ground of jurisdiction is controversial enough in 
itself, albeit gaining wider acceptance. International law does not appear to permit it to be expanded 
to include hypotheticals. Therefore, such assertions are likely in excess of permitted bases of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction, and consequently, are not readily known and available, nor certain or 
clear. This is problematic because, as Solow suggests, before a foreigner is subject to ‗criminal 
jurisdiction in a United States court, we must be assured he was on notice‘.189 Of particular note in 
this context is that the majority of persons indicted for terrorism offences since 9/11 were not 
charged with conduct linked with a particular terrorist attack or target, but with less direct offences, 
such as the provision of material support to terrorist organisations.
190
 Direct acts of terrorism are so 
universally condemned that it could not be said that a person accused of extraterritorial acts of 
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terrorism was not ‗on notice‘ of the criminality of the conduct or of the interest of foreign countries 
in prosecuting such conduct. The same cannot necessarily be said, however, for the types of conduct 
that may constitute the provision of material support to a terrorist organisation. Consider, for 
example, a doctor in a foreign country who provides medical treatment, or a teacher who provides 
education, to members of a terrorist organisation. Involvement with the organisation may simply be 
a product of the society in which they practise their profession, and it may not always be anticipated 
that such conduct could bring them before the courts of a country to which they otherwise have no 
connection.  
Criterion 2: The law should be applied to all people equally, and operate uniformly in 
circumstances that are not materially different 
The continued existence of the Ker-Frisbie and dual sovereignty doctrines creates a system in which 
persons accused of extraterritorial crime are not treated equally to those accused of territorial crime. 
For example, irregularities in the extradition process will not require remedying and will not 
preclude prosecution as irregularities in domestic arrest procedures might. Further, regardless of 
whether a person has been prosecuted for the same conduct in another State, any relevant double-
jeopardy provisions will not apply in the same way as they would for a purely territorial 
prosecution. There are also inconsistencies between the way in which jurisdiction is assessed for 
private law matters and criminal law matters. Despite criminal law matters often presenting greater 
consequences for individual liberty, the regulation of extraterritorial jurisdiction in private law 
matters is far more evolved. To establish private law jurisdiction, a plaintiff much show ‗minimum 
contact‘ or ‗purposeful availment‘ by the respondent. This is not the case in criminal law 
prosecutions where the relationship between due process and criminal jurisdiction is often not 
addressed by the court at all. To be fair, criminal law and private law matters could be said to be 
materially different and therefore differential treatment is justified. However, given the personal 
vulnerability of a person accused of a criminal offence is often far greater than a person subject to a 
private law claim, the material difference would demand a stricter approach to extraterritorial 
criminal jurisdiction, than what is currently a less-prescriptive approach.  
Criterion 3: There must be some capacity for judicial review of executive action and the 
Executive arm of government should be subject to the law and any action undertaken by the 
Executive should be authorised by law.  
Notably, as mentioned above, in the same year as Hamdi, the Supreme Court also delivered its 
judgment in Rasul v Bush.
191
 This decision is relevant to criteria three because it raised questions of 
judicial review of executive decision-making. In particular, the petitioners challenged the executive 
branch of government‘s right to ‗designate individuals as enemy combatants and thereafter to hold 
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them indefinitely without judicial review or access to counsel.‘192 In that sense it raised similar 
issues to the decision in Hamdi, but instead, in this case, the petitioners were not nationals of the 
United States, but of other countries. The petitioners in Rasul were two Australians and twelve 
Kuwatis held in Guantanamo Bay who sought to review the legality of their imprisonment.
193
 All 
had been captured in either Afghanistan or Pakistan and turned over to American forces, but argued 
that they had been engaged in innocent activities, such as the provision of humanitarian aid, visiting 
relatives or in arranging marriages.
194
  
 
Ultimately, the Court rejected the argument of the executive and found that the judiciary did in fact 
have jurisdiction to consider the imprisonment of foreign national in Guantanamo Bay. However, 
the Court did not go so far as to expressly find that due process rights apply extraterritorially, but 
instead, avoided that question and simply found that the petitioners fell within the mandate of the 
habeas corpus legislation. It was, in fact, simply a modest exercise in statutory construction, albeit a 
significant one. Kermit Roosevelt has observed that this ‗allowed the Court to reject the Executive‘s 
claim of unreviewable authority without taking any more dramatic steps, such as… announcing that 
Guantanamo detainees possessed constitutional rights‘.195  While this cautious approach is 
understandable in what has been a climate of heightened nationalism and political sensitivities in 
the post 9/11 era, it is nonetheless problematic. As Gerald Neuman has suggested:  
The question of extraterritorial rights remains important after Rasul, both within and outside the 
context of counterterrorism efforts. If the government blundered by bringing its captives to 
Guantanamo, it may rely more heavily in the future on other, more authentically extraterritorial 
venues for detention.
196
 
 
Therefore, it appears that ‗the search continues for a persuasive account of U.S. constitutionalism 
that responds adequately to the vastly increased overseas activity of the federal government‘.197 
Nonetheless, the decision in Rasul is still significant because ‗the scope of habeas jurisdiction may 
be hard to sever from the scope of the underlying substantive rights that habeas is meant to 
protect‘,198 and, therefore, the argument that constitutional rights can apply extraterritorially is not 
an entirely untenable proposition. Kermit Roosevelt has suggested that, other than the rebuttable 
presumption against extraterritorially generally accepted by United States courts in interpreting 
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legislation, there is no actual textual reason to prevent rights in the Constitution applying 
extraterritorially, and to foreign nationals. For example, he has argued:  
The Fifth Amendment‘s Due Process Clause, like the habeas statute, makes no mention of 
citizenship or geography. The straightforward textualist methodology the Court employed with the 
statute would suggest a similar conclusion: the protections of the Due Process Clause extend to any 
person alleging that the U.S. government has deprived him of liberty without due process of law. 
The words of the Constitution require nothing more.
199
 
Louis Henkin has also made this same point:  
The choice in the Bill of rights of the word ‗person‘ rather than ‗citizen‘ was not fortuitous; nor was 
the absence of geographical limitation. Both reflect a commitment to respect the individual rights of 
all human beings.
200
 
Further, as Roosevelt has argued:  
A rigidly territorial interpretation of the Constitution would ignore the effects of economic 
globalisation, extraterritorial regulation and law enforcement, and delocalized information 
technology. At the same time advances in communications technology have greatly decreased the 
cost of accommodating extraterritorial rights claims.
201
  
 
Taking into account these lines of argument, if due process rights are capable of extraterritorial 
application to both citizens and foreign nationals, then there would be greater scope for judicial 
review of executive action in relation to the exercise of extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction. Given 
that ‗extraterritorial rights of foreign citizens presumptively arise only in contexts where the United 
States seeks to impose and enforce its own law‘,202 this is not particularly revolutionary or 
unreasonable. It is simply a matter of the regulation of extraterritorial activity keeping pace with its 
exercise. If this were the case, then the Ker-Frisbie and dual sovereignty doctrines would need to be 
over-ruled on the basis that they are inconsistent with constitutional guarantees of due process. In 
any event, courts in the United States, given their familiarity and rich body of jurisprudential history 
on due process and individual rights, may be able to make use of the abuse of rights doctrine in 
regulating assertions of extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction that would otherwise be inconsistent 
with due process rights. As set out above, courts in the United States are not necessarily unwilling 
to make use of international law, particularly customary international law, of which the abuse of 
rights doctrines could be said to be part.  
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7. Observations and Summary   
In summary, the United States has exercised broad extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction, relying not 
only on conventional and widely accepted grounds such as active nationality and protective 
principle jurisdiction, but also on controversial bases such as the passive personality principle, even 
where the impact on United States nationals is hypothetical. This is problematic under the chosen 
rule of law framework because such assertions mean that the laws of the United States are not 
always certain of being readily known in their application. Further, the continued acceptance of 
doctrines such as the Ker-Frisbie and dual sovereignty doctrines means that constitutional 
protections do not apply equally to persons accused of extraterritorial offences as to persons 
accused of territorial offences, despite the fact that both are enforced in United States courts.  
 
Notwithstanding these inconsistencies with the rule of law in the regulation of extraterritorial 
criminal jurisdiction, the United States has a sophisticated and well-established body of due process 
jurisprudence. Such jurisprudence is analogous to the abuse of rights doctrine in that the rights of 
the executive are abused if such rights are exercised in a way that is contrary to requirements of due 
process.  In this way, there is a relationship between due process and jurisdiction. Although this 
same approach has not necessarily been taken in the regulation of extraterritorial jurisdiction in a 
criminal law context, there is no reason why that could not be the case. It is a matter of the 
regulation of extraterritorial activity keeping pace with its exercise. The jurisdictional architecture is 
all there, and decisions by the Supreme Court in cases such as Hamdi, Rasul and Hamdan all 
indicate that the judiciary is both willing and capable of holding the executive to account. 
Ultimately, as Koh has argued,  ‗domestic courts must play a role in coordinating U.S. domestic 
constitutional rules with rules of foreign and international law, not simply to promote American 
aims, but to advance the broader development of a well-functioning international judicial 
system‘.203 
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CHAPTER SEVEN:  CONCLUSIONS 
This final concluding Chapter draws on the previous six Chapters, particularly Chapters Four, Five 
and Six, to present three tiers of conclusions. The first tier presents conclusions as to the regulation 
of extraterritorial jurisdiction by Australia, India and United States, respectively. The second tier 
relates to conclusions about the regulation of extraterritorial jurisdiction in common-law 
jurisdictions. The third tier identifies contributions this thesis makes to the broader dialogue on 
extraterritorial jurisdiction. In closing, specific responses are given to the particular research 
questions posed in Chapter One and some short final remarks are made. 
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1. Introduction 
In the course of deciding the Arrest Warrant Case,
1
 Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal 
observed that, ‗a state may exercise the criminal jurisdiction which it has under international law, 
but in doing so it is subject to other legal obligations‘.2  In essence, this thesis has sought to 
consider what some of those ‗other legal obligations‘ are, and the extent to which those obligations 
are adequate in regulating the relationship between a State and an individual in the exercise of 
extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction.  
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Chapter One observed that States are increasingly engaging in exercises of extraterritorial criminal 
jurisdiction. It was suggested that the regulation of extraterritoriality has not have kept pace with 
this increased engagement. A review of the literature revealed that although extraterritorial criminal 
jurisdiction may be a useful response to transnational crime, it is also controversial and, perhaps, 
inadequately regulated. The literature review also revealed that very little analysis has been 
undertaken on the adequacy of the ways in which jurisdiction is regulated in relation to the interests 
of individual persons, rather than the interests of States in relation to each other. Similarly, little or 
no attention has been given to the potential usefulness of the abuse of rights doctrine in regulating 
exercises of extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction and it is that gap that this thesis has sought to fill. 
 
Chapter Two then identified the grounds on which extraterritorial jurisdiction is permitted under 
international law. Examples of these grounds were given and the extent to which these grounds are 
generally accepted was considered. Some preliminary conclusions were presented. Specifically, it 
was suggested that an increased reliance by States on extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction may have 
the following consequences:  
 An accused person may be subject to multiple prosecutions for the same conduct, with no 
foreseeable end point;  
 Persons may be unable to know or ascertain each and every law in each and every state that 
may have grounds for jurisdiction over their conduct, creating legal uncertainty; and 
 Given that a country other than the country in which an offence occurred may assert 
jurisdiction and seek to prosecute, plea bargains and a government‘s promises of amnesties 
may be undermined. 
 
Chapter Three then introduced principles of jurisdictional restraint, such as comity, genuine 
connection and reasonableness. It also considered the role of international human rights law and 
other legal principles that may serve to restrain jurisdiction. These were non-interference, 
proportionality and the abuse of rights doctrine. The usefulness, or otherwise, of each of these 
principles in regulating the relationship between a state and an individual in exercises of 
extraterritoriality was considered. Chapter Three concluded that most of these principles are 
inadequate regulators of extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction because they are concerned primarily 
with the interests of States and not with individuals. International human rights law is useful to 
some extent, but not all human rights obligations apply extraterritorially, as can be seen in the 
protection against double jeopardy only applying within a State and not as between States. It is also 
of limited effectiveness in regulating exercises of jurisdiction that may give rise to legal uncertainty 
or lack a due process requirement, for example, but do not breach a specific human right.   
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The abuse of rights doctrine, however, does have potential as a useful tool in regulating 
extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction. Although traditionally understood at international law as 
regulating rights as between States, there is sufficient evidence that the doctrine, or analogous 
principles, is capable of application by municipal courts to the relationship between States and 
individuals. In any event, international law recognises the existence of individual rights.  There is a 
relationship between the rule of law and the abuse of rights doctrine.  As Helmut Aust has observed, 
the ‗prohibition of abuse of rights is frequently considered to be an essential element of the rule of 
law.‘3  As set out in Chapter One, for the purposes of this thesis the rule of law is taken to require 1) 
that the law must be both readily known and available, and certain and clear; 2) that the law should 
be applied to all people equally, and operate uniformly in circumstances which are not materially 
different; and 3) that there must be some capacity for judicial review of executive action.  
 
This relationship between the rule of law and the abuse of rights doctrine arises because of a 
common concern with regulating the manner in which power is exercised and in limiting discretion. 
It is not an exclusive relationship, and the content of the abuse of rights doctrine is not confined to 
this context, but nonetheless, there is a link.  The abuse of rights doctrine requires that any right that 
must be considered in the context of other rights, such as, for example, the right of States to 
exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction needs to be considered in the context of the right of persons and 
the expectation that power will be exercised in a manner consistent with the rule of law.  As noted 
in Chapter Three, Hersch Lauterpacht argued that ‗[t]here is no legal right, however well 
established, which could not, in some circumstances, be refused recognition on the ground that it 
has been abused‘.4 Similarly, Graham Taylor has suggested that the abuse of rights doctrine can be 
understood as an ‗omnibus term to describe certain ways of exercising a power which are legally 
reprehensible‘.5 The idea that abuse of rights doctrine may be ‗one possible technique to solve 
conflicts of colliding rights‘,6 is a view that has also been expressed by Helmut Aust. To that end, 
the abuse of rights doctrine is useful in the regulation of extraterritorial jurisdiction.  
 
In Chapters Four, Five and Six, this thesis considered examples of the regulation of extraterritorial 
criminal jurisdiction. In particular, examples of assertions of extraterritorial jurisdiction were 
identified, and judicial regulation of such assertions was considered. In so doing, conclusions were 
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drawn as to the relationship between municipal courts and international law and whether there was 
any evidence as to the use of principles analogous to the abuse of rights doctrine. The regulation of 
extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction was then assessed as against the three stated criteria of the 
chosen conception of the rule of law.  The findings in these chapters represent a statement about the 
law on extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction in Australia, India and the United States.  These findings 
are discussed below under the heading, ‗First Tier Conclusions: Extraterritorial Criminal 
Jurisdiction and Australia, India and the United States‘.  
 
Drawing on each of these six chapters, three tiers of conclusions are now presented. The first tier 
presents conclusions as to the regulation of extraterritorial jurisdiction by Australia, India and 
United States, respectively. The second tier relates to conclusions about the regulation of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction in common-law jurisdictions. The third tier identifies contributions this 
thesis makes to the broader debate on the international law of extraterritorial jurisdiction. In closing, 
specific responses are given to the particular research questions posed in Chapter 1, and some short 
final remarks are made.  
2. First Tier Conclusions: Extraterritorial Criminal Jurisdiction and Australia, India and 
the United States  
Chapters Four, Five and Six considered extraterritoriality in Australia, India and the United States. 
In so doing, examples of extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction were provided, and its regulation by 
courts was analysed. The relationship between those courts and international law was considered, so 
as to further assess the effectiveness of such regulation. Each of these chapters also considered 
whether there was any evidence of judicial application of the abuse of rights doctrine, or of any 
analogous legal principles. This was done to determine the relevance of the abuse of rights doctrine 
to the regulation of extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction by municipal courts. Finally, the regulation 
of extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction was assessed as against the three criteria of the chosen 
conception of the rule of law.  
2.1. Examples of exercises of extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction and regulation by 
courts 
Generally speaking, Australia has been quite conservative in exercising its jurisdiction 
extraterritorially. However, an examination of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) revealed four 
categories of prescriptive extraterritorial jurisdiction. Category D assertions are the broadest, and 
are an example of universal jurisdiction. Further, Australia‘s constitutional arrangements have been 
interpreted as providing the Commonwealth with a plenary power over matters geographically 
external to Australia. From this, it can be concluded that Australia‘s constitutional frameworks will 
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permit broad extraterritorial assertions. Unlike India, however, the High Court of Australia is not 
prohibited from striking down legislation on the basis that it applies extraterritorially.  
 
India‘s constitutional frameworks permit broad extraterritorial assertions. The Constitution of India 
expressly provides that a court cannot strike down legislation on the basis that it applies 
extraterritorially. Further, the Supreme Court of India has defined the extraterritorial scope of 
Parliament very broadly, and so as to include, ‗events, things, phenomena (however commonplace 
they may be), resources, actions or transactions, and the like – that occur, arise or exist or may be 
expected to do so‘, 7 when these would, ‗have, or are expected to have, some impact on, or effect in, 
or consequences for: (a) the territory of India; or (b) the interests of, welfare of, wellbeing of, or 
security of inhabitants of India, and Indians‘.8  From this, it can be concluded that India‘s 
constitutional frameworks will permit broad extraterritorial assertions, perhaps even more so than 
Australia. 
 
In practice, the United States has been the most active of the three States in exercising 
extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction, particularly in an enforcement and adjudicative context. The 
United States has relied not only on conventional and widely accepted grounds such as active 
nationality and protective principle jurisdiction, but also on controversial bases such as the passive 
personality principle, even where the impact on United States nationals is hypothetical. Of 
particular note is the offence of ‗material support‘ to terrorist organisations, which extends to all 
nationalities and in all places, provided that the person is brought to, or found, in the United States 
at some point after the event.   
 
In summary, the domestic constitutional arrangements in Australia, India and the United States all 
permit a broad exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction under their own domestic legal frameworks. 
Given that these domestic frameworks are so permissive in principle, courts need other ways of 
regulating the means by which jurisdiction is exercised, even where the ends may be otherwise 
justified. 
2.2. Relationship between Municipal Courts and International Law 
From the analysis in Chapter Four, it can be seen that the High Court of Australia has been 
unwilling to draw on international law in matters of constitutional interpretation. In Chapter Five, it 
became clear that the Supreme Court of India adopts a far more complementary approach to 
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international law than Australia, and has been willing to draw on international law in order to 
interpret the Constitution, particularly in the contexts of individual rights. In Chapter Six, it was 
seen that the Supreme Court of the United States, particularly in its early days, adopted an inclusive 
approach to customary international law, but appears, notwithstanding Article VI of the 
Constitution, to have been more reticent to incorporate treaty law in the absence of domestic 
legislation. In recent times, if the decision in Yunis is any indication, the United States now takes a 
more conservative approach to international law. There is much to be said for a complementary and 
inclusive approach to international law by municipal court because ‗compliance with international 
law has in itself has become a key requirement of the rule of law as it applies at the domestic 
level‘.9 It would also provide courts with a greater repertoire in regulating extraterritorial criminal 
jurisdiction and in protecting the rights of individuals.  
2.3. Relationship between Municipal Courts and the Abuse of Rights Doctrine 
Australian courts have engaged with principles analogous to the abuse of rights doctrine. For 
example, the High Court has been prepared to subject the rights of the state to a requirement that 
prosecutions not constitute an abuse of process or that a trial is not fundamentally void of ‗fairness‘. 
India also has analogous principles, although, due to the existence of a number of entrenched rights 
in the Constitution, there are more ways in which the government may abuse its rights. For 
example, courts in India have been prepared to find that sovereign immunity does not apply if the 
sovereign is abusing fundamental rights. The Supreme Court of India has also been prepared to 
accept the existence of due-process-type rights. Therefore, it can be argued that an abuse of rights 
doctrine is more sophisticated in India than in Australia, and that, in theory, it may offer individuals 
some protection of their substantive and procedural rights if accused of an extraterritorial offence. 
The United States has a sophisticated and well-established body of due process jurisprudence. Such 
jurisprudence is analogous to the abuse of rights doctrine in that the rights of the executive are 
abused if such rights are exercised in a way that is contrary to requirements of due process. In this 
way, there is a relationship between due process and jurisdiction. Although this same approach has 
not necessarily been taken in the regulation of extraterritorial jurisdiction in a criminal law context, 
there is no reason why it could not be the case. However, the existence of the Ker-Frisbie and dual 
sovereignty doctrines are problematic and, in effect, abrogate due process rights. The doctrines are 
an obstacle to the effective operation of the abuse of rights doctrine, and should therefore be held 
subject to its application.  
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2.4. Assessment of the regulation of extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction as against the 
three criteria of the chosen conception of the rule of law  
The regulation of extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction in Australia, India and the United States was 
assessed as against the three chosen criteria, which are that 1) the law must be both readily known 
and available and certain and clear, 2) the law should be applied to all people equally and operate 
uniformly in circumstances that are not materially different, and 3) that there must be some capacity 
for judicial review of executive action and the executive arm of government should be subject to the 
law.   
 
Generally speaking, as to the first criteria, that the law must be both readily known and available 
and certain and clear, laws in Australia with extraterritorial reach are ‗knowable‘. In relation to the 
second criteria, that the law should be applied to all people equally and operate uniformly in 
circumstances that are not materially different, extraterritorial offences are applied in much the 
same way as territorial offences. Some offences, however, relating to the ‗provision of support‘ to 
people smuggling ventures or ancillary terrorism offences are possibly too vague and uncertain in 
their application to meet the first criteria.  As to the third criteria, the Australian executive and the 
parliament are capable of being held to account by the courts to some extent. For example, if there 
is an abuse of process or if the executive or parliament act in such a way as to undermine 
institutional integrity or public confidence in the courts, then the courts may intervene. By way of 
example, the High Court in Moti v The Queen,
10
 stated it would require that the principles of double 
jeopardy and speciality ordinarily apply, that the process of the court are used fairly by the state and 
citizen in order to protect public confidence. The absence of a bill of rights, however, means that the 
courts are limited in the extent to which they can protect individual rights, either under international 
law or municipal law. Therefore, it can be argued that while an abuse of process doctrine could be 
used in Australia and does offer individuals accused of an extraterritorial offence some protection; 
substantive rights can still be abrogated by legislation.  
 
The result of the analysis of the regulation of extraterritorial jurisdiction in India as against the three 
criteria of the rule of law was that each is generally met, but there were some possible issues and 
gaps. For example, in the context of the first criterion, that the law must be certain and capable of 
being known, the courts have adopted a potentially very broad conception of extraterritoriality, one 
that most resembled the effects doctrine. This makes exercises uncertain and it is difficult for an 
individual extraterritorially to always be ‗on notice‘ as to the applicability of Indian law.  Further, as 
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to criterion two, the requirement that the law apply equally to all persons, while the courts have also 
held that the principle of equality is an essential part of India‘s constitutional frameworks, it is not 
clear whether the constitutional protection against double jeopardy would also apply to persons who 
had been prosecuted for offences outside India or whether, like the guarantee in the ICCPR, it 
simply applies within India. Finally, as for criterion three, that executive action is subject to judicial 
review, India has an entrenched separation of powers, and a judiciary that has held judicial review 
to be an essential part of the constitutional frameworks. Therefore, India generally meets the 
criteria.  
       
The broad exercise of extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction by the United States, in the case of 
‗material support‘ for terrorism, for example, is problematic because the laws of the United States 
are not always certain of being readily known by persons acting extraterritorially. Further, the 
continued acceptance of the Ker-Frisbie and dual sovereignty doctrines means that constitutional 
protections do not apply equally to persons accused of extraterritorial offences compared to persons 
accused of territorial offences, despite the fact that both are enforced in United States courts. 
However, the jurisdictional architecture is there to allow for judicial review of executive action. 
Decisions by the Supreme Court in cases such as Hamdi, Rasul and Hamdan all indicate that the 
judiciary is both willing and capable of holding the executive to account, and so, while the first and 
second criteria are not met, the third category is generally satisfied.  
 
In summary, the abuse of rights doctrine is capable of judicial application in the regulation of 
extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction in Australia, India and the United States.  
 
3. Second Tier Conclusions: Extraterritorial Criminal Jurisdiction in the Common-Law 
World 
This thesis considered the exercise and regulation of extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction by 
Australia, India and the United States. As all three states are common-law systems, there are some 
conclusions to be drawn that may contribute to the dialogue on extraterritoriality in the common-
law world more generally. In particular, this thesis revealed that while the ‗abuse of rights‘ doctrine 
is better known in civil-law States, it is lesser known in common-law systems. There are, however, 
analogous legal concepts. For example, in Australia, the tort of abuse of process has been described 
as ‗the clearest illustration in Australian law of what civil lawyers call an ―abuse of right‖‘,11 and 
due process jurisprudence in India and the United States is essentially preoccupied with the same 
                                               
11
 J G Fleming, The Law of Torts (The Law Book Company, 8
th
 ed, 1992) 623. 
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ideas as the abuse of process doctrine. While there may be no doctrine entitled ‗abuse of rights‘ in 
common-law countries, the concept is inherent in a variety of common law and equitable 
principles.
12
 As early as the 1930s, Harold Gutteridge advanced the argument that the common law 
should recognise an abuse of rights principle.
13
  Further, there is no reason why the abuse of rights 
doctrine cannot apply in the exercise of government power, as it does to the exercise of individual 
power. In essence, the right of a common-law state to prescribe, enforce and adjudicate 
extraterritorial criminal offences is not absolute. That right is relative to the rights of an individual 
and the expectation that the State will act in ways that are consistent with the rule of law.  
4. Third Tier Conclusions: Extraterritorial Criminal Jurisdiction in a Global Context 
There are a number of points made in the course of this thesis that may be relevant to the broader 
dialogue on extraterritoriality. First, it is also possible that decisions of national courts are not 
receiving adequate attention from international law scholars. It is clear from Chapters Four, Five 
and Six that national courts have a significant role to play in regulating the extraterritorial activities 
of nation States. It may be that more can be discovered about the actual application of international 
law principles of jurisdiction from national courts, than from international courts and tribunals.  
 
Second, as set out in Chapters One and Two, extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction is useful in 
seeking to regulate transnational crime, such as child-sex tourism, money-laundering, drug-
trafficking, trafficking in persons and the smuggling of migrants. These activities are not confined 
within territorial borders, and therefore, nor should the relevant legal frameworks. However, as Neil 
Boister observes, the system is ‗dominated by sovereignty…law enforcement and the objectification 
of individuals as criminals‘,14 and reliance on extraterritorial jurisdiction may have the following 
consequences:  
 An accused person may be subject to multiple prosecutions for the same conduct, with no 
foreseeable end point;  
 Persons may be unable to know or ascertain each and every law in each and every state that 
may have grounds for jurisdiction over their conduct, creating legal uncertainty; and 
 Given that a country other than the country in which an offence occurred may assert 
jurisdiction and seek to prosecute, plea bargains and a government‘s promises of amnesties 
may be undermined. 
 
                                               
12
 Rick Bigwood, ‗Throwing the Baby Out With the Bathwater? Four Questions on the Demise of Lawful-Act Duress in 
New South Wales‘ (2008) 27(2) The University of Queensland Law Journal 41, 65. 
13
 Harold (HC) Gutteridge, ‗Abuse of Rights‘ (1933-1935) 5 (1) Cambridge Law Journal 22, 25. 
14
 Neil Boister, ‗Transnational Criminal Law?‘ (2003) 14(5) European Journal of International Law 953, 959. 
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Third, the abuse of rights doctrine may be a useful tool in regulating the relationship between a 
state‘s jurisdictional rights and the rights of individuals. In turn, the abuse of rights doctrine and the 
rule of law share a relationship of interconnectedness. Both are concerned with constraints on the 
exercise of power. The rule of law is generally concerned with certainty, equality, and judicial 
review of executive action. This thesis suggests that a state that asserts extraterritorial criminal 
jurisdiction in such a way as to deprive an individual of legal certainty, equality before the law, or 
so as to preclude judicial review, is a state that abuses its jurisdictional rights. In that way, it may be 
that an ‗abuse of jurisdictional rights‘ or ‗abuse of jurisdiction‘ doctrine can emerge as a regulator 
of extraterritoriality. Nonetheless, it is conceded that even if the doctrine can compensate for an 
accountability gap in the regulation of extraterritorial jurisdiction, it will still not compensate for 
any illegitimacy in the content of the law. Therefore, extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction ought only 
be exercised over crimes that are the subject of international treaties or customary international law.   
 
 
5. Specific Responses to Research Questions posed in Chapter One 
The answers to the research questions posed in Chapter One can be found throughout the thesis and 
are set out above. However, by way of summary, the responses are set out briefly below.   
 
Research Question 1: What are the principles of jurisdiction under international law? 
Answer: Under customary international law, States are entitled to exercise jurisdiction on three 
main bases: territoriality, nationality, and universality. Put simply, the nationality principle can 
provide a state with grounds for jurisdiction where a national is either a victim (passive nationality) 
or a perpetrator (active nationality). The territoriality principle may be invoked where conduct 
either takes place within a nation‘s borders (subjective territoriality), or the effects of the conduct 
are felt within the borders (objective territoriality). The universality principle is reserved for 
conduct constituting an international crime, such as piracy, genocide and crimes against humanity. 
International law also recognises a ‗protective principle‘, wherein a state can assert jurisdiction over 
foreign conduct that threatens national security.  There is also some support for an ‗effects 
principle‘, which gives jurisdiction over extraterritorial conduct, the effects of which are felt by a 
state.  
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Research Question 2: What are the restraints on jurisdiction under international law? Are 
these restraints adequate? 
Answer: Principles of jurisdictional restraint include comity, the need for a ‗genuine connection‘ 
and requirements of ‗reasonableness‘ in claiming jurisdiction. Generally speaking, these principles 
are concerned with rights as between States and not with the rights of individuals. This makes them 
inadequate regulators of extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction. International human rights law is 
useful to some extent, but not all human rights obligations apply extraterritorially, as can be seen in 
the protection against double jeopardy only applying within a State and not as between States. It is 
also of limited effectiveness in regulating exercises of jurisdiction that may give rise to legal 
uncertainty or lack a due process requirement analysis, for example, but do not breach a specific 
human right.   There are other legal principles that might potentially restrict assertions of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction, such as non-interference, proportionality, and the abuse of rights 
doctrine. In particular, the abuse of rights doctrine has potential as a useful tool in regulating 
extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction because it provides a means by which courts can measure the 
right of a State to exercise extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction as against even a minimalist 
conception of the rule of law.  
 
Research Question 3: How are assertions of extraterritorial jurisdiction regulated in 
Australia, India and the United States?  
Answer: The constitutional frameworks in Australia, India and the United States all permit broad 
assertions of extraterritoriality. Generally speaking, the courts are not in a position to regulate 
extraterritorial jurisdiction on the basis that it exceeds one of the recognised grounds set out in 
Chapter Two. In any event, with the exception of India, which adopts a complementary approach to 
international law, courts in the United States, and even more so in Australia, are reticent in applying 
international law to matters of constitutional interpretation. Courts in each do regulate the means by 
which jurisdiction is exercised using domestic law and principles analogous to the abuse of rights 
doctrine, such as due process rights or ‗abuse of process‘ doctrines. Generally speaking, Indian 
courts are generally better placed to do this than courts in Australia and the United States, because 
Australia does not have an entrenched bill of rights, and because the Ker-Frisbie and dual 
sovereignty doctrines continue to be accepted in the United States. Nonetheless, there is a genuine 
capacity for judicial review in each of the three States, and therefore, the abuse of rights doctrine 
may be of use to courts in regulating extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction.  
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Research Question 4: What contribution can an analysis of extraterritorial jurisdiction in 
Australia, India and the United States make to the broader discussion and debate on 
extraterritoriality? 
Answer: The exercise and regulation of extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction in Australia, India and 
the United States indicates that while municipal courts might be unwilling to restrain extraterritorial 
jurisdiction as a matter of principle, there is scope for municipal courts to regulate the means by 
which individuals accused of extraterritorial crimes are brought before municipal courts. Further, 
the application by courts in Australia, India and the United States of principles analogous to the 
abuse of rights doctrine indicates that the doctrine may be useful in the regulation of extraterritorial 
criminal jurisdiction. This is because the right of a State to exercise criminal jurisdiction is modified 
by the rights of an individual and the expectation that power will be exercised in a way that is 
consistent with even a minimalist conception of the rule of law. In short, the abuse of rights doctrine 
could be a useful tool in the regulation of exercises of extraterritorial jurisdiction.  
 
6. Final remarks  
Exercises of extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction can be useful in seeking to achieve some ends, 
such as the regulation of transnational crimes. As has been observed in relation to the United States 
Constitution, however,  
[i]f we do cherish constitutional freedoms, if we do think that constitutional rights are, in some 
normative sense, right, it is surprising that the accident of geography should control the ability to 
invoke them. Why should a governmental action repugnant to our deepest values become anodyne 
merely because it occurs outside our borders?
15
 
 
This point, although made in relation to the United States, has broader relevance. It is simply a 
matter of the regulation of extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction keeping pace with its exercise. There 
must be accountability in extraterritoriality. Principles of jurisdiction under both international and 
municipal law are generally permissive. Therefore, the means by which jurisdiction is exercised 
must be capable of adequate regulation. The abuse of rights doctrine may be useful in such 
regulation and could result in the emergence of a specialist ‗abuse of jurisdictional rights‘ doctrine.  
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